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46 changed files with 2990 additions and 676 deletions
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@ -411,6 +411,9 @@
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## - "biometrics-sdk-ipc": Enable biometric unlock over the SDK IPC framework (Desktop >= 2026.9.0, Browser >= 2026.9.0)
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## - "biometrics-sdk-ipc": Enable biometric unlock over the SDK IPC framework (Desktop >= 2026.9.0, Browser >= 2026.9.0)
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## - "windows-native-credential-sync": Register the desktop app as a passkey provider in Windows, so passkeys in the vault can be used by other apps and browsers.
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## - "windows-native-credential-sync": Register the desktop app as a passkey provider in Windows, so passkeys in the vault can be used by other apps and browsers.
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## Requires the Microsoft Store (appx) build of the desktop app. Stable releases up to and including 2026.9.1 lack the required plugin registration, so it has no effect there yet.
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## Requires the Microsoft Store (appx) build of the desktop app. Stable releases up to and including 2026.9.1 lack the required plugin registration, so it has no effect there yet.
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## - "pm-27278-v2-password-registration": Register new accounts with v2 encryption. (Web >= 2026.6.4, Desktop/Browser/CLI >= 2026.7.0, Android >= 2026.4.1, iOS >= 2026.5.1)
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## - "enable-account-encryption-v2-jit-password-registration": Give SSO users who set their master password on their first login v2 encryption. (Web >= 2026.1.1, Desktop/Browser/CLI >= 2026.1.0, Android >= 2026.4.1, iOS >= 2026.6.0)
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## These two flags can't be undone: a v2 account stays v2, and it can only log in from clients that are 2026.10.1 or newer (2026.10.2 for the desktop app), so the versions above are only enough to create one.
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# EXPERIMENTAL_CLIENT_FEATURE_FLAGS=
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# EXPERIMENTAL_CLIENT_FEATURE_FLAGS=
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## Require new device emails. When a user logs in an email is required to be sent.
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## Require new device emails. When a user logs in an email is required to be sent.
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@ -14,9 +14,8 @@ extend-ignore-re = [
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# In SMTP it's called HELO, so ignore it
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# In SMTP it's called HELO, so ignore it
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"(?i)helo_name",
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"(?i)helo_name",
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"Server name sent during.+HELO",
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"Server name sent during.+HELO",
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# COSE Is short for CBOR Object Signing and Encryption, ignore these specific items
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# COSE Is short for CBOR Object Signing and Encryption
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"COSEKey",
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"(?i)cose",
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"COSEAlgorithm",
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# Ignore this specific string as it's valid
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# Ignore this specific string as it's valid
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"Ensure they are valid OTPs",
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"Ensure they are valid OTPs",
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# This word is misspelled upstream
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# This word is misspelled upstream
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@ -107,7 +107,7 @@ serde = { version = "1.0.229", features = ["derive"] }
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serde_json = "1.0.154"
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serde_json = "1.0.154"
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# A safe, extensible ORM and Query builder
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# A safe, extensible ORM and Query builder
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diesel = { version = "2.3.14", features = ["chrono", "r2d2", "numeric"] }
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diesel = { version = "2.3.14", features = ["chrono", "r2d2", "numeric", "64-column-tables"] }
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diesel_migrations = "2.3.2"
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diesel_migrations = "2.3.2"
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derive_more = { version = "2.1.1", features = [
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derive_more = { version = "2.1.1", features = [
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@ -0,0 +1,3 @@
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-- A blob-encrypted cipher keeps all of its content in `data`, up to 500,000 characters, so the
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-- 64 KiB of TEXT is too small. Like upstream, which uses LONGTEXT.
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ALTER TABLE ciphers MODIFY data LONGTEXT NOT NULL;
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@ -0,0 +1,5 @@
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DROP TABLE IF EXISTS user_signature_key_pairs;
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ALTER TABLE users DROP COLUMN signed_public_key;
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ALTER TABLE users DROP COLUMN security_state;
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ALTER TABLE users DROP COLUMN security_version;
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14
migrations/mysql/2026-10-09-120000_user_crypto_v2/up.sql
Normal file
14
migrations/mysql/2026-10-09-120000_user_crypto_v2/up.sql
Normal file
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@ -0,0 +1,14 @@
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ALTER TABLE users ADD COLUMN signed_public_key TEXT;
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ALTER TABLE users ADD COLUMN security_state TEXT;
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ALTER TABLE users ADD COLUMN security_version INTEGER;
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CREATE TABLE user_signature_key_pairs (
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uuid CHAR(36) NOT NULL PRIMARY KEY,
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user_uuid CHAR(36) NOT NULL UNIQUE,
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signature_algorithm INTEGER NOT NULL, -- 0 = ed25519, 1 = mldsa44
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signing_key TEXT NOT NULL,
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verifying_key TEXT NOT NULL,
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created_at DATETIME NOT NULL,
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updated_at DATETIME NOT NULL,
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FOREIGN KEY (user_uuid) REFERENCES users (uuid) ON DELETE CASCADE
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);
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@ -0,0 +1,4 @@
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-- Key rotations before this kept the id of the old user key, so every new
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-- cipher was refused from then on. Stale ids can't be told apart, so clear
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-- all of them; clients record their current key's id again when it's empty.
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UPDATE users SET key_id = NULL;
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@ -0,0 +1,2 @@
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ALTER TABLE users DROP COLUMN v2_upgrade_token;
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ALTER TABLE users_organizations DROP COLUMN v2_upgrade_token;
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@ -0,0 +1,2 @@
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ALTER TABLE users ADD COLUMN v2_upgrade_token TEXT;
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ALTER TABLE users_organizations ADD COLUMN v2_upgrade_token TEXT;
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@ -0,0 +1,3 @@
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-- TEXT has no size limit here, only MySQL needed the change.
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-- PostgreSQL rejects a migration that is only comments ("Received an empty query"), hence the no-op.
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SELECT 1;
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@ -0,0 +1,5 @@
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DROP TABLE IF EXISTS user_signature_key_pairs;
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ALTER TABLE users DROP COLUMN signed_public_key;
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ALTER TABLE users DROP COLUMN security_state;
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ALTER TABLE users DROP COLUMN security_version;
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@ -0,0 +1,13 @@
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ALTER TABLE users ADD COLUMN signed_public_key TEXT;
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ALTER TABLE users ADD COLUMN security_state TEXT;
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ALTER TABLE users ADD COLUMN security_version INTEGER;
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CREATE TABLE user_signature_key_pairs (
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uuid CHAR(36) NOT NULL PRIMARY KEY,
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user_uuid CHAR(36) NOT NULL UNIQUE REFERENCES users (uuid) ON DELETE CASCADE,
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signature_algorithm INTEGER NOT NULL, -- 0 = ed25519, 1 = mldsa44
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signing_key TEXT NOT NULL,
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verifying_key TEXT NOT NULL,
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created_at TIMESTAMP NOT NULL,
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updated_at TIMESTAMP NOT NULL
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);
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@ -0,0 +1,4 @@
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-- Key rotations before this kept the id of the old user key, so every new
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-- cipher was refused from then on. Stale ids can't be told apart, so clear
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-- all of them; clients record their current key's id again when it's empty.
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UPDATE users SET key_id = NULL;
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@ -0,0 +1,2 @@
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ALTER TABLE users DROP COLUMN v2_upgrade_token;
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ALTER TABLE users_organizations DROP COLUMN v2_upgrade_token;
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@ -0,0 +1,2 @@
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ALTER TABLE users ADD COLUMN v2_upgrade_token TEXT;
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ALTER TABLE users_organizations ADD COLUMN v2_upgrade_token TEXT;
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