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44 changed files with 1960 additions and 427 deletions
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@ -411,6 +411,9 @@
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## - "biometrics-sdk-ipc": Enable biometric unlock over the SDK IPC framework (Desktop >= 2026.9.0, Browser >= 2026.9.0)
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## - "biometrics-sdk-ipc": Enable biometric unlock over the SDK IPC framework (Desktop >= 2026.9.0, Browser >= 2026.9.0)
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## - "windows-native-credential-sync": Register the desktop app as a passkey provider in Windows, so passkeys in the vault can be used by other apps and browsers.
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## - "windows-native-credential-sync": Register the desktop app as a passkey provider in Windows, so passkeys in the vault can be used by other apps and browsers.
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## Requires the Microsoft Store (appx) build of the desktop app. Stable releases up to and including 2026.9.1 lack the required plugin registration, so it has no effect there yet.
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## Requires the Microsoft Store (appx) build of the desktop app. Stable releases up to and including 2026.9.1 lack the required plugin registration, so it has no effect there yet.
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## - "pm-27278-v2-password-registration": Register new accounts with v2 encryption. (Web >= 2026.6.4, Desktop/Browser/CLI >= 2026.7.0, Android >= 2026.4.1, iOS >= 2026.5.1)
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## - "enable-account-encryption-v2-jit-password-registration": Give SSO users who set their master password on their first login v2 encryption. (Web >= 2026.1.1, Desktop/Browser/CLI >= 2026.1.0, Android >= 2026.4.1, iOS >= 2026.6.0)
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## These two flags can't be undone: a v2 account stays v2, and it can only log in from clients that are 2025.11.0 or newer and send their version, which rules out some older and third-party clients.
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# EXPERIMENTAL_CLIENT_FEATURE_FLAGS=
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# EXPERIMENTAL_CLIENT_FEATURE_FLAGS=
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## Require new device emails. When a user logs in an email is required to be sent.
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## Require new device emails. When a user logs in an email is required to be sent.
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@ -14,9 +14,8 @@ extend-ignore-re = [
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# In SMTP it's called HELO, so ignore it
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# In SMTP it's called HELO, so ignore it
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"(?i)helo_name",
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"(?i)helo_name",
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"Server name sent during.+HELO",
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"Server name sent during.+HELO",
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# COSE Is short for CBOR Object Signing and Encryption, ignore these specific items
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# COSE Is short for CBOR Object Signing and Encryption
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"COSEKey",
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"(?i)cose",
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"COSEAlgorithm",
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# Ignore this specific string as it's valid
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# Ignore this specific string as it's valid
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"Ensure they are valid OTPs",
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"Ensure they are valid OTPs",
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# This word is misspelled upstream
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# This word is misspelled upstream
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@ -107,7 +107,7 @@ serde = { version = "1.0.229", features = ["derive"] }
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serde_json = "1.0.154"
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serde_json = "1.0.154"
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# A safe, extensible ORM and Query builder
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# A safe, extensible ORM and Query builder
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diesel = { version = "2.3.14", features = ["chrono", "r2d2", "numeric"] }
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diesel = { version = "2.3.14", features = ["chrono", "r2d2", "numeric", "64-column-tables"] }
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diesel_migrations = "2.3.2"
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diesel_migrations = "2.3.2"
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derive_more = { version = "2.1.1", features = [
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derive_more = { version = "2.1.1", features = [
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@ -0,0 +1,3 @@
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-- A blob-encrypted cipher keeps all of its content in `data`, up to 500,000 characters, so the
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-- 64 KiB of TEXT is too small. Like upstream, which uses LONGTEXT.
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ALTER TABLE ciphers MODIFY data LONGTEXT NOT NULL;
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@ -0,0 +1,5 @@
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DROP TABLE IF EXISTS user_signature_key_pairs;
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ALTER TABLE users DROP COLUMN signed_public_key;
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ALTER TABLE users DROP COLUMN security_state;
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ALTER TABLE users DROP COLUMN security_version;
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14
migrations/mysql/2026-10-09-120000_user_crypto_v2/up.sql
Normal file
14
migrations/mysql/2026-10-09-120000_user_crypto_v2/up.sql
Normal file
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@ -0,0 +1,14 @@
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ALTER TABLE users ADD COLUMN signed_public_key TEXT;
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ALTER TABLE users ADD COLUMN security_state TEXT;
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ALTER TABLE users ADD COLUMN security_version INTEGER;
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CREATE TABLE user_signature_key_pairs (
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uuid CHAR(36) NOT NULL PRIMARY KEY,
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user_uuid CHAR(36) NOT NULL UNIQUE,
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signature_algorithm INTEGER NOT NULL, -- 0 = ed25519, 1 = mldsa44
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signing_key TEXT NOT NULL,
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verifying_key TEXT NOT NULL,
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created_at DATETIME NOT NULL,
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updated_at DATETIME NOT NULL,
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FOREIGN KEY (user_uuid) REFERENCES users (uuid) ON DELETE CASCADE
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);
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@ -0,0 +1,4 @@
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-- Key rotations before this kept the id of the old user key, so every new
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-- cipher was refused from then on. Stale ids can't be told apart, so clear
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-- all of them; clients record their current key's id again when it's empty.
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UPDATE users SET key_id = NULL;
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@ -0,0 +1,2 @@
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ALTER TABLE users DROP COLUMN v2_upgrade_token;
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ALTER TABLE users_organizations DROP COLUMN v2_upgrade_token;
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@ -0,0 +1,2 @@
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ALTER TABLE users ADD COLUMN v2_upgrade_token TEXT;
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ALTER TABLE users_organizations ADD COLUMN v2_upgrade_token TEXT;
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@ -0,0 +1,3 @@
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-- TEXT has no size limit here, only MySQL needed the change.
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-- PostgreSQL rejects a migration that is only comments ("Received an empty query"), hence the no-op.
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SELECT 1;
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@ -0,0 +1,5 @@
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DROP TABLE IF EXISTS user_signature_key_pairs;
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ALTER TABLE users DROP COLUMN signed_public_key;
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ALTER TABLE users DROP COLUMN security_state;
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ALTER TABLE users DROP COLUMN security_version;
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@ -0,0 +1,13 @@
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ALTER TABLE users ADD COLUMN signed_public_key TEXT;
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ALTER TABLE users ADD COLUMN security_state TEXT;
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ALTER TABLE users ADD COLUMN security_version INTEGER;
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CREATE TABLE user_signature_key_pairs (
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uuid CHAR(36) NOT NULL PRIMARY KEY,
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user_uuid CHAR(36) NOT NULL UNIQUE REFERENCES users (uuid) ON DELETE CASCADE,
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signature_algorithm INTEGER NOT NULL, -- 0 = ed25519, 1 = mldsa44
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signing_key TEXT NOT NULL,
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verifying_key TEXT NOT NULL,
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created_at TIMESTAMP NOT NULL,
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updated_at TIMESTAMP NOT NULL
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);
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@ -0,0 +1,4 @@
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-- Key rotations before this kept the id of the old user key, so every new
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-- cipher was refused from then on. Stale ids can't be told apart, so clear
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-- all of them; clients record their current key's id again when it's empty.
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UPDATE users SET key_id = NULL;
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@ -0,0 +1,2 @@
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ALTER TABLE users DROP COLUMN v2_upgrade_token;
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ALTER TABLE users_organizations DROP COLUMN v2_upgrade_token;
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@ -0,0 +1,2 @@
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ALTER TABLE users ADD COLUMN v2_upgrade_token TEXT;
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ALTER TABLE users_organizations ADD COLUMN v2_upgrade_token TEXT;
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