2026-01-29 19:35:15 +00:00
package handler
import (
"encoding/json"
2026-07-26 20:07:46 +02:00
"errors"
2026-01-29 19:35:15 +00:00
"fmt"
Route containerd ns mirror requests to configured registries (#405)
* Route containerd ns mirror requests to configured registries
containerd's hosts.toml mirrors append ?ns=<registry-host> to every
request. The container handler ignored it, so a single _default mirror
entry could not serve more than one registry.
ns is a closed-world lookup key and is never dialed. Docker Hub aliases
and the host of upstream.oci_default select the default route, hosts of
upstream.oci entries select their named upstream. Unknown hosts return
NAME_UNKNOWN so containerd falls back to its next host. Registry URLs
with a path are not indexed, because ns names the registry at the root
of a host. Host collisions log a warning and resolve deterministically.
With ns the path is the verbatim upstream repository, the reserved
upstream/ prefix is rejected, and repository prefix routes such as
Homebrew's do not apply. Cache names match the unprefixed and
upstream/{name}/ routes, so all routes share cached blobs, manifests and
tag lists. ns is no longer forwarded on tag-list requests, and the
pagination Link is rewritten per request instead of at store time so
clients on different routes get links for their own route.
Refs #303
* Document containerd ns mirroring
Refs #303
* Version the tag-list cache identity for the raw-link format
Tag-list rows now store the upstream Link verbatim and rewrite it per
request. Rows written by earlier versions hold a Link already rewritten
for one route. Under the unchanged key an older binary running next to
this one (rolling update on shared Postgres, or a rollback) would serve
the raw Link unrewritten, sending clients to the wrong route for the
next page. A format marker in the key keeps the two apart at the cost of
one cache miss per tag list after the upgrade.
Adversarial review finding F1: tag-list cache rows hold raw upstream
Links under unchanged keys, so an older binary serves them unrewritten.
* Qualify the README claim about ns mirror coverage
Registries whose URL has a path and hosts shared by two entries are not
reachable through ns; point to the configuration guide for both rules.
Adversarial review finding F3: README says ns covers every upstream.oci
registry.
* Redact registry URLs in ns index warnings
Configured registry URLs may carry userinfo credentials, which the new
startup warnings wrote to the log verbatim. Log them with the password
masked, and say precisely what a path-prefixed default registry means:
its host is not indexed, while the Docker Hub aliases still select it.
Adversarial review finding F2: startup warnings print registry URLs
unredacted and the default-registry message is misleading.
* Keep non-default ports apart in the ns index
Dropping 80 and 443 regardless of scheme turned https://host:80 and
https://host into the same key, so a request for one of them could land
on the other registry. Only the default port of the URL's scheme is
optional now. A configured host is indexed with and without that port,
because image references spell it either way; any other port has to
match exactly, and the ns value is used as containerd sends it, apart
from case and IPv6 brackets.
Since a URL now yields two keys that can belong to different routes,
the collision warning lists the owner per key.
The handler test runs two registries on one host that differ only in
the port. Tests can't bind 80 or 443, so a dialer maps those addresses
to the fake servers.
* Allow upstream/{name}/ together with ns when they agree
containerd sends ns on every request to a mirror host, override_path or
not. Per-registry mirrors pointing at /v2/upstream/{name} therefore
arrive as upstream/{name}/...?ns=<registry>, and refusing every prefixed
name under ns broke them, including the only way to mirror an upstream
whose URL has a path.
Such requests are now handled like the prefix route without ns, as long
as ns names that upstream's own host under the same port rules as the
index. Any other ns on a prefixed name is still NAME_UNKNOWN, so ns
can't be used to create cache entries under another registry's name.
* README: containerd config_path and how to check it
A _default/hosts.toml does nothing while CRI has no hosts directory
configured, so add the config.toml snippet for containerd 2.x and 1.x.
To check the setup, look at containerd config dump and pull with
crictl, then find the request in the proxy log; ctr --hosts-dir reads
the directory on its own and would succeed even without config_path.
Also mention that existing per-registry override_path entries keep
working and that k3s generates the directory itself.
* Let the prefix route take ns for aliases and mirrored registries
With upstream.oci.hub pointing at registry-1.docker.io and a docker.io
hosts.toml mirror on /v2/upstream/hub, containerd sends ns=docker.io,
and the prefix check only accepted the upstream's own host. The same
happens whenever the upstream is a mirror of the registry the nodes
pull from, say an Artifactory remote for ghcr.io: ns carries ghcr.io,
the upstream host is something else, and the pull got a 404.
The prefix already decides where the content comes from and which
cache entries are used, so ns can't redirect anything there. The check
now only refuses an ns that contradicts the prefix, meaning a host the
proxy knows that belongs to another route. The Docker Hub aliases count
as one host, and a host the proxy doesn't know at all is accepted,
since a client can only arrive at the prefix through its own mirror
entry.
* Take docker.io on every prefix route
A Docker Hub mirror configured as a named upstream (mirror.gcr.io, an
Artifactory remote) with a docker.io hosts.toml pointing at
/v2/upstream/hub got a 404 again: docker.io is always in the index for
the default route, so the check saw a known host of another route. That
setup worked before this branch. Docker Hub repository names have
exactly two path components, so docker.io/upstream/... can never be a
real image, and accepting the aliases on every prefix route shadows
nothing.
While here: the collision warning claimed ns requests go to the other
route, which is only true without the prefix, and the README said pulls
for unknown registries always get a 404, which isn't the case for paths
under upstream/{name}/.
* Only take a foreign ns on a prefix route when it is configured
A containerd _default mirror sends the same request for a pull of
unconfigured.example/upstream/mirror/owner/app as a ghcr.io hosts.toml
with override_path does for a mirror upstream. Accepting any host the
proxy didn't know therefore let such a pull be answered with owner/app
from the mirror upstream, a different image, instead of a 404 that lets
containerd go to the registry the image actually names.
The prefix route now accepts ns only for the upstream's own host, for
Docker Hub, and for hosts listed in the new upstream.oci_mirrors setting.
That setting is how an Artifactory remote of ghcr.io keeps working:
upstream:
oci_mirrors:
ghcr: ["ghcr.io"]
The listed hosts also select the upstream for unprefixed ns requests,
which makes a mirror with a path in its URL reachable through the
_default entry as well. Hosts from configured URLs still win over
mirror entries; the proxy warns about such overlaps at startup.
* Fix the docs sentence on which ns a prefix route takes
configuration.md still said a prefix request with ns is only refused
when ns names another route's host. Since the last commit it is the
other way round: only the upstream's own host, its oci_mirrors entries
and Docker Hub get through.
* Note what a host accepted on a prefix route gives up
Listing ghcr.io for an upstream (or the upstream's own host) still has
the ambiguity from the wildcard case: ghcr.io/upstream/ghcr/owner/app
lands on that upstream. That is the price of an explicit entry and
fine in practice, but it should be written down.
* Test that oci_mirrors entries stay with their own upstream
Two gaps in the coverage of the last change: nothing failed if a host
listed for one upstream was also accepted on another upstream's prefix,
and nothing checked that the server actually hands upstream.oci_mirrors
to the container handler. The handler test now has a second upstream
that must refuse ghcr.io, and a small server test pulls through a
mirror entry on both the prefix and the unprefixed route.
* Log when a prefix route refuses an ns
Setups with a ghcr.io hosts.toml pointing at a mirror upstream worked
before this branch and now need an oci_mirrors entry. Without one,
containerd gets a 404, quietly pulls from ghcr.io directly, and nobody
notices the proxy is being skipped. The refusal is now logged as a
warning that names the upstream and the ns and points at
upstream.oci_mirrors.
* Drop a check in validateOCIMirrors that could never fire
user@ghcr.io parses with ghcr.io as its host, so the parsed.Host != host
comparison already rejects it and the extra parsed.User test was dead.
A test case for a host with credentials keeps that path covered.
* Reject an oci_mirrors host that is listed for two upstreams
With ghcr.io under both art and nexus, both prefix routes took ns=ghcr.io
while unprefixed requests went to whichever name sorted first, with
nothing but a startup warning. Config validation now refuses the second
entry, comparing hosts without case and without the default :443.
* Log each refused ns once per upstream and refuse overlong values
The refusal warning fired on every request, and a node with a missing
oci_mirrors entry asks for the manifest and each layer, so the same line
piled up. Each upstream/ns pair is now logged once, for up to 1024
pairs; after that every refusal is logged again.
ns comes straight from the client and can be as long as the request
line allows, so remembering it as is would let anyone pin a lot of
memory with a handful of requests. No registry host is longer than 259
characters (a 253-character name plus a port), so anything longer is
refused right away, before it is logged or remembered.
* Compare oci_mirrors hosts the way the handler does
The duplicate check lowercased the host and trimmed :443, while the
handler splits host and port, brackets IPv6 literals and drops an empty
port. So ghcr.io and ghcr.io:, or [::1] and [::1]:, passed as different
hosts in two upstreams and then collided in the handler. The check now
builds the same key the handler uses.
* Rewrap the oci_mirrors paragraphs in the configuration docs
Two sentences had been dropped into the middle of wrapped lines, and the
prefix-route paragraph named Docker Hub twice in a row. Same content,
shorter lines, one mention.
* Stop logging ns refusals once the set is full
Past 1024 different upstream/ns pairs every refusal was logged again,
so anyone could fill the set with made-up hosts and then flood the log
at warning level. When the set is full the proxy now says so once and
keeps quiet after that. A real misconfiguration shows up long before
that, with the first pull.
* Test the limit on remembered ns refusals
Nothing covered what happens once 1024 pairs are remembered. The new
test fills the set, then sends a known pair and two new ones: the proxy
must log the limit notice exactly once, log none of the refusals and
keep the set at its size.
2026-10-10 08:35:50 +02:00
"maps"
"net"
2026-01-29 19:35:15 +00:00
"net/http"
Route containerd ns mirror requests to configured registries (#405)
* Route containerd ns mirror requests to configured registries
containerd's hosts.toml mirrors append ?ns=<registry-host> to every
request. The container handler ignored it, so a single _default mirror
entry could not serve more than one registry.
ns is a closed-world lookup key and is never dialed. Docker Hub aliases
and the host of upstream.oci_default select the default route, hosts of
upstream.oci entries select their named upstream. Unknown hosts return
NAME_UNKNOWN so containerd falls back to its next host. Registry URLs
with a path are not indexed, because ns names the registry at the root
of a host. Host collisions log a warning and resolve deterministically.
With ns the path is the verbatim upstream repository, the reserved
upstream/ prefix is rejected, and repository prefix routes such as
Homebrew's do not apply. Cache names match the unprefixed and
upstream/{name}/ routes, so all routes share cached blobs, manifests and
tag lists. ns is no longer forwarded on tag-list requests, and the
pagination Link is rewritten per request instead of at store time so
clients on different routes get links for their own route.
Refs #303
* Document containerd ns mirroring
Refs #303
* Version the tag-list cache identity for the raw-link format
Tag-list rows now store the upstream Link verbatim and rewrite it per
request. Rows written by earlier versions hold a Link already rewritten
for one route. Under the unchanged key an older binary running next to
this one (rolling update on shared Postgres, or a rollback) would serve
the raw Link unrewritten, sending clients to the wrong route for the
next page. A format marker in the key keeps the two apart at the cost of
one cache miss per tag list after the upgrade.
Adversarial review finding F1: tag-list cache rows hold raw upstream
Links under unchanged keys, so an older binary serves them unrewritten.
* Qualify the README claim about ns mirror coverage
Registries whose URL has a path and hosts shared by two entries are not
reachable through ns; point to the configuration guide for both rules.
Adversarial review finding F3: README says ns covers every upstream.oci
registry.
* Redact registry URLs in ns index warnings
Configured registry URLs may carry userinfo credentials, which the new
startup warnings wrote to the log verbatim. Log them with the password
masked, and say precisely what a path-prefixed default registry means:
its host is not indexed, while the Docker Hub aliases still select it.
Adversarial review finding F2: startup warnings print registry URLs
unredacted and the default-registry message is misleading.
* Keep non-default ports apart in the ns index
Dropping 80 and 443 regardless of scheme turned https://host:80 and
https://host into the same key, so a request for one of them could land
on the other registry. Only the default port of the URL's scheme is
optional now. A configured host is indexed with and without that port,
because image references spell it either way; any other port has to
match exactly, and the ns value is used as containerd sends it, apart
from case and IPv6 brackets.
Since a URL now yields two keys that can belong to different routes,
the collision warning lists the owner per key.
The handler test runs two registries on one host that differ only in
the port. Tests can't bind 80 or 443, so a dialer maps those addresses
to the fake servers.
* Allow upstream/{name}/ together with ns when they agree
containerd sends ns on every request to a mirror host, override_path or
not. Per-registry mirrors pointing at /v2/upstream/{name} therefore
arrive as upstream/{name}/...?ns=<registry>, and refusing every prefixed
name under ns broke them, including the only way to mirror an upstream
whose URL has a path.
Such requests are now handled like the prefix route without ns, as long
as ns names that upstream's own host under the same port rules as the
index. Any other ns on a prefixed name is still NAME_UNKNOWN, so ns
can't be used to create cache entries under another registry's name.
* README: containerd config_path and how to check it
A _default/hosts.toml does nothing while CRI has no hosts directory
configured, so add the config.toml snippet for containerd 2.x and 1.x.
To check the setup, look at containerd config dump and pull with
crictl, then find the request in the proxy log; ctr --hosts-dir reads
the directory on its own and would succeed even without config_path.
Also mention that existing per-registry override_path entries keep
working and that k3s generates the directory itself.
* Let the prefix route take ns for aliases and mirrored registries
With upstream.oci.hub pointing at registry-1.docker.io and a docker.io
hosts.toml mirror on /v2/upstream/hub, containerd sends ns=docker.io,
and the prefix check only accepted the upstream's own host. The same
happens whenever the upstream is a mirror of the registry the nodes
pull from, say an Artifactory remote for ghcr.io: ns carries ghcr.io,
the upstream host is something else, and the pull got a 404.
The prefix already decides where the content comes from and which
cache entries are used, so ns can't redirect anything there. The check
now only refuses an ns that contradicts the prefix, meaning a host the
proxy knows that belongs to another route. The Docker Hub aliases count
as one host, and a host the proxy doesn't know at all is accepted,
since a client can only arrive at the prefix through its own mirror
entry.
* Take docker.io on every prefix route
A Docker Hub mirror configured as a named upstream (mirror.gcr.io, an
Artifactory remote) with a docker.io hosts.toml pointing at
/v2/upstream/hub got a 404 again: docker.io is always in the index for
the default route, so the check saw a known host of another route. That
setup worked before this branch. Docker Hub repository names have
exactly two path components, so docker.io/upstream/... can never be a
real image, and accepting the aliases on every prefix route shadows
nothing.
While here: the collision warning claimed ns requests go to the other
route, which is only true without the prefix, and the README said pulls
for unknown registries always get a 404, which isn't the case for paths
under upstream/{name}/.
* Only take a foreign ns on a prefix route when it is configured
A containerd _default mirror sends the same request for a pull of
unconfigured.example/upstream/mirror/owner/app as a ghcr.io hosts.toml
with override_path does for a mirror upstream. Accepting any host the
proxy didn't know therefore let such a pull be answered with owner/app
from the mirror upstream, a different image, instead of a 404 that lets
containerd go to the registry the image actually names.
The prefix route now accepts ns only for the upstream's own host, for
Docker Hub, and for hosts listed in the new upstream.oci_mirrors setting.
That setting is how an Artifactory remote of ghcr.io keeps working:
upstream:
oci_mirrors:
ghcr: ["ghcr.io"]
The listed hosts also select the upstream for unprefixed ns requests,
which makes a mirror with a path in its URL reachable through the
_default entry as well. Hosts from configured URLs still win over
mirror entries; the proxy warns about such overlaps at startup.
* Fix the docs sentence on which ns a prefix route takes
configuration.md still said a prefix request with ns is only refused
when ns names another route's host. Since the last commit it is the
other way round: only the upstream's own host, its oci_mirrors entries
and Docker Hub get through.
* Note what a host accepted on a prefix route gives up
Listing ghcr.io for an upstream (or the upstream's own host) still has
the ambiguity from the wildcard case: ghcr.io/upstream/ghcr/owner/app
lands on that upstream. That is the price of an explicit entry and
fine in practice, but it should be written down.
* Test that oci_mirrors entries stay with their own upstream
Two gaps in the coverage of the last change: nothing failed if a host
listed for one upstream was also accepted on another upstream's prefix,
and nothing checked that the server actually hands upstream.oci_mirrors
to the container handler. The handler test now has a second upstream
that must refuse ghcr.io, and a small server test pulls through a
mirror entry on both the prefix and the unprefixed route.
* Log when a prefix route refuses an ns
Setups with a ghcr.io hosts.toml pointing at a mirror upstream worked
before this branch and now need an oci_mirrors entry. Without one,
containerd gets a 404, quietly pulls from ghcr.io directly, and nobody
notices the proxy is being skipped. The refusal is now logged as a
warning that names the upstream and the ns and points at
upstream.oci_mirrors.
* Drop a check in validateOCIMirrors that could never fire
user@ghcr.io parses with ghcr.io as its host, so the parsed.Host != host
comparison already rejects it and the extra parsed.User test was dead.
A test case for a host with credentials keeps that path covered.
* Reject an oci_mirrors host that is listed for two upstreams
With ghcr.io under both art and nexus, both prefix routes took ns=ghcr.io
while unprefixed requests went to whichever name sorted first, with
nothing but a startup warning. Config validation now refuses the second
entry, comparing hosts without case and without the default :443.
* Log each refused ns once per upstream and refuse overlong values
The refusal warning fired on every request, and a node with a missing
oci_mirrors entry asks for the manifest and each layer, so the same line
piled up. Each upstream/ns pair is now logged once, for up to 1024
pairs; after that every refusal is logged again.
ns comes straight from the client and can be as long as the request
line allows, so remembering it as is would let anyone pin a lot of
memory with a handful of requests. No registry host is longer than 259
characters (a 253-character name plus a port), so anything longer is
refused right away, before it is logged or remembered.
* Compare oci_mirrors hosts the way the handler does
The duplicate check lowercased the host and trimmed :443, while the
handler splits host and port, brackets IPv6 literals and drops an empty
port. So ghcr.io and ghcr.io:, or [::1] and [::1]:, passed as different
hosts in two upstreams and then collided in the handler. The check now
builds the same key the handler uses.
* Rewrap the oci_mirrors paragraphs in the configuration docs
Two sentences had been dropped into the middle of wrapped lines, and the
prefix-route paragraph named Docker Hub twice in a row. Same content,
shorter lines, one mention.
* Stop logging ns refusals once the set is full
Past 1024 different upstream/ns pairs every refusal was logged again,
so anyone could fill the set with made-up hosts and then flood the log
at warning level. When the set is full the proxy now says so once and
keeps quiet after that. A real misconfiguration shows up long before
that, with the first pull.
* Test the limit on remembered ns refusals
Nothing covered what happens once 1024 pairs are remembered. The new
test fills the set, then sends a known pair and two new ones: the proxy
must log the limit notice exactly once, log none of the refusals and
keep the set at its size.
2026-10-10 08:35:50 +02:00
"net/url"
2026-01-29 19:35:15 +00:00
"regexp"
Route containerd ns mirror requests to configured registries (#405)
* Route containerd ns mirror requests to configured registries
containerd's hosts.toml mirrors append ?ns=<registry-host> to every
request. The container handler ignored it, so a single _default mirror
entry could not serve more than one registry.
ns is a closed-world lookup key and is never dialed. Docker Hub aliases
and the host of upstream.oci_default select the default route, hosts of
upstream.oci entries select their named upstream. Unknown hosts return
NAME_UNKNOWN so containerd falls back to its next host. Registry URLs
with a path are not indexed, because ns names the registry at the root
of a host. Host collisions log a warning and resolve deterministically.
With ns the path is the verbatim upstream repository, the reserved
upstream/ prefix is rejected, and repository prefix routes such as
Homebrew's do not apply. Cache names match the unprefixed and
upstream/{name}/ routes, so all routes share cached blobs, manifests and
tag lists. ns is no longer forwarded on tag-list requests, and the
pagination Link is rewritten per request instead of at store time so
clients on different routes get links for their own route.
Refs #303
* Document containerd ns mirroring
Refs #303
* Version the tag-list cache identity for the raw-link format
Tag-list rows now store the upstream Link verbatim and rewrite it per
request. Rows written by earlier versions hold a Link already rewritten
for one route. Under the unchanged key an older binary running next to
this one (rolling update on shared Postgres, or a rollback) would serve
the raw Link unrewritten, sending clients to the wrong route for the
next page. A format marker in the key keeps the two apart at the cost of
one cache miss per tag list after the upgrade.
Adversarial review finding F1: tag-list cache rows hold raw upstream
Links under unchanged keys, so an older binary serves them unrewritten.
* Qualify the README claim about ns mirror coverage
Registries whose URL has a path and hosts shared by two entries are not
reachable through ns; point to the configuration guide for both rules.
Adversarial review finding F3: README says ns covers every upstream.oci
registry.
* Redact registry URLs in ns index warnings
Configured registry URLs may carry userinfo credentials, which the new
startup warnings wrote to the log verbatim. Log them with the password
masked, and say precisely what a path-prefixed default registry means:
its host is not indexed, while the Docker Hub aliases still select it.
Adversarial review finding F2: startup warnings print registry URLs
unredacted and the default-registry message is misleading.
* Keep non-default ports apart in the ns index
Dropping 80 and 443 regardless of scheme turned https://host:80 and
https://host into the same key, so a request for one of them could land
on the other registry. Only the default port of the URL's scheme is
optional now. A configured host is indexed with and without that port,
because image references spell it either way; any other port has to
match exactly, and the ns value is used as containerd sends it, apart
from case and IPv6 brackets.
Since a URL now yields two keys that can belong to different routes,
the collision warning lists the owner per key.
The handler test runs two registries on one host that differ only in
the port. Tests can't bind 80 or 443, so a dialer maps those addresses
to the fake servers.
* Allow upstream/{name}/ together with ns when they agree
containerd sends ns on every request to a mirror host, override_path or
not. Per-registry mirrors pointing at /v2/upstream/{name} therefore
arrive as upstream/{name}/...?ns=<registry>, and refusing every prefixed
name under ns broke them, including the only way to mirror an upstream
whose URL has a path.
Such requests are now handled like the prefix route without ns, as long
as ns names that upstream's own host under the same port rules as the
index. Any other ns on a prefixed name is still NAME_UNKNOWN, so ns
can't be used to create cache entries under another registry's name.
* README: containerd config_path and how to check it
A _default/hosts.toml does nothing while CRI has no hosts directory
configured, so add the config.toml snippet for containerd 2.x and 1.x.
To check the setup, look at containerd config dump and pull with
crictl, then find the request in the proxy log; ctr --hosts-dir reads
the directory on its own and would succeed even without config_path.
Also mention that existing per-registry override_path entries keep
working and that k3s generates the directory itself.
* Let the prefix route take ns for aliases and mirrored registries
With upstream.oci.hub pointing at registry-1.docker.io and a docker.io
hosts.toml mirror on /v2/upstream/hub, containerd sends ns=docker.io,
and the prefix check only accepted the upstream's own host. The same
happens whenever the upstream is a mirror of the registry the nodes
pull from, say an Artifactory remote for ghcr.io: ns carries ghcr.io,
the upstream host is something else, and the pull got a 404.
The prefix already decides where the content comes from and which
cache entries are used, so ns can't redirect anything there. The check
now only refuses an ns that contradicts the prefix, meaning a host the
proxy knows that belongs to another route. The Docker Hub aliases count
as one host, and a host the proxy doesn't know at all is accepted,
since a client can only arrive at the prefix through its own mirror
entry.
* Take docker.io on every prefix route
A Docker Hub mirror configured as a named upstream (mirror.gcr.io, an
Artifactory remote) with a docker.io hosts.toml pointing at
/v2/upstream/hub got a 404 again: docker.io is always in the index for
the default route, so the check saw a known host of another route. That
setup worked before this branch. Docker Hub repository names have
exactly two path components, so docker.io/upstream/... can never be a
real image, and accepting the aliases on every prefix route shadows
nothing.
While here: the collision warning claimed ns requests go to the other
route, which is only true without the prefix, and the README said pulls
for unknown registries always get a 404, which isn't the case for paths
under upstream/{name}/.
* Only take a foreign ns on a prefix route when it is configured
A containerd _default mirror sends the same request for a pull of
unconfigured.example/upstream/mirror/owner/app as a ghcr.io hosts.toml
with override_path does for a mirror upstream. Accepting any host the
proxy didn't know therefore let such a pull be answered with owner/app
from the mirror upstream, a different image, instead of a 404 that lets
containerd go to the registry the image actually names.
The prefix route now accepts ns only for the upstream's own host, for
Docker Hub, and for hosts listed in the new upstream.oci_mirrors setting.
That setting is how an Artifactory remote of ghcr.io keeps working:
upstream:
oci_mirrors:
ghcr: ["ghcr.io"]
The listed hosts also select the upstream for unprefixed ns requests,
which makes a mirror with a path in its URL reachable through the
_default entry as well. Hosts from configured URLs still win over
mirror entries; the proxy warns about such overlaps at startup.
* Fix the docs sentence on which ns a prefix route takes
configuration.md still said a prefix request with ns is only refused
when ns names another route's host. Since the last commit it is the
other way round: only the upstream's own host, its oci_mirrors entries
and Docker Hub get through.
* Note what a host accepted on a prefix route gives up
Listing ghcr.io for an upstream (or the upstream's own host) still has
the ambiguity from the wildcard case: ghcr.io/upstream/ghcr/owner/app
lands on that upstream. That is the price of an explicit entry and
fine in practice, but it should be written down.
* Test that oci_mirrors entries stay with their own upstream
Two gaps in the coverage of the last change: nothing failed if a host
listed for one upstream was also accepted on another upstream's prefix,
and nothing checked that the server actually hands upstream.oci_mirrors
to the container handler. The handler test now has a second upstream
that must refuse ghcr.io, and a small server test pulls through a
mirror entry on both the prefix and the unprefixed route.
* Log when a prefix route refuses an ns
Setups with a ghcr.io hosts.toml pointing at a mirror upstream worked
before this branch and now need an oci_mirrors entry. Without one,
containerd gets a 404, quietly pulls from ghcr.io directly, and nobody
notices the proxy is being skipped. The refusal is now logged as a
warning that names the upstream and the ns and points at
upstream.oci_mirrors.
* Drop a check in validateOCIMirrors that could never fire
user@ghcr.io parses with ghcr.io as its host, so the parsed.Host != host
comparison already rejects it and the extra parsed.User test was dead.
A test case for a host with credentials keeps that path covered.
* Reject an oci_mirrors host that is listed for two upstreams
With ghcr.io under both art and nexus, both prefix routes took ns=ghcr.io
while unprefixed requests went to whichever name sorted first, with
nothing but a startup warning. Config validation now refuses the second
entry, comparing hosts without case and without the default :443.
* Log each refused ns once per upstream and refuse overlong values
The refusal warning fired on every request, and a node with a missing
oci_mirrors entry asks for the manifest and each layer, so the same line
piled up. Each upstream/ns pair is now logged once, for up to 1024
pairs; after that every refusal is logged again.
ns comes straight from the client and can be as long as the request
line allows, so remembering it as is would let anyone pin a lot of
memory with a handful of requests. No registry host is longer than 259
characters (a 253-character name plus a port), so anything longer is
refused right away, before it is logged or remembered.
* Compare oci_mirrors hosts the way the handler does
The duplicate check lowercased the host and trimmed :443, while the
handler splits host and port, brackets IPv6 literals and drops an empty
port. So ghcr.io and ghcr.io:, or [::1] and [::1]:, passed as different
hosts in two upstreams and then collided in the handler. The check now
builds the same key the handler uses.
* Rewrap the oci_mirrors paragraphs in the configuration docs
Two sentences had been dropped into the middle of wrapped lines, and the
prefix-route paragraph named Docker Hub twice in a row. Same content,
shorter lines, one mention.
* Stop logging ns refusals once the set is full
Past 1024 different upstream/ns pairs every refusal was logged again,
so anyone could fill the set with made-up hosts and then flood the log
at warning level. When the set is full the proxy now says so once and
keeps quiet after that. A real misconfiguration shows up long before
that, with the first pull.
* Test the limit on remembered ns refusals
Nothing covered what happens once 1024 pairs are remembered. The new
test fills the set, then sends a known pair and two new ones: the proxy
must log the limit notice exactly once, log none of the refusals and
keep the set at its size.
2026-10-10 08:35:50 +02:00
"slices"
2026-01-29 19:35:15 +00:00
"strings"
Route containerd ns mirror requests to configured registries (#405)
* Route containerd ns mirror requests to configured registries
containerd's hosts.toml mirrors append ?ns=<registry-host> to every
request. The container handler ignored it, so a single _default mirror
entry could not serve more than one registry.
ns is a closed-world lookup key and is never dialed. Docker Hub aliases
and the host of upstream.oci_default select the default route, hosts of
upstream.oci entries select their named upstream. Unknown hosts return
NAME_UNKNOWN so containerd falls back to its next host. Registry URLs
with a path are not indexed, because ns names the registry at the root
of a host. Host collisions log a warning and resolve deterministically.
With ns the path is the verbatim upstream repository, the reserved
upstream/ prefix is rejected, and repository prefix routes such as
Homebrew's do not apply. Cache names match the unprefixed and
upstream/{name}/ routes, so all routes share cached blobs, manifests and
tag lists. ns is no longer forwarded on tag-list requests, and the
pagination Link is rewritten per request instead of at store time so
clients on different routes get links for their own route.
Refs #303
* Document containerd ns mirroring
Refs #303
* Version the tag-list cache identity for the raw-link format
Tag-list rows now store the upstream Link verbatim and rewrite it per
request. Rows written by earlier versions hold a Link already rewritten
for one route. Under the unchanged key an older binary running next to
this one (rolling update on shared Postgres, or a rollback) would serve
the raw Link unrewritten, sending clients to the wrong route for the
next page. A format marker in the key keeps the two apart at the cost of
one cache miss per tag list after the upgrade.
Adversarial review finding F1: tag-list cache rows hold raw upstream
Links under unchanged keys, so an older binary serves them unrewritten.
* Qualify the README claim about ns mirror coverage
Registries whose URL has a path and hosts shared by two entries are not
reachable through ns; point to the configuration guide for both rules.
Adversarial review finding F3: README says ns covers every upstream.oci
registry.
* Redact registry URLs in ns index warnings
Configured registry URLs may carry userinfo credentials, which the new
startup warnings wrote to the log verbatim. Log them with the password
masked, and say precisely what a path-prefixed default registry means:
its host is not indexed, while the Docker Hub aliases still select it.
Adversarial review finding F2: startup warnings print registry URLs
unredacted and the default-registry message is misleading.
* Keep non-default ports apart in the ns index
Dropping 80 and 443 regardless of scheme turned https://host:80 and
https://host into the same key, so a request for one of them could land
on the other registry. Only the default port of the URL's scheme is
optional now. A configured host is indexed with and without that port,
because image references spell it either way; any other port has to
match exactly, and the ns value is used as containerd sends it, apart
from case and IPv6 brackets.
Since a URL now yields two keys that can belong to different routes,
the collision warning lists the owner per key.
The handler test runs two registries on one host that differ only in
the port. Tests can't bind 80 or 443, so a dialer maps those addresses
to the fake servers.
* Allow upstream/{name}/ together with ns when they agree
containerd sends ns on every request to a mirror host, override_path or
not. Per-registry mirrors pointing at /v2/upstream/{name} therefore
arrive as upstream/{name}/...?ns=<registry>, and refusing every prefixed
name under ns broke them, including the only way to mirror an upstream
whose URL has a path.
Such requests are now handled like the prefix route without ns, as long
as ns names that upstream's own host under the same port rules as the
index. Any other ns on a prefixed name is still NAME_UNKNOWN, so ns
can't be used to create cache entries under another registry's name.
* README: containerd config_path and how to check it
A _default/hosts.toml does nothing while CRI has no hosts directory
configured, so add the config.toml snippet for containerd 2.x and 1.x.
To check the setup, look at containerd config dump and pull with
crictl, then find the request in the proxy log; ctr --hosts-dir reads
the directory on its own and would succeed even without config_path.
Also mention that existing per-registry override_path entries keep
working and that k3s generates the directory itself.
* Let the prefix route take ns for aliases and mirrored registries
With upstream.oci.hub pointing at registry-1.docker.io and a docker.io
hosts.toml mirror on /v2/upstream/hub, containerd sends ns=docker.io,
and the prefix check only accepted the upstream's own host. The same
happens whenever the upstream is a mirror of the registry the nodes
pull from, say an Artifactory remote for ghcr.io: ns carries ghcr.io,
the upstream host is something else, and the pull got a 404.
The prefix already decides where the content comes from and which
cache entries are used, so ns can't redirect anything there. The check
now only refuses an ns that contradicts the prefix, meaning a host the
proxy knows that belongs to another route. The Docker Hub aliases count
as one host, and a host the proxy doesn't know at all is accepted,
since a client can only arrive at the prefix through its own mirror
entry.
* Take docker.io on every prefix route
A Docker Hub mirror configured as a named upstream (mirror.gcr.io, an
Artifactory remote) with a docker.io hosts.toml pointing at
/v2/upstream/hub got a 404 again: docker.io is always in the index for
the default route, so the check saw a known host of another route. That
setup worked before this branch. Docker Hub repository names have
exactly two path components, so docker.io/upstream/... can never be a
real image, and accepting the aliases on every prefix route shadows
nothing.
While here: the collision warning claimed ns requests go to the other
route, which is only true without the prefix, and the README said pulls
for unknown registries always get a 404, which isn't the case for paths
under upstream/{name}/.
* Only take a foreign ns on a prefix route when it is configured
A containerd _default mirror sends the same request for a pull of
unconfigured.example/upstream/mirror/owner/app as a ghcr.io hosts.toml
with override_path does for a mirror upstream. Accepting any host the
proxy didn't know therefore let such a pull be answered with owner/app
from the mirror upstream, a different image, instead of a 404 that lets
containerd go to the registry the image actually names.
The prefix route now accepts ns only for the upstream's own host, for
Docker Hub, and for hosts listed in the new upstream.oci_mirrors setting.
That setting is how an Artifactory remote of ghcr.io keeps working:
upstream:
oci_mirrors:
ghcr: ["ghcr.io"]
The listed hosts also select the upstream for unprefixed ns requests,
which makes a mirror with a path in its URL reachable through the
_default entry as well. Hosts from configured URLs still win over
mirror entries; the proxy warns about such overlaps at startup.
* Fix the docs sentence on which ns a prefix route takes
configuration.md still said a prefix request with ns is only refused
when ns names another route's host. Since the last commit it is the
other way round: only the upstream's own host, its oci_mirrors entries
and Docker Hub get through.
* Note what a host accepted on a prefix route gives up
Listing ghcr.io for an upstream (or the upstream's own host) still has
the ambiguity from the wildcard case: ghcr.io/upstream/ghcr/owner/app
lands on that upstream. That is the price of an explicit entry and
fine in practice, but it should be written down.
* Test that oci_mirrors entries stay with their own upstream
Two gaps in the coverage of the last change: nothing failed if a host
listed for one upstream was also accepted on another upstream's prefix,
and nothing checked that the server actually hands upstream.oci_mirrors
to the container handler. The handler test now has a second upstream
that must refuse ghcr.io, and a small server test pulls through a
mirror entry on both the prefix and the unprefixed route.
* Log when a prefix route refuses an ns
Setups with a ghcr.io hosts.toml pointing at a mirror upstream worked
before this branch and now need an oci_mirrors entry. Without one,
containerd gets a 404, quietly pulls from ghcr.io directly, and nobody
notices the proxy is being skipped. The refusal is now logged as a
warning that names the upstream and the ns and points at
upstream.oci_mirrors.
* Drop a check in validateOCIMirrors that could never fire
user@ghcr.io parses with ghcr.io as its host, so the parsed.Host != host
comparison already rejects it and the extra parsed.User test was dead.
A test case for a host with credentials keeps that path covered.
* Reject an oci_mirrors host that is listed for two upstreams
With ghcr.io under both art and nexus, both prefix routes took ns=ghcr.io
while unprefixed requests went to whichever name sorted first, with
nothing but a startup warning. Config validation now refuses the second
entry, comparing hosts without case and without the default :443.
* Log each refused ns once per upstream and refuse overlong values
The refusal warning fired on every request, and a node with a missing
oci_mirrors entry asks for the manifest and each layer, so the same line
piled up. Each upstream/ns pair is now logged once, for up to 1024
pairs; after that every refusal is logged again.
ns comes straight from the client and can be as long as the request
line allows, so remembering it as is would let anyone pin a lot of
memory with a handful of requests. No registry host is longer than 259
characters (a 253-character name plus a port), so anything longer is
refused right away, before it is logged or remembered.
* Compare oci_mirrors hosts the way the handler does
The duplicate check lowercased the host and trimmed :443, while the
handler splits host and port, brackets IPv6 literals and drops an empty
port. So ghcr.io and ghcr.io:, or [::1] and [::1]:, passed as different
hosts in two upstreams and then collided in the handler. The check now
builds the same key the handler uses.
* Rewrap the oci_mirrors paragraphs in the configuration docs
Two sentences had been dropped into the middle of wrapped lines, and the
prefix-route paragraph named Docker Hub twice in a row. Same content,
shorter lines, one mention.
* Stop logging ns refusals once the set is full
Past 1024 different upstream/ns pairs every refusal was logged again,
so anyone could fill the set with made-up hosts and then flood the log
at warning level. When the set is full the proxy now says so once and
keeps quiet after that. A real misconfiguration shows up long before
that, with the first pull.
* Test the limit on remembered ns refusals
Nothing covered what happens once 1024 pairs are remembered. The new
test fills the set, then sends a known pair and two new ones: the proxy
must log the limit notice exactly once, log none of the refusals and
keep the set at its size.
2026-10-10 08:35:50 +02:00
"sync"
2026-10-12 14:00:57 +02:00
"github.com/git-pkgs/proxy/internal/retention"
"github.com/git-pkgs/purl"
2026-01-29 19:35:15 +00:00
)
const (
2026-08-16 22:42:55 +05:30
dockerHubRegistry = "https://registry-1.docker.io"
blobMatchCount = 3 // full match + name + digest
manifestMatchCount = 3 // full match + name + reference
tagsListMatchCount = 2 // full match + name
registrySelectorParts = 3 // upstream + name + repository
Route containerd ns mirror requests to configured registries (#405)
* Route containerd ns mirror requests to configured registries
containerd's hosts.toml mirrors append ?ns=<registry-host> to every
request. The container handler ignored it, so a single _default mirror
entry could not serve more than one registry.
ns is a closed-world lookup key and is never dialed. Docker Hub aliases
and the host of upstream.oci_default select the default route, hosts of
upstream.oci entries select their named upstream. Unknown hosts return
NAME_UNKNOWN so containerd falls back to its next host. Registry URLs
with a path are not indexed, because ns names the registry at the root
of a host. Host collisions log a warning and resolve deterministically.
With ns the path is the verbatim upstream repository, the reserved
upstream/ prefix is rejected, and repository prefix routes such as
Homebrew's do not apply. Cache names match the unprefixed and
upstream/{name}/ routes, so all routes share cached blobs, manifests and
tag lists. ns is no longer forwarded on tag-list requests, and the
pagination Link is rewritten per request instead of at store time so
clients on different routes get links for their own route.
Refs #303
* Document containerd ns mirroring
Refs #303
* Version the tag-list cache identity for the raw-link format
Tag-list rows now store the upstream Link verbatim and rewrite it per
request. Rows written by earlier versions hold a Link already rewritten
for one route. Under the unchanged key an older binary running next to
this one (rolling update on shared Postgres, or a rollback) would serve
the raw Link unrewritten, sending clients to the wrong route for the
next page. A format marker in the key keeps the two apart at the cost of
one cache miss per tag list after the upgrade.
Adversarial review finding F1: tag-list cache rows hold raw upstream
Links under unchanged keys, so an older binary serves them unrewritten.
* Qualify the README claim about ns mirror coverage
Registries whose URL has a path and hosts shared by two entries are not
reachable through ns; point to the configuration guide for both rules.
Adversarial review finding F3: README says ns covers every upstream.oci
registry.
* Redact registry URLs in ns index warnings
Configured registry URLs may carry userinfo credentials, which the new
startup warnings wrote to the log verbatim. Log them with the password
masked, and say precisely what a path-prefixed default registry means:
its host is not indexed, while the Docker Hub aliases still select it.
Adversarial review finding F2: startup warnings print registry URLs
unredacted and the default-registry message is misleading.
* Keep non-default ports apart in the ns index
Dropping 80 and 443 regardless of scheme turned https://host:80 and
https://host into the same key, so a request for one of them could land
on the other registry. Only the default port of the URL's scheme is
optional now. A configured host is indexed with and without that port,
because image references spell it either way; any other port has to
match exactly, and the ns value is used as containerd sends it, apart
from case and IPv6 brackets.
Since a URL now yields two keys that can belong to different routes,
the collision warning lists the owner per key.
The handler test runs two registries on one host that differ only in
the port. Tests can't bind 80 or 443, so a dialer maps those addresses
to the fake servers.
* Allow upstream/{name}/ together with ns when they agree
containerd sends ns on every request to a mirror host, override_path or
not. Per-registry mirrors pointing at /v2/upstream/{name} therefore
arrive as upstream/{name}/...?ns=<registry>, and refusing every prefixed
name under ns broke them, including the only way to mirror an upstream
whose URL has a path.
Such requests are now handled like the prefix route without ns, as long
as ns names that upstream's own host under the same port rules as the
index. Any other ns on a prefixed name is still NAME_UNKNOWN, so ns
can't be used to create cache entries under another registry's name.
* README: containerd config_path and how to check it
A _default/hosts.toml does nothing while CRI has no hosts directory
configured, so add the config.toml snippet for containerd 2.x and 1.x.
To check the setup, look at containerd config dump and pull with
crictl, then find the request in the proxy log; ctr --hosts-dir reads
the directory on its own and would succeed even without config_path.
Also mention that existing per-registry override_path entries keep
working and that k3s generates the directory itself.
* Let the prefix route take ns for aliases and mirrored registries
With upstream.oci.hub pointing at registry-1.docker.io and a docker.io
hosts.toml mirror on /v2/upstream/hub, containerd sends ns=docker.io,
and the prefix check only accepted the upstream's own host. The same
happens whenever the upstream is a mirror of the registry the nodes
pull from, say an Artifactory remote for ghcr.io: ns carries ghcr.io,
the upstream host is something else, and the pull got a 404.
The prefix already decides where the content comes from and which
cache entries are used, so ns can't redirect anything there. The check
now only refuses an ns that contradicts the prefix, meaning a host the
proxy knows that belongs to another route. The Docker Hub aliases count
as one host, and a host the proxy doesn't know at all is accepted,
since a client can only arrive at the prefix through its own mirror
entry.
* Take docker.io on every prefix route
A Docker Hub mirror configured as a named upstream (mirror.gcr.io, an
Artifactory remote) with a docker.io hosts.toml pointing at
/v2/upstream/hub got a 404 again: docker.io is always in the index for
the default route, so the check saw a known host of another route. That
setup worked before this branch. Docker Hub repository names have
exactly two path components, so docker.io/upstream/... can never be a
real image, and accepting the aliases on every prefix route shadows
nothing.
While here: the collision warning claimed ns requests go to the other
route, which is only true without the prefix, and the README said pulls
for unknown registries always get a 404, which isn't the case for paths
under upstream/{name}/.
* Only take a foreign ns on a prefix route when it is configured
A containerd _default mirror sends the same request for a pull of
unconfigured.example/upstream/mirror/owner/app as a ghcr.io hosts.toml
with override_path does for a mirror upstream. Accepting any host the
proxy didn't know therefore let such a pull be answered with owner/app
from the mirror upstream, a different image, instead of a 404 that lets
containerd go to the registry the image actually names.
The prefix route now accepts ns only for the upstream's own host, for
Docker Hub, and for hosts listed in the new upstream.oci_mirrors setting.
That setting is how an Artifactory remote of ghcr.io keeps working:
upstream:
oci_mirrors:
ghcr: ["ghcr.io"]
The listed hosts also select the upstream for unprefixed ns requests,
which makes a mirror with a path in its URL reachable through the
_default entry as well. Hosts from configured URLs still win over
mirror entries; the proxy warns about such overlaps at startup.
* Fix the docs sentence on which ns a prefix route takes
configuration.md still said a prefix request with ns is only refused
when ns names another route's host. Since the last commit it is the
other way round: only the upstream's own host, its oci_mirrors entries
and Docker Hub get through.
* Note what a host accepted on a prefix route gives up
Listing ghcr.io for an upstream (or the upstream's own host) still has
the ambiguity from the wildcard case: ghcr.io/upstream/ghcr/owner/app
lands on that upstream. That is the price of an explicit entry and
fine in practice, but it should be written down.
* Test that oci_mirrors entries stay with their own upstream
Two gaps in the coverage of the last change: nothing failed if a host
listed for one upstream was also accepted on another upstream's prefix,
and nothing checked that the server actually hands upstream.oci_mirrors
to the container handler. The handler test now has a second upstream
that must refuse ghcr.io, and a small server test pulls through a
mirror entry on both the prefix and the unprefixed route.
* Log when a prefix route refuses an ns
Setups with a ghcr.io hosts.toml pointing at a mirror upstream worked
before this branch and now need an oci_mirrors entry. Without one,
containerd gets a 404, quietly pulls from ghcr.io directly, and nobody
notices the proxy is being skipped. The refusal is now logged as a
warning that names the upstream and the ns and points at
upstream.oci_mirrors.
* Drop a check in validateOCIMirrors that could never fire
user@ghcr.io parses with ghcr.io as its host, so the parsed.Host != host
comparison already rejects it and the extra parsed.User test was dead.
A test case for a host with credentials keeps that path covered.
* Reject an oci_mirrors host that is listed for two upstreams
With ghcr.io under both art and nexus, both prefix routes took ns=ghcr.io
while unprefixed requests went to whichever name sorted first, with
nothing but a startup warning. Config validation now refuses the second
entry, comparing hosts without case and without the default :443.
* Log each refused ns once per upstream and refuse overlong values
The refusal warning fired on every request, and a node with a missing
oci_mirrors entry asks for the manifest and each layer, so the same line
piled up. Each upstream/ns pair is now logged once, for up to 1024
pairs; after that every refusal is logged again.
ns comes straight from the client and can be as long as the request
line allows, so remembering it as is would let anyone pin a lot of
memory with a handful of requests. No registry host is longer than 259
characters (a 253-character name plus a port), so anything longer is
refused right away, before it is logged or remembered.
* Compare oci_mirrors hosts the way the handler does
The duplicate check lowercased the host and trimmed :443, while the
handler splits host and port, brackets IPv6 literals and drops an empty
port. So ghcr.io and ghcr.io:, or [::1] and [::1]:, passed as different
hosts in two upstreams and then collided in the handler. The check now
builds the same key the handler uses.
* Rewrap the oci_mirrors paragraphs in the configuration docs
Two sentences had been dropped into the middle of wrapped lines, and the
prefix-route paragraph named Docker Hub twice in a row. Same content,
shorter lines, one mention.
* Stop logging ns refusals once the set is full
Past 1024 different upstream/ns pairs every refusal was logged again,
so anyone could fill the set with made-up hosts and then flood the log
at warning level. When the set is full the proxy now says so once and
keeps quiet after that. A real misconfiguration shows up long before
that, with the first pull.
* Test the limit on remembered ns refusals
Nothing covered what happens once 1024 pairs are remembered. The new
test fills the set, then sends a known pair and two new ones: the proxy
must log the limit notice exactly once, log none of the refusals and
keep the set at its size.
2026-10-10 08:35:50 +02:00
// namespaceQueryParam is the query parameter containerd appends to mirror
// requests to name the registry the image reference points at.
namespaceQueryParam = "ns"
// defaultNamespaceRoute marks namespace hosts served by the default registry.
defaultNamespaceRoute = ""
// maxReportedNamespaceRefusals bounds the upstream/ns pairs remembered
// for logging refusals once; past it further refusals are not logged.
maxReportedNamespaceRefusals = 1024
// maxNamespaceLength is the longest ns a registry host can produce: a
// 253-character DNS name plus ":65535". Longer values are refused before
// they are logged or remembered.
maxNamespaceLength = 259
2026-01-29 19:35:15 +00:00
)
Route containerd ns mirror requests to configured registries (#405)
* Route containerd ns mirror requests to configured registries
containerd's hosts.toml mirrors append ?ns=<registry-host> to every
request. The container handler ignored it, so a single _default mirror
entry could not serve more than one registry.
ns is a closed-world lookup key and is never dialed. Docker Hub aliases
and the host of upstream.oci_default select the default route, hosts of
upstream.oci entries select their named upstream. Unknown hosts return
NAME_UNKNOWN so containerd falls back to its next host. Registry URLs
with a path are not indexed, because ns names the registry at the root
of a host. Host collisions log a warning and resolve deterministically.
With ns the path is the verbatim upstream repository, the reserved
upstream/ prefix is rejected, and repository prefix routes such as
Homebrew's do not apply. Cache names match the unprefixed and
upstream/{name}/ routes, so all routes share cached blobs, manifests and
tag lists. ns is no longer forwarded on tag-list requests, and the
pagination Link is rewritten per request instead of at store time so
clients on different routes get links for their own route.
Refs #303
* Document containerd ns mirroring
Refs #303
* Version the tag-list cache identity for the raw-link format
Tag-list rows now store the upstream Link verbatim and rewrite it per
request. Rows written by earlier versions hold a Link already rewritten
for one route. Under the unchanged key an older binary running next to
this one (rolling update on shared Postgres, or a rollback) would serve
the raw Link unrewritten, sending clients to the wrong route for the
next page. A format marker in the key keeps the two apart at the cost of
one cache miss per tag list after the upgrade.
Adversarial review finding F1: tag-list cache rows hold raw upstream
Links under unchanged keys, so an older binary serves them unrewritten.
* Qualify the README claim about ns mirror coverage
Registries whose URL has a path and hosts shared by two entries are not
reachable through ns; point to the configuration guide for both rules.
Adversarial review finding F3: README says ns covers every upstream.oci
registry.
* Redact registry URLs in ns index warnings
Configured registry URLs may carry userinfo credentials, which the new
startup warnings wrote to the log verbatim. Log them with the password
masked, and say precisely what a path-prefixed default registry means:
its host is not indexed, while the Docker Hub aliases still select it.
Adversarial review finding F2: startup warnings print registry URLs
unredacted and the default-registry message is misleading.
* Keep non-default ports apart in the ns index
Dropping 80 and 443 regardless of scheme turned https://host:80 and
https://host into the same key, so a request for one of them could land
on the other registry. Only the default port of the URL's scheme is
optional now. A configured host is indexed with and without that port,
because image references spell it either way; any other port has to
match exactly, and the ns value is used as containerd sends it, apart
from case and IPv6 brackets.
Since a URL now yields two keys that can belong to different routes,
the collision warning lists the owner per key.
The handler test runs two registries on one host that differ only in
the port. Tests can't bind 80 or 443, so a dialer maps those addresses
to the fake servers.
* Allow upstream/{name}/ together with ns when they agree
containerd sends ns on every request to a mirror host, override_path or
not. Per-registry mirrors pointing at /v2/upstream/{name} therefore
arrive as upstream/{name}/...?ns=<registry>, and refusing every prefixed
name under ns broke them, including the only way to mirror an upstream
whose URL has a path.
Such requests are now handled like the prefix route without ns, as long
as ns names that upstream's own host under the same port rules as the
index. Any other ns on a prefixed name is still NAME_UNKNOWN, so ns
can't be used to create cache entries under another registry's name.
* README: containerd config_path and how to check it
A _default/hosts.toml does nothing while CRI has no hosts directory
configured, so add the config.toml snippet for containerd 2.x and 1.x.
To check the setup, look at containerd config dump and pull with
crictl, then find the request in the proxy log; ctr --hosts-dir reads
the directory on its own and would succeed even without config_path.
Also mention that existing per-registry override_path entries keep
working and that k3s generates the directory itself.
* Let the prefix route take ns for aliases and mirrored registries
With upstream.oci.hub pointing at registry-1.docker.io and a docker.io
hosts.toml mirror on /v2/upstream/hub, containerd sends ns=docker.io,
and the prefix check only accepted the upstream's own host. The same
happens whenever the upstream is a mirror of the registry the nodes
pull from, say an Artifactory remote for ghcr.io: ns carries ghcr.io,
the upstream host is something else, and the pull got a 404.
The prefix already decides where the content comes from and which
cache entries are used, so ns can't redirect anything there. The check
now only refuses an ns that contradicts the prefix, meaning a host the
proxy knows that belongs to another route. The Docker Hub aliases count
as one host, and a host the proxy doesn't know at all is accepted,
since a client can only arrive at the prefix through its own mirror
entry.
* Take docker.io on every prefix route
A Docker Hub mirror configured as a named upstream (mirror.gcr.io, an
Artifactory remote) with a docker.io hosts.toml pointing at
/v2/upstream/hub got a 404 again: docker.io is always in the index for
the default route, so the check saw a known host of another route. That
setup worked before this branch. Docker Hub repository names have
exactly two path components, so docker.io/upstream/... can never be a
real image, and accepting the aliases on every prefix route shadows
nothing.
While here: the collision warning claimed ns requests go to the other
route, which is only true without the prefix, and the README said pulls
for unknown registries always get a 404, which isn't the case for paths
under upstream/{name}/.
* Only take a foreign ns on a prefix route when it is configured
A containerd _default mirror sends the same request for a pull of
unconfigured.example/upstream/mirror/owner/app as a ghcr.io hosts.toml
with override_path does for a mirror upstream. Accepting any host the
proxy didn't know therefore let such a pull be answered with owner/app
from the mirror upstream, a different image, instead of a 404 that lets
containerd go to the registry the image actually names.
The prefix route now accepts ns only for the upstream's own host, for
Docker Hub, and for hosts listed in the new upstream.oci_mirrors setting.
That setting is how an Artifactory remote of ghcr.io keeps working:
upstream:
oci_mirrors:
ghcr: ["ghcr.io"]
The listed hosts also select the upstream for unprefixed ns requests,
which makes a mirror with a path in its URL reachable through the
_default entry as well. Hosts from configured URLs still win over
mirror entries; the proxy warns about such overlaps at startup.
* Fix the docs sentence on which ns a prefix route takes
configuration.md still said a prefix request with ns is only refused
when ns names another route's host. Since the last commit it is the
other way round: only the upstream's own host, its oci_mirrors entries
and Docker Hub get through.
* Note what a host accepted on a prefix route gives up
Listing ghcr.io for an upstream (or the upstream's own host) still has
the ambiguity from the wildcard case: ghcr.io/upstream/ghcr/owner/app
lands on that upstream. That is the price of an explicit entry and
fine in practice, but it should be written down.
* Test that oci_mirrors entries stay with their own upstream
Two gaps in the coverage of the last change: nothing failed if a host
listed for one upstream was also accepted on another upstream's prefix,
and nothing checked that the server actually hands upstream.oci_mirrors
to the container handler. The handler test now has a second upstream
that must refuse ghcr.io, and a small server test pulls through a
mirror entry on both the prefix and the unprefixed route.
* Log when a prefix route refuses an ns
Setups with a ghcr.io hosts.toml pointing at a mirror upstream worked
before this branch and now need an oci_mirrors entry. Without one,
containerd gets a 404, quietly pulls from ghcr.io directly, and nobody
notices the proxy is being skipped. The refusal is now logged as a
warning that names the upstream and the ns and points at
upstream.oci_mirrors.
* Drop a check in validateOCIMirrors that could never fire
user@ghcr.io parses with ghcr.io as its host, so the parsed.Host != host
comparison already rejects it and the extra parsed.User test was dead.
A test case for a host with credentials keeps that path covered.
* Reject an oci_mirrors host that is listed for two upstreams
With ghcr.io under both art and nexus, both prefix routes took ns=ghcr.io
while unprefixed requests went to whichever name sorted first, with
nothing but a startup warning. Config validation now refuses the second
entry, comparing hosts without case and without the default :443.
* Log each refused ns once per upstream and refuse overlong values
The refusal warning fired on every request, and a node with a missing
oci_mirrors entry asks for the manifest and each layer, so the same line
piled up. Each upstream/ns pair is now logged once, for up to 1024
pairs; after that every refusal is logged again.
ns comes straight from the client and can be as long as the request
line allows, so remembering it as is would let anyone pin a lot of
memory with a handful of requests. No registry host is longer than 259
characters (a 253-character name plus a port), so anything longer is
refused right away, before it is logged or remembered.
* Compare oci_mirrors hosts the way the handler does
The duplicate check lowercased the host and trimmed :443, while the
handler splits host and port, brackets IPv6 literals and drops an empty
port. So ghcr.io and ghcr.io:, or [::1] and [::1]:, passed as different
hosts in two upstreams and then collided in the handler. The check now
builds the same key the handler uses.
* Rewrap the oci_mirrors paragraphs in the configuration docs
Two sentences had been dropped into the middle of wrapped lines, and the
prefix-route paragraph named Docker Hub twice in a row. Same content,
shorter lines, one mention.
* Stop logging ns refusals once the set is full
Past 1024 different upstream/ns pairs every refusal was logged again,
so anyone could fill the set with made-up hosts and then flood the log
at warning level. When the set is full the proxy now says so once and
keeps quiet after that. A real misconfiguration shows up long before
that, with the first pull.
* Test the limit on remembered ns refusals
Nothing covered what happens once 1024 pairs are remembered. The new
test fills the set, then sends a known pair and two new ones: the proxy
must log the limit notice exactly once, log none of the refusals and
keep the set at its size.
2026-10-10 08:35:50 +02:00
// dockerHubNamespaces are the registry URLs clients use for Docker Hub.
var dockerHubNamespaces = [ ] string { "https://docker.io" , "https://index.docker.io" , "https://registry-1.docker.io" } //nolint:gochecknoglobals // fixed alias list
// schemeDefaultPorts are the ports an image reference may leave out.
var schemeDefaultPorts = map [ string ] string { "https" : "443" , "http" : "80" } //nolint:gochecknoglobals // fixed table
// dockerHubNamespaceKeys are the ns lookup keys of the Docker Hub aliases.
var dockerHubNamespaceKeys = dockerHubKeys ( ) //nolint:gochecknoglobals // fixed table
func dockerHubKeys ( ) [ ] string {
var keys [ ] string
for _ , registryURL := range dockerHubNamespaces {
hostKeys , _ := namespaceKeysForURL ( registryURL )
keys = append ( keys , hostKeys ... )
}
return keys
}
func isDockerHubKey ( key string ) bool {
return slices . Contains ( dockerHubNamespaceKeys , key )
}
2026-10-12 14:00:57 +02:00
// Blobs are stored under the repository name the client asks for, which
// purl writes as one name, pkg:oci/library%2Fnginx. Named upstreams keep
// their upstream/{name}/ prefix, also when containerd reaches them through
// ns. Homebrew bottles are stored under Homebrew's image name, which writes
// openssl@3 as homebrew/core/openssl/3, and Helm charts pulled over OCI go
// through here like images.
// Package rules write the repository name as a path, pkg:oci/library/nginx,
// and are mapped to that form.
func init ( ) {
retention . Default . Register ( retention . Spec { Key : "oci" , CanonicalPackage : ociRetentionKey } )
}
// ociRetentionKey maps a package rule to the stored package PURL. It refuses
// a key with an empty path segment, a segment with ':' or '@' (a tag or
// digest from an image reference), or an upstream/{name} prefix without a
// repository, since no blob is ever stored under such a name.
func ociRetentionKey ( p * purl . PURL ) ( string , bool ) {
if p == nil {
return "" , false
}
name := p . Name
if p . Namespace != "" {
name = p . Namespace + "/" + p . Name
}
segments := strings . Split ( name , "/" )
if slices . Contains ( segments , "" ) || strings . ContainsAny ( name , ":@" ) ||
( segments [ 0 ] == "upstream" && len ( segments ) < registrySelectorParts ) {
return "" , false
}
return retention . DefaultCanonical ( "oci" ) ( purl . New ( p . Type , "" , name , "" , nil ) )
}
2026-01-29 19:35:15 +00:00
// ContainerHandler handles OCI/Docker container registry protocol requests.
// It implements the OCI Distribution Spec for pulling images.
// Reference: https://github.com/opencontainers/distribution-spec/blob/main/spec.md
type ContainerHandler struct {
2026-08-16 22:42:55 +05:30
proxy * Proxy
registryURL string
proxyURL string
namedRegistries map [ string ] string
2026-09-03 16:59:12 +01:00
registries [ ] containerRegistry
Route containerd ns mirror requests to configured registries (#405)
* Route containerd ns mirror requests to configured registries
containerd's hosts.toml mirrors append ?ns=<registry-host> to every
request. The container handler ignored it, so a single _default mirror
entry could not serve more than one registry.
ns is a closed-world lookup key and is never dialed. Docker Hub aliases
and the host of upstream.oci_default select the default route, hosts of
upstream.oci entries select their named upstream. Unknown hosts return
NAME_UNKNOWN so containerd falls back to its next host. Registry URLs
with a path are not indexed, because ns names the registry at the root
of a host. Host collisions log a warning and resolve deterministically.
With ns the path is the verbatim upstream repository, the reserved
upstream/ prefix is rejected, and repository prefix routes such as
Homebrew's do not apply. Cache names match the unprefixed and
upstream/{name}/ routes, so all routes share cached blobs, manifests and
tag lists. ns is no longer forwarded on tag-list requests, and the
pagination Link is rewritten per request instead of at store time so
clients on different routes get links for their own route.
Refs #303
* Document containerd ns mirroring
Refs #303
* Version the tag-list cache identity for the raw-link format
Tag-list rows now store the upstream Link verbatim and rewrite it per
request. Rows written by earlier versions hold a Link already rewritten
for one route. Under the unchanged key an older binary running next to
this one (rolling update on shared Postgres, or a rollback) would serve
the raw Link unrewritten, sending clients to the wrong route for the
next page. A format marker in the key keeps the two apart at the cost of
one cache miss per tag list after the upgrade.
Adversarial review finding F1: tag-list cache rows hold raw upstream
Links under unchanged keys, so an older binary serves them unrewritten.
* Qualify the README claim about ns mirror coverage
Registries whose URL has a path and hosts shared by two entries are not
reachable through ns; point to the configuration guide for both rules.
Adversarial review finding F3: README says ns covers every upstream.oci
registry.
* Redact registry URLs in ns index warnings
Configured registry URLs may carry userinfo credentials, which the new
startup warnings wrote to the log verbatim. Log them with the password
masked, and say precisely what a path-prefixed default registry means:
its host is not indexed, while the Docker Hub aliases still select it.
Adversarial review finding F2: startup warnings print registry URLs
unredacted and the default-registry message is misleading.
* Keep non-default ports apart in the ns index
Dropping 80 and 443 regardless of scheme turned https://host:80 and
https://host into the same key, so a request for one of them could land
on the other registry. Only the default port of the URL's scheme is
optional now. A configured host is indexed with and without that port,
because image references spell it either way; any other port has to
match exactly, and the ns value is used as containerd sends it, apart
from case and IPv6 brackets.
Since a URL now yields two keys that can belong to different routes,
the collision warning lists the owner per key.
The handler test runs two registries on one host that differ only in
the port. Tests can't bind 80 or 443, so a dialer maps those addresses
to the fake servers.
* Allow upstream/{name}/ together with ns when they agree
containerd sends ns on every request to a mirror host, override_path or
not. Per-registry mirrors pointing at /v2/upstream/{name} therefore
arrive as upstream/{name}/...?ns=<registry>, and refusing every prefixed
name under ns broke them, including the only way to mirror an upstream
whose URL has a path.
Such requests are now handled like the prefix route without ns, as long
as ns names that upstream's own host under the same port rules as the
index. Any other ns on a prefixed name is still NAME_UNKNOWN, so ns
can't be used to create cache entries under another registry's name.
* README: containerd config_path and how to check it
A _default/hosts.toml does nothing while CRI has no hosts directory
configured, so add the config.toml snippet for containerd 2.x and 1.x.
To check the setup, look at containerd config dump and pull with
crictl, then find the request in the proxy log; ctr --hosts-dir reads
the directory on its own and would succeed even without config_path.
Also mention that existing per-registry override_path entries keep
working and that k3s generates the directory itself.
* Let the prefix route take ns for aliases and mirrored registries
With upstream.oci.hub pointing at registry-1.docker.io and a docker.io
hosts.toml mirror on /v2/upstream/hub, containerd sends ns=docker.io,
and the prefix check only accepted the upstream's own host. The same
happens whenever the upstream is a mirror of the registry the nodes
pull from, say an Artifactory remote for ghcr.io: ns carries ghcr.io,
the upstream host is something else, and the pull got a 404.
The prefix already decides where the content comes from and which
cache entries are used, so ns can't redirect anything there. The check
now only refuses an ns that contradicts the prefix, meaning a host the
proxy knows that belongs to another route. The Docker Hub aliases count
as one host, and a host the proxy doesn't know at all is accepted,
since a client can only arrive at the prefix through its own mirror
entry.
* Take docker.io on every prefix route
A Docker Hub mirror configured as a named upstream (mirror.gcr.io, an
Artifactory remote) with a docker.io hosts.toml pointing at
/v2/upstream/hub got a 404 again: docker.io is always in the index for
the default route, so the check saw a known host of another route. That
setup worked before this branch. Docker Hub repository names have
exactly two path components, so docker.io/upstream/... can never be a
real image, and accepting the aliases on every prefix route shadows
nothing.
While here: the collision warning claimed ns requests go to the other
route, which is only true without the prefix, and the README said pulls
for unknown registries always get a 404, which isn't the case for paths
under upstream/{name}/.
* Only take a foreign ns on a prefix route when it is configured
A containerd _default mirror sends the same request for a pull of
unconfigured.example/upstream/mirror/owner/app as a ghcr.io hosts.toml
with override_path does for a mirror upstream. Accepting any host the
proxy didn't know therefore let such a pull be answered with owner/app
from the mirror upstream, a different image, instead of a 404 that lets
containerd go to the registry the image actually names.
The prefix route now accepts ns only for the upstream's own host, for
Docker Hub, and for hosts listed in the new upstream.oci_mirrors setting.
That setting is how an Artifactory remote of ghcr.io keeps working:
upstream:
oci_mirrors:
ghcr: ["ghcr.io"]
The listed hosts also select the upstream for unprefixed ns requests,
which makes a mirror with a path in its URL reachable through the
_default entry as well. Hosts from configured URLs still win over
mirror entries; the proxy warns about such overlaps at startup.
* Fix the docs sentence on which ns a prefix route takes
configuration.md still said a prefix request with ns is only refused
when ns names another route's host. Since the last commit it is the
other way round: only the upstream's own host, its oci_mirrors entries
and Docker Hub get through.
* Note what a host accepted on a prefix route gives up
Listing ghcr.io for an upstream (or the upstream's own host) still has
the ambiguity from the wildcard case: ghcr.io/upstream/ghcr/owner/app
lands on that upstream. That is the price of an explicit entry and
fine in practice, but it should be written down.
* Test that oci_mirrors entries stay with their own upstream
Two gaps in the coverage of the last change: nothing failed if a host
listed for one upstream was also accepted on another upstream's prefix,
and nothing checked that the server actually hands upstream.oci_mirrors
to the container handler. The handler test now has a second upstream
that must refuse ghcr.io, and a small server test pulls through a
mirror entry on both the prefix and the unprefixed route.
* Log when a prefix route refuses an ns
Setups with a ghcr.io hosts.toml pointing at a mirror upstream worked
before this branch and now need an oci_mirrors entry. Without one,
containerd gets a 404, quietly pulls from ghcr.io directly, and nobody
notices the proxy is being skipped. The refusal is now logged as a
warning that names the upstream and the ns and points at
upstream.oci_mirrors.
* Drop a check in validateOCIMirrors that could never fire
user@ghcr.io parses with ghcr.io as its host, so the parsed.Host != host
comparison already rejects it and the extra parsed.User test was dead.
A test case for a host with credentials keeps that path covered.
* Reject an oci_mirrors host that is listed for two upstreams
With ghcr.io under both art and nexus, both prefix routes took ns=ghcr.io
while unprefixed requests went to whichever name sorted first, with
nothing but a startup warning. Config validation now refuses the second
entry, comparing hosts without case and without the default :443.
* Log each refused ns once per upstream and refuse overlong values
The refusal warning fired on every request, and a node with a missing
oci_mirrors entry asks for the manifest and each layer, so the same line
piled up. Each upstream/ns pair is now logged once, for up to 1024
pairs; after that every refusal is logged again.
ns comes straight from the client and can be as long as the request
line allows, so remembering it as is would let anyone pin a lot of
memory with a handful of requests. No registry host is longer than 259
characters (a 253-character name plus a port), so anything longer is
refused right away, before it is logged or remembered.
* Compare oci_mirrors hosts the way the handler does
The duplicate check lowercased the host and trimmed :443, while the
handler splits host and port, brackets IPv6 literals and drops an empty
port. So ghcr.io and ghcr.io:, or [::1] and [::1]:, passed as different
hosts in two upstreams and then collided in the handler. The check now
builds the same key the handler uses.
* Rewrap the oci_mirrors paragraphs in the configuration docs
Two sentences had been dropped into the middle of wrapped lines, and the
prefix-route paragraph named Docker Hub twice in a row. Same content,
shorter lines, one mention.
* Stop logging ns refusals once the set is full
Past 1024 different upstream/ns pairs every refusal was logged again,
so anyone could fill the set with made-up hosts and then flood the log
at warning level. When the set is full the proxy now says so once and
keeps quiet after that. A real misconfiguration shows up long before
that, with the first pull.
* Test the limit on remembered ns refusals
Nothing covered what happens once 1024 pairs are remembered. The new
test fills the set, then sends a known pair and two new ones: the proxy
must log the limit notice exactly once, log none of the refusals and
keep the set at its size.
2026-10-10 08:35:50 +02:00
// namespaces maps normalized registry hosts from containerd's ns query
// parameter to a named upstream, or to defaultNamespaceRoute.
namespaces map [ string ] string
// mirrorKeys holds, per named upstream, the ns lookup keys of the
// registries it is configured to mirror.
mirrorKeys map [ string ] [ ] string
refusalsMu sync . Mutex
// refusals remembers upstream/ns pairs whose refusal was already logged.
refusals map [ string ] struct { }
// refusalsFull is set once the refusals set reached its limit and that
// was logged.
refusalsFull bool
2026-09-03 16:59:12 +01:00
}
type containerRegistry struct {
repositoryPrefix string
registryURL string
2026-01-29 19:35:15 +00:00
}
// NewContainerHandler creates a new container registry protocol handler.
2026-08-16 22:42:55 +05:30
// Named registries are selected with the repository prefix
// upstream/{name}/, leaving unprefixed requests compatible with the Docker Hub
// mirror behavior.
func NewContainerHandler ( proxy * Proxy , proxyURL string , namedRegistries ... map [ string ] string ) * ContainerHandler {
Route containerd ns mirror requests to configured registries (#405)
* Route containerd ns mirror requests to configured registries
containerd's hosts.toml mirrors append ?ns=<registry-host> to every
request. The container handler ignored it, so a single _default mirror
entry could not serve more than one registry.
ns is a closed-world lookup key and is never dialed. Docker Hub aliases
and the host of upstream.oci_default select the default route, hosts of
upstream.oci entries select their named upstream. Unknown hosts return
NAME_UNKNOWN so containerd falls back to its next host. Registry URLs
with a path are not indexed, because ns names the registry at the root
of a host. Host collisions log a warning and resolve deterministically.
With ns the path is the verbatim upstream repository, the reserved
upstream/ prefix is rejected, and repository prefix routes such as
Homebrew's do not apply. Cache names match the unprefixed and
upstream/{name}/ routes, so all routes share cached blobs, manifests and
tag lists. ns is no longer forwarded on tag-list requests, and the
pagination Link is rewritten per request instead of at store time so
clients on different routes get links for their own route.
Refs #303
* Document containerd ns mirroring
Refs #303
* Version the tag-list cache identity for the raw-link format
Tag-list rows now store the upstream Link verbatim and rewrite it per
request. Rows written by earlier versions hold a Link already rewritten
for one route. Under the unchanged key an older binary running next to
this one (rolling update on shared Postgres, or a rollback) would serve
the raw Link unrewritten, sending clients to the wrong route for the
next page. A format marker in the key keeps the two apart at the cost of
one cache miss per tag list after the upgrade.
Adversarial review finding F1: tag-list cache rows hold raw upstream
Links under unchanged keys, so an older binary serves them unrewritten.
* Qualify the README claim about ns mirror coverage
Registries whose URL has a path and hosts shared by two entries are not
reachable through ns; point to the configuration guide for both rules.
Adversarial review finding F3: README says ns covers every upstream.oci
registry.
* Redact registry URLs in ns index warnings
Configured registry URLs may carry userinfo credentials, which the new
startup warnings wrote to the log verbatim. Log them with the password
masked, and say precisely what a path-prefixed default registry means:
its host is not indexed, while the Docker Hub aliases still select it.
Adversarial review finding F2: startup warnings print registry URLs
unredacted and the default-registry message is misleading.
* Keep non-default ports apart in the ns index
Dropping 80 and 443 regardless of scheme turned https://host:80 and
https://host into the same key, so a request for one of them could land
on the other registry. Only the default port of the URL's scheme is
optional now. A configured host is indexed with and without that port,
because image references spell it either way; any other port has to
match exactly, and the ns value is used as containerd sends it, apart
from case and IPv6 brackets.
Since a URL now yields two keys that can belong to different routes,
the collision warning lists the owner per key.
The handler test runs two registries on one host that differ only in
the port. Tests can't bind 80 or 443, so a dialer maps those addresses
to the fake servers.
* Allow upstream/{name}/ together with ns when they agree
containerd sends ns on every request to a mirror host, override_path or
not. Per-registry mirrors pointing at /v2/upstream/{name} therefore
arrive as upstream/{name}/...?ns=<registry>, and refusing every prefixed
name under ns broke them, including the only way to mirror an upstream
whose URL has a path.
Such requests are now handled like the prefix route without ns, as long
as ns names that upstream's own host under the same port rules as the
index. Any other ns on a prefixed name is still NAME_UNKNOWN, so ns
can't be used to create cache entries under another registry's name.
* README: containerd config_path and how to check it
A _default/hosts.toml does nothing while CRI has no hosts directory
configured, so add the config.toml snippet for containerd 2.x and 1.x.
To check the setup, look at containerd config dump and pull with
crictl, then find the request in the proxy log; ctr --hosts-dir reads
the directory on its own and would succeed even without config_path.
Also mention that existing per-registry override_path entries keep
working and that k3s generates the directory itself.
* Let the prefix route take ns for aliases and mirrored registries
With upstream.oci.hub pointing at registry-1.docker.io and a docker.io
hosts.toml mirror on /v2/upstream/hub, containerd sends ns=docker.io,
and the prefix check only accepted the upstream's own host. The same
happens whenever the upstream is a mirror of the registry the nodes
pull from, say an Artifactory remote for ghcr.io: ns carries ghcr.io,
the upstream host is something else, and the pull got a 404.
The prefix already decides where the content comes from and which
cache entries are used, so ns can't redirect anything there. The check
now only refuses an ns that contradicts the prefix, meaning a host the
proxy knows that belongs to another route. The Docker Hub aliases count
as one host, and a host the proxy doesn't know at all is accepted,
since a client can only arrive at the prefix through its own mirror
entry.
* Take docker.io on every prefix route
A Docker Hub mirror configured as a named upstream (mirror.gcr.io, an
Artifactory remote) with a docker.io hosts.toml pointing at
/v2/upstream/hub got a 404 again: docker.io is always in the index for
the default route, so the check saw a known host of another route. That
setup worked before this branch. Docker Hub repository names have
exactly two path components, so docker.io/upstream/... can never be a
real image, and accepting the aliases on every prefix route shadows
nothing.
While here: the collision warning claimed ns requests go to the other
route, which is only true without the prefix, and the README said pulls
for unknown registries always get a 404, which isn't the case for paths
under upstream/{name}/.
* Only take a foreign ns on a prefix route when it is configured
A containerd _default mirror sends the same request for a pull of
unconfigured.example/upstream/mirror/owner/app as a ghcr.io hosts.toml
with override_path does for a mirror upstream. Accepting any host the
proxy didn't know therefore let such a pull be answered with owner/app
from the mirror upstream, a different image, instead of a 404 that lets
containerd go to the registry the image actually names.
The prefix route now accepts ns only for the upstream's own host, for
Docker Hub, and for hosts listed in the new upstream.oci_mirrors setting.
That setting is how an Artifactory remote of ghcr.io keeps working:
upstream:
oci_mirrors:
ghcr: ["ghcr.io"]
The listed hosts also select the upstream for unprefixed ns requests,
which makes a mirror with a path in its URL reachable through the
_default entry as well. Hosts from configured URLs still win over
mirror entries; the proxy warns about such overlaps at startup.
* Fix the docs sentence on which ns a prefix route takes
configuration.md still said a prefix request with ns is only refused
when ns names another route's host. Since the last commit it is the
other way round: only the upstream's own host, its oci_mirrors entries
and Docker Hub get through.
* Note what a host accepted on a prefix route gives up
Listing ghcr.io for an upstream (or the upstream's own host) still has
the ambiguity from the wildcard case: ghcr.io/upstream/ghcr/owner/app
lands on that upstream. That is the price of an explicit entry and
fine in practice, but it should be written down.
* Test that oci_mirrors entries stay with their own upstream
Two gaps in the coverage of the last change: nothing failed if a host
listed for one upstream was also accepted on another upstream's prefix,
and nothing checked that the server actually hands upstream.oci_mirrors
to the container handler. The handler test now has a second upstream
that must refuse ghcr.io, and a small server test pulls through a
mirror entry on both the prefix and the unprefixed route.
* Log when a prefix route refuses an ns
Setups with a ghcr.io hosts.toml pointing at a mirror upstream worked
before this branch and now need an oci_mirrors entry. Without one,
containerd gets a 404, quietly pulls from ghcr.io directly, and nobody
notices the proxy is being skipped. The refusal is now logged as a
warning that names the upstream and the ns and points at
upstream.oci_mirrors.
* Drop a check in validateOCIMirrors that could never fire
user@ghcr.io parses with ghcr.io as its host, so the parsed.Host != host
comparison already rejects it and the extra parsed.User test was dead.
A test case for a host with credentials keeps that path covered.
* Reject an oci_mirrors host that is listed for two upstreams
With ghcr.io under both art and nexus, both prefix routes took ns=ghcr.io
while unprefixed requests went to whichever name sorted first, with
nothing but a startup warning. Config validation now refuses the second
entry, comparing hosts without case and without the default :443.
* Log each refused ns once per upstream and refuse overlong values
The refusal warning fired on every request, and a node with a missing
oci_mirrors entry asks for the manifest and each layer, so the same line
piled up. Each upstream/ns pair is now logged once, for up to 1024
pairs; after that every refusal is logged again.
ns comes straight from the client and can be as long as the request
line allows, so remembering it as is would let anyone pin a lot of
memory with a handful of requests. No registry host is longer than 259
characters (a 253-character name plus a port), so anything longer is
refused right away, before it is logged or remembered.
* Compare oci_mirrors hosts the way the handler does
The duplicate check lowercased the host and trimmed :443, while the
handler splits host and port, brackets IPv6 literals and drops an empty
port. So ghcr.io and ghcr.io:, or [::1] and [::1]:, passed as different
hosts in two upstreams and then collided in the handler. The check now
builds the same key the handler uses.
* Rewrap the oci_mirrors paragraphs in the configuration docs
Two sentences had been dropped into the middle of wrapped lines, and the
prefix-route paragraph named Docker Hub twice in a row. Same content,
shorter lines, one mention.
* Stop logging ns refusals once the set is full
Past 1024 different upstream/ns pairs every refusal was logged again,
so anyone could fill the set with made-up hosts and then flood the log
at warning level. When the set is full the proxy now says so once and
keeps quiet after that. A real misconfiguration shows up long before
that, with the first pull.
* Test the limit on remembered ns refusals
Nothing covered what happens once 1024 pairs are remembered. The new
test fills the set, then sends a known pair and two new ones: the proxy
must log the limit notice exactly once, log none of the refusals and
keep the set at its size.
2026-10-10 08:35:50 +02:00
return newContainerHandler ( proxy , proxyURL , dockerHubRegistry , namedRegistries ... )
}
// NewContainerHandlerWithRegistry creates a container handler with a custom
// default registry and optional named registries.
func NewContainerHandlerWithRegistry (
proxy * Proxy ,
proxyURL , registryURL string ,
namedRegistries ... map [ string ] string ,
) * ContainerHandler {
return newContainerHandler ( proxy , proxyURL , configuredUpstreamURL ( registryURL , dockerHubRegistry ) , namedRegistries ... )
}
func newContainerHandler (
proxy * Proxy ,
proxyURL , registryURL string ,
namedRegistries ... map [ string ] string ,
) * ContainerHandler {
2026-08-16 22:42:55 +05:30
h := & ContainerHandler {
2026-01-29 19:35:15 +00:00
proxy : proxy ,
Route containerd ns mirror requests to configured registries (#405)
* Route containerd ns mirror requests to configured registries
containerd's hosts.toml mirrors append ?ns=<registry-host> to every
request. The container handler ignored it, so a single _default mirror
entry could not serve more than one registry.
ns is a closed-world lookup key and is never dialed. Docker Hub aliases
and the host of upstream.oci_default select the default route, hosts of
upstream.oci entries select their named upstream. Unknown hosts return
NAME_UNKNOWN so containerd falls back to its next host. Registry URLs
with a path are not indexed, because ns names the registry at the root
of a host. Host collisions log a warning and resolve deterministically.
With ns the path is the verbatim upstream repository, the reserved
upstream/ prefix is rejected, and repository prefix routes such as
Homebrew's do not apply. Cache names match the unprefixed and
upstream/{name}/ routes, so all routes share cached blobs, manifests and
tag lists. ns is no longer forwarded on tag-list requests, and the
pagination Link is rewritten per request instead of at store time so
clients on different routes get links for their own route.
Refs #303
* Document containerd ns mirroring
Refs #303
* Version the tag-list cache identity for the raw-link format
Tag-list rows now store the upstream Link verbatim and rewrite it per
request. Rows written by earlier versions hold a Link already rewritten
for one route. Under the unchanged key an older binary running next to
this one (rolling update on shared Postgres, or a rollback) would serve
the raw Link unrewritten, sending clients to the wrong route for the
next page. A format marker in the key keeps the two apart at the cost of
one cache miss per tag list after the upgrade.
Adversarial review finding F1: tag-list cache rows hold raw upstream
Links under unchanged keys, so an older binary serves them unrewritten.
* Qualify the README claim about ns mirror coverage
Registries whose URL has a path and hosts shared by two entries are not
reachable through ns; point to the configuration guide for both rules.
Adversarial review finding F3: README says ns covers every upstream.oci
registry.
* Redact registry URLs in ns index warnings
Configured registry URLs may carry userinfo credentials, which the new
startup warnings wrote to the log verbatim. Log them with the password
masked, and say precisely what a path-prefixed default registry means:
its host is not indexed, while the Docker Hub aliases still select it.
Adversarial review finding F2: startup warnings print registry URLs
unredacted and the default-registry message is misleading.
* Keep non-default ports apart in the ns index
Dropping 80 and 443 regardless of scheme turned https://host:80 and
https://host into the same key, so a request for one of them could land
on the other registry. Only the default port of the URL's scheme is
optional now. A configured host is indexed with and without that port,
because image references spell it either way; any other port has to
match exactly, and the ns value is used as containerd sends it, apart
from case and IPv6 brackets.
Since a URL now yields two keys that can belong to different routes,
the collision warning lists the owner per key.
The handler test runs two registries on one host that differ only in
the port. Tests can't bind 80 or 443, so a dialer maps those addresses
to the fake servers.
* Allow upstream/{name}/ together with ns when they agree
containerd sends ns on every request to a mirror host, override_path or
not. Per-registry mirrors pointing at /v2/upstream/{name} therefore
arrive as upstream/{name}/...?ns=<registry>, and refusing every prefixed
name under ns broke them, including the only way to mirror an upstream
whose URL has a path.
Such requests are now handled like the prefix route without ns, as long
as ns names that upstream's own host under the same port rules as the
index. Any other ns on a prefixed name is still NAME_UNKNOWN, so ns
can't be used to create cache entries under another registry's name.
* README: containerd config_path and how to check it
A _default/hosts.toml does nothing while CRI has no hosts directory
configured, so add the config.toml snippet for containerd 2.x and 1.x.
To check the setup, look at containerd config dump and pull with
crictl, then find the request in the proxy log; ctr --hosts-dir reads
the directory on its own and would succeed even without config_path.
Also mention that existing per-registry override_path entries keep
working and that k3s generates the directory itself.
* Let the prefix route take ns for aliases and mirrored registries
With upstream.oci.hub pointing at registry-1.docker.io and a docker.io
hosts.toml mirror on /v2/upstream/hub, containerd sends ns=docker.io,
and the prefix check only accepted the upstream's own host. The same
happens whenever the upstream is a mirror of the registry the nodes
pull from, say an Artifactory remote for ghcr.io: ns carries ghcr.io,
the upstream host is something else, and the pull got a 404.
The prefix already decides where the content comes from and which
cache entries are used, so ns can't redirect anything there. The check
now only refuses an ns that contradicts the prefix, meaning a host the
proxy knows that belongs to another route. The Docker Hub aliases count
as one host, and a host the proxy doesn't know at all is accepted,
since a client can only arrive at the prefix through its own mirror
entry.
* Take docker.io on every prefix route
A Docker Hub mirror configured as a named upstream (mirror.gcr.io, an
Artifactory remote) with a docker.io hosts.toml pointing at
/v2/upstream/hub got a 404 again: docker.io is always in the index for
the default route, so the check saw a known host of another route. That
setup worked before this branch. Docker Hub repository names have
exactly two path components, so docker.io/upstream/... can never be a
real image, and accepting the aliases on every prefix route shadows
nothing.
While here: the collision warning claimed ns requests go to the other
route, which is only true without the prefix, and the README said pulls
for unknown registries always get a 404, which isn't the case for paths
under upstream/{name}/.
* Only take a foreign ns on a prefix route when it is configured
A containerd _default mirror sends the same request for a pull of
unconfigured.example/upstream/mirror/owner/app as a ghcr.io hosts.toml
with override_path does for a mirror upstream. Accepting any host the
proxy didn't know therefore let such a pull be answered with owner/app
from the mirror upstream, a different image, instead of a 404 that lets
containerd go to the registry the image actually names.
The prefix route now accepts ns only for the upstream's own host, for
Docker Hub, and for hosts listed in the new upstream.oci_mirrors setting.
That setting is how an Artifactory remote of ghcr.io keeps working:
upstream:
oci_mirrors:
ghcr: ["ghcr.io"]
The listed hosts also select the upstream for unprefixed ns requests,
which makes a mirror with a path in its URL reachable through the
_default entry as well. Hosts from configured URLs still win over
mirror entries; the proxy warns about such overlaps at startup.
* Fix the docs sentence on which ns a prefix route takes
configuration.md still said a prefix request with ns is only refused
when ns names another route's host. Since the last commit it is the
other way round: only the upstream's own host, its oci_mirrors entries
and Docker Hub get through.
* Note what a host accepted on a prefix route gives up
Listing ghcr.io for an upstream (or the upstream's own host) still has
the ambiguity from the wildcard case: ghcr.io/upstream/ghcr/owner/app
lands on that upstream. That is the price of an explicit entry and
fine in practice, but it should be written down.
* Test that oci_mirrors entries stay with their own upstream
Two gaps in the coverage of the last change: nothing failed if a host
listed for one upstream was also accepted on another upstream's prefix,
and nothing checked that the server actually hands upstream.oci_mirrors
to the container handler. The handler test now has a second upstream
that must refuse ghcr.io, and a small server test pulls through a
mirror entry on both the prefix and the unprefixed route.
* Log when a prefix route refuses an ns
Setups with a ghcr.io hosts.toml pointing at a mirror upstream worked
before this branch and now need an oci_mirrors entry. Without one,
containerd gets a 404, quietly pulls from ghcr.io directly, and nobody
notices the proxy is being skipped. The refusal is now logged as a
warning that names the upstream and the ns and points at
upstream.oci_mirrors.
* Drop a check in validateOCIMirrors that could never fire
user@ghcr.io parses with ghcr.io as its host, so the parsed.Host != host
comparison already rejects it and the extra parsed.User test was dead.
A test case for a host with credentials keeps that path covered.
* Reject an oci_mirrors host that is listed for two upstreams
With ghcr.io under both art and nexus, both prefix routes took ns=ghcr.io
while unprefixed requests went to whichever name sorted first, with
nothing but a startup warning. Config validation now refuses the second
entry, comparing hosts without case and without the default :443.
* Log each refused ns once per upstream and refuse overlong values
The refusal warning fired on every request, and a node with a missing
oci_mirrors entry asks for the manifest and each layer, so the same line
piled up. Each upstream/ns pair is now logged once, for up to 1024
pairs; after that every refusal is logged again.
ns comes straight from the client and can be as long as the request
line allows, so remembering it as is would let anyone pin a lot of
memory with a handful of requests. No registry host is longer than 259
characters (a 253-character name plus a port), so anything longer is
refused right away, before it is logged or remembered.
* Compare oci_mirrors hosts the way the handler does
The duplicate check lowercased the host and trimmed :443, while the
handler splits host and port, brackets IPv6 literals and drops an empty
port. So ghcr.io and ghcr.io:, or [::1] and [::1]:, passed as different
hosts in two upstreams and then collided in the handler. The check now
builds the same key the handler uses.
* Rewrap the oci_mirrors paragraphs in the configuration docs
Two sentences had been dropped into the middle of wrapped lines, and the
prefix-route paragraph named Docker Hub twice in a row. Same content,
shorter lines, one mention.
* Stop logging ns refusals once the set is full
Past 1024 different upstream/ns pairs every refusal was logged again,
so anyone could fill the set with made-up hosts and then flood the log
at warning level. When the set is full the proxy now says so once and
keeps quiet after that. A real misconfiguration shows up long before
that, with the first pull.
* Test the limit on remembered ns refusals
Nothing covered what happens once 1024 pairs are remembered. The new
test fills the set, then sends a known pair and two new ones: the proxy
must log the limit notice exactly once, log none of the refusals and
keep the set at its size.
2026-10-10 08:35:50 +02:00
registryURL : registryURL ,
2026-01-29 19:35:15 +00:00
proxyURL : strings . TrimSuffix ( proxyURL , "/" ) ,
}
2026-08-16 22:42:55 +05:30
if len ( namedRegistries ) > 0 {
h . namedRegistries = make ( map [ string ] string , len ( namedRegistries [ 0 ] ) )
for name , registryURL := range namedRegistries [ 0 ] {
h . namedRegistries [ name ] = strings . TrimSuffix ( registryURL , "/" )
}
}
Route containerd ns mirror requests to configured registries (#405)
* Route containerd ns mirror requests to configured registries
containerd's hosts.toml mirrors append ?ns=<registry-host> to every
request. The container handler ignored it, so a single _default mirror
entry could not serve more than one registry.
ns is a closed-world lookup key and is never dialed. Docker Hub aliases
and the host of upstream.oci_default select the default route, hosts of
upstream.oci entries select their named upstream. Unknown hosts return
NAME_UNKNOWN so containerd falls back to its next host. Registry URLs
with a path are not indexed, because ns names the registry at the root
of a host. Host collisions log a warning and resolve deterministically.
With ns the path is the verbatim upstream repository, the reserved
upstream/ prefix is rejected, and repository prefix routes such as
Homebrew's do not apply. Cache names match the unprefixed and
upstream/{name}/ routes, so all routes share cached blobs, manifests and
tag lists. ns is no longer forwarded on tag-list requests, and the
pagination Link is rewritten per request instead of at store time so
clients on different routes get links for their own route.
Refs #303
* Document containerd ns mirroring
Refs #303
* Version the tag-list cache identity for the raw-link format
Tag-list rows now store the upstream Link verbatim and rewrite it per
request. Rows written by earlier versions hold a Link already rewritten
for one route. Under the unchanged key an older binary running next to
this one (rolling update on shared Postgres, or a rollback) would serve
the raw Link unrewritten, sending clients to the wrong route for the
next page. A format marker in the key keeps the two apart at the cost of
one cache miss per tag list after the upgrade.
Adversarial review finding F1: tag-list cache rows hold raw upstream
Links under unchanged keys, so an older binary serves them unrewritten.
* Qualify the README claim about ns mirror coverage
Registries whose URL has a path and hosts shared by two entries are not
reachable through ns; point to the configuration guide for both rules.
Adversarial review finding F3: README says ns covers every upstream.oci
registry.
* Redact registry URLs in ns index warnings
Configured registry URLs may carry userinfo credentials, which the new
startup warnings wrote to the log verbatim. Log them with the password
masked, and say precisely what a path-prefixed default registry means:
its host is not indexed, while the Docker Hub aliases still select it.
Adversarial review finding F2: startup warnings print registry URLs
unredacted and the default-registry message is misleading.
* Keep non-default ports apart in the ns index
Dropping 80 and 443 regardless of scheme turned https://host:80 and
https://host into the same key, so a request for one of them could land
on the other registry. Only the default port of the URL's scheme is
optional now. A configured host is indexed with and without that port,
because image references spell it either way; any other port has to
match exactly, and the ns value is used as containerd sends it, apart
from case and IPv6 brackets.
Since a URL now yields two keys that can belong to different routes,
the collision warning lists the owner per key.
The handler test runs two registries on one host that differ only in
the port. Tests can't bind 80 or 443, so a dialer maps those addresses
to the fake servers.
* Allow upstream/{name}/ together with ns when they agree
containerd sends ns on every request to a mirror host, override_path or
not. Per-registry mirrors pointing at /v2/upstream/{name} therefore
arrive as upstream/{name}/...?ns=<registry>, and refusing every prefixed
name under ns broke them, including the only way to mirror an upstream
whose URL has a path.
Such requests are now handled like the prefix route without ns, as long
as ns names that upstream's own host under the same port rules as the
index. Any other ns on a prefixed name is still NAME_UNKNOWN, so ns
can't be used to create cache entries under another registry's name.
* README: containerd config_path and how to check it
A _default/hosts.toml does nothing while CRI has no hosts directory
configured, so add the config.toml snippet for containerd 2.x and 1.x.
To check the setup, look at containerd config dump and pull with
crictl, then find the request in the proxy log; ctr --hosts-dir reads
the directory on its own and would succeed even without config_path.
Also mention that existing per-registry override_path entries keep
working and that k3s generates the directory itself.
* Let the prefix route take ns for aliases and mirrored registries
With upstream.oci.hub pointing at registry-1.docker.io and a docker.io
hosts.toml mirror on /v2/upstream/hub, containerd sends ns=docker.io,
and the prefix check only accepted the upstream's own host. The same
happens whenever the upstream is a mirror of the registry the nodes
pull from, say an Artifactory remote for ghcr.io: ns carries ghcr.io,
the upstream host is something else, and the pull got a 404.
The prefix already decides where the content comes from and which
cache entries are used, so ns can't redirect anything there. The check
now only refuses an ns that contradicts the prefix, meaning a host the
proxy knows that belongs to another route. The Docker Hub aliases count
as one host, and a host the proxy doesn't know at all is accepted,
since a client can only arrive at the prefix through its own mirror
entry.
* Take docker.io on every prefix route
A Docker Hub mirror configured as a named upstream (mirror.gcr.io, an
Artifactory remote) with a docker.io hosts.toml pointing at
/v2/upstream/hub got a 404 again: docker.io is always in the index for
the default route, so the check saw a known host of another route. That
setup worked before this branch. Docker Hub repository names have
exactly two path components, so docker.io/upstream/... can never be a
real image, and accepting the aliases on every prefix route shadows
nothing.
While here: the collision warning claimed ns requests go to the other
route, which is only true without the prefix, and the README said pulls
for unknown registries always get a 404, which isn't the case for paths
under upstream/{name}/.
* Only take a foreign ns on a prefix route when it is configured
A containerd _default mirror sends the same request for a pull of
unconfigured.example/upstream/mirror/owner/app as a ghcr.io hosts.toml
with override_path does for a mirror upstream. Accepting any host the
proxy didn't know therefore let such a pull be answered with owner/app
from the mirror upstream, a different image, instead of a 404 that lets
containerd go to the registry the image actually names.
The prefix route now accepts ns only for the upstream's own host, for
Docker Hub, and for hosts listed in the new upstream.oci_mirrors setting.
That setting is how an Artifactory remote of ghcr.io keeps working:
upstream:
oci_mirrors:
ghcr: ["ghcr.io"]
The listed hosts also select the upstream for unprefixed ns requests,
which makes a mirror with a path in its URL reachable through the
_default entry as well. Hosts from configured URLs still win over
mirror entries; the proxy warns about such overlaps at startup.
* Fix the docs sentence on which ns a prefix route takes
configuration.md still said a prefix request with ns is only refused
when ns names another route's host. Since the last commit it is the
other way round: only the upstream's own host, its oci_mirrors entries
and Docker Hub get through.
* Note what a host accepted on a prefix route gives up
Listing ghcr.io for an upstream (or the upstream's own host) still has
the ambiguity from the wildcard case: ghcr.io/upstream/ghcr/owner/app
lands on that upstream. That is the price of an explicit entry and
fine in practice, but it should be written down.
* Test that oci_mirrors entries stay with their own upstream
Two gaps in the coverage of the last change: nothing failed if a host
listed for one upstream was also accepted on another upstream's prefix,
and nothing checked that the server actually hands upstream.oci_mirrors
to the container handler. The handler test now has a second upstream
that must refuse ghcr.io, and a small server test pulls through a
mirror entry on both the prefix and the unprefixed route.
* Log when a prefix route refuses an ns
Setups with a ghcr.io hosts.toml pointing at a mirror upstream worked
before this branch and now need an oci_mirrors entry. Without one,
containerd gets a 404, quietly pulls from ghcr.io directly, and nobody
notices the proxy is being skipped. The refusal is now logged as a
warning that names the upstream and the ns and points at
upstream.oci_mirrors.
* Drop a check in validateOCIMirrors that could never fire
user@ghcr.io parses with ghcr.io as its host, so the parsed.Host != host
comparison already rejects it and the extra parsed.User test was dead.
A test case for a host with credentials keeps that path covered.
* Reject an oci_mirrors host that is listed for two upstreams
With ghcr.io under both art and nexus, both prefix routes took ns=ghcr.io
while unprefixed requests went to whichever name sorted first, with
nothing but a startup warning. Config validation now refuses the second
entry, comparing hosts without case and without the default :443.
* Log each refused ns once per upstream and refuse overlong values
The refusal warning fired on every request, and a node with a missing
oci_mirrors entry asks for the manifest and each layer, so the same line
piled up. Each upstream/ns pair is now logged once, for up to 1024
pairs; after that every refusal is logged again.
ns comes straight from the client and can be as long as the request
line allows, so remembering it as is would let anyone pin a lot of
memory with a handful of requests. No registry host is longer than 259
characters (a 253-character name plus a port), so anything longer is
refused right away, before it is logged or remembered.
* Compare oci_mirrors hosts the way the handler does
The duplicate check lowercased the host and trimmed :443, while the
handler splits host and port, brackets IPv6 literals and drops an empty
port. So ghcr.io and ghcr.io:, or [::1] and [::1]:, passed as different
hosts in two upstreams and then collided in the handler. The check now
builds the same key the handler uses.
* Rewrap the oci_mirrors paragraphs in the configuration docs
Two sentences had been dropped into the middle of wrapped lines, and the
prefix-route paragraph named Docker Hub twice in a row. Same content,
shorter lines, one mention.
* Stop logging ns refusals once the set is full
Past 1024 different upstream/ns pairs every refusal was logged again,
so anyone could fill the set with made-up hosts and then flood the log
at warning level. When the set is full the proxy now says so once and
keeps quiet after that. A real misconfiguration shows up long before
that, with the first pull.
* Test the limit on remembered ns refusals
Nothing covered what happens once 1024 pairs are remembered. The new
test fills the set, then sends a known pair and two new ones: the proxy
must log the limit notice exactly once, log none of the refusals and
keep the set at its size.
2026-10-10 08:35:50 +02:00
// The index needs the final default registry URL, so build it last.
h . buildNamespaceIndex ( )
2026-08-16 22:42:55 +05:30
return h
2026-01-29 19:35:15 +00:00
}
Route containerd ns mirror requests to configured registries (#405)
* Route containerd ns mirror requests to configured registries
containerd's hosts.toml mirrors append ?ns=<registry-host> to every
request. The container handler ignored it, so a single _default mirror
entry could not serve more than one registry.
ns is a closed-world lookup key and is never dialed. Docker Hub aliases
and the host of upstream.oci_default select the default route, hosts of
upstream.oci entries select their named upstream. Unknown hosts return
NAME_UNKNOWN so containerd falls back to its next host. Registry URLs
with a path are not indexed, because ns names the registry at the root
of a host. Host collisions log a warning and resolve deterministically.
With ns the path is the verbatim upstream repository, the reserved
upstream/ prefix is rejected, and repository prefix routes such as
Homebrew's do not apply. Cache names match the unprefixed and
upstream/{name}/ routes, so all routes share cached blobs, manifests and
tag lists. ns is no longer forwarded on tag-list requests, and the
pagination Link is rewritten per request instead of at store time so
clients on different routes get links for their own route.
Refs #303
* Document containerd ns mirroring
Refs #303
* Version the tag-list cache identity for the raw-link format
Tag-list rows now store the upstream Link verbatim and rewrite it per
request. Rows written by earlier versions hold a Link already rewritten
for one route. Under the unchanged key an older binary running next to
this one (rolling update on shared Postgres, or a rollback) would serve
the raw Link unrewritten, sending clients to the wrong route for the
next page. A format marker in the key keeps the two apart at the cost of
one cache miss per tag list after the upgrade.
Adversarial review finding F1: tag-list cache rows hold raw upstream
Links under unchanged keys, so an older binary serves them unrewritten.
* Qualify the README claim about ns mirror coverage
Registries whose URL has a path and hosts shared by two entries are not
reachable through ns; point to the configuration guide for both rules.
Adversarial review finding F3: README says ns covers every upstream.oci
registry.
* Redact registry URLs in ns index warnings
Configured registry URLs may carry userinfo credentials, which the new
startup warnings wrote to the log verbatim. Log them with the password
masked, and say precisely what a path-prefixed default registry means:
its host is not indexed, while the Docker Hub aliases still select it.
Adversarial review finding F2: startup warnings print registry URLs
unredacted and the default-registry message is misleading.
* Keep non-default ports apart in the ns index
Dropping 80 and 443 regardless of scheme turned https://host:80 and
https://host into the same key, so a request for one of them could land
on the other registry. Only the default port of the URL's scheme is
optional now. A configured host is indexed with and without that port,
because image references spell it either way; any other port has to
match exactly, and the ns value is used as containerd sends it, apart
from case and IPv6 brackets.
Since a URL now yields two keys that can belong to different routes,
the collision warning lists the owner per key.
The handler test runs two registries on one host that differ only in
the port. Tests can't bind 80 or 443, so a dialer maps those addresses
to the fake servers.
* Allow upstream/{name}/ together with ns when they agree
containerd sends ns on every request to a mirror host, override_path or
not. Per-registry mirrors pointing at /v2/upstream/{name} therefore
arrive as upstream/{name}/...?ns=<registry>, and refusing every prefixed
name under ns broke them, including the only way to mirror an upstream
whose URL has a path.
Such requests are now handled like the prefix route without ns, as long
as ns names that upstream's own host under the same port rules as the
index. Any other ns on a prefixed name is still NAME_UNKNOWN, so ns
can't be used to create cache entries under another registry's name.
* README: containerd config_path and how to check it
A _default/hosts.toml does nothing while CRI has no hosts directory
configured, so add the config.toml snippet for containerd 2.x and 1.x.
To check the setup, look at containerd config dump and pull with
crictl, then find the request in the proxy log; ctr --hosts-dir reads
the directory on its own and would succeed even without config_path.
Also mention that existing per-registry override_path entries keep
working and that k3s generates the directory itself.
* Let the prefix route take ns for aliases and mirrored registries
With upstream.oci.hub pointing at registry-1.docker.io and a docker.io
hosts.toml mirror on /v2/upstream/hub, containerd sends ns=docker.io,
and the prefix check only accepted the upstream's own host. The same
happens whenever the upstream is a mirror of the registry the nodes
pull from, say an Artifactory remote for ghcr.io: ns carries ghcr.io,
the upstream host is something else, and the pull got a 404.
The prefix already decides where the content comes from and which
cache entries are used, so ns can't redirect anything there. The check
now only refuses an ns that contradicts the prefix, meaning a host the
proxy knows that belongs to another route. The Docker Hub aliases count
as one host, and a host the proxy doesn't know at all is accepted,
since a client can only arrive at the prefix through its own mirror
entry.
* Take docker.io on every prefix route
A Docker Hub mirror configured as a named upstream (mirror.gcr.io, an
Artifactory remote) with a docker.io hosts.toml pointing at
/v2/upstream/hub got a 404 again: docker.io is always in the index for
the default route, so the check saw a known host of another route. That
setup worked before this branch. Docker Hub repository names have
exactly two path components, so docker.io/upstream/... can never be a
real image, and accepting the aliases on every prefix route shadows
nothing.
While here: the collision warning claimed ns requests go to the other
route, which is only true without the prefix, and the README said pulls
for unknown registries always get a 404, which isn't the case for paths
under upstream/{name}/.
* Only take a foreign ns on a prefix route when it is configured
A containerd _default mirror sends the same request for a pull of
unconfigured.example/upstream/mirror/owner/app as a ghcr.io hosts.toml
with override_path does for a mirror upstream. Accepting any host the
proxy didn't know therefore let such a pull be answered with owner/app
from the mirror upstream, a different image, instead of a 404 that lets
containerd go to the registry the image actually names.
The prefix route now accepts ns only for the upstream's own host, for
Docker Hub, and for hosts listed in the new upstream.oci_mirrors setting.
That setting is how an Artifactory remote of ghcr.io keeps working:
upstream:
oci_mirrors:
ghcr: ["ghcr.io"]
The listed hosts also select the upstream for unprefixed ns requests,
which makes a mirror with a path in its URL reachable through the
_default entry as well. Hosts from configured URLs still win over
mirror entries; the proxy warns about such overlaps at startup.
* Fix the docs sentence on which ns a prefix route takes
configuration.md still said a prefix request with ns is only refused
when ns names another route's host. Since the last commit it is the
other way round: only the upstream's own host, its oci_mirrors entries
and Docker Hub get through.
* Note what a host accepted on a prefix route gives up
Listing ghcr.io for an upstream (or the upstream's own host) still has
the ambiguity from the wildcard case: ghcr.io/upstream/ghcr/owner/app
lands on that upstream. That is the price of an explicit entry and
fine in practice, but it should be written down.
* Test that oci_mirrors entries stay with their own upstream
Two gaps in the coverage of the last change: nothing failed if a host
listed for one upstream was also accepted on another upstream's prefix,
and nothing checked that the server actually hands upstream.oci_mirrors
to the container handler. The handler test now has a second upstream
that must refuse ghcr.io, and a small server test pulls through a
mirror entry on both the prefix and the unprefixed route.
* Log when a prefix route refuses an ns
Setups with a ghcr.io hosts.toml pointing at a mirror upstream worked
before this branch and now need an oci_mirrors entry. Without one,
containerd gets a 404, quietly pulls from ghcr.io directly, and nobody
notices the proxy is being skipped. The refusal is now logged as a
warning that names the upstream and the ns and points at
upstream.oci_mirrors.
* Drop a check in validateOCIMirrors that could never fire
user@ghcr.io parses with ghcr.io as its host, so the parsed.Host != host
comparison already rejects it and the extra parsed.User test was dead.
A test case for a host with credentials keeps that path covered.
* Reject an oci_mirrors host that is listed for two upstreams
With ghcr.io under both art and nexus, both prefix routes took ns=ghcr.io
while unprefixed requests went to whichever name sorted first, with
nothing but a startup warning. Config validation now refuses the second
entry, comparing hosts without case and without the default :443.
* Log each refused ns once per upstream and refuse overlong values
The refusal warning fired on every request, and a node with a missing
oci_mirrors entry asks for the manifest and each layer, so the same line
piled up. Each upstream/ns pair is now logged once, for up to 1024
pairs; after that every refusal is logged again.
ns comes straight from the client and can be as long as the request
line allows, so remembering it as is would let anyone pin a lot of
memory with a handful of requests. No registry host is longer than 259
characters (a 253-character name plus a port), so anything longer is
refused right away, before it is logged or remembered.
* Compare oci_mirrors hosts the way the handler does
The duplicate check lowercased the host and trimmed :443, while the
handler splits host and port, brackets IPv6 literals and drops an empty
port. So ghcr.io and ghcr.io:, or [::1] and [::1]:, passed as different
hosts in two upstreams and then collided in the handler. The check now
builds the same key the handler uses.
* Rewrap the oci_mirrors paragraphs in the configuration docs
Two sentences had been dropped into the middle of wrapped lines, and the
prefix-route paragraph named Docker Hub twice in a row. Same content,
shorter lines, one mention.
* Stop logging ns refusals once the set is full
Past 1024 different upstream/ns pairs every refusal was logged again,
so anyone could fill the set with made-up hosts and then flood the log
at warning level. When the set is full the proxy now says so once and
keeps quiet after that. A real misconfiguration shows up long before
that, with the first pull.
* Test the limit on remembered ns refusals
Nothing covered what happens once 1024 pairs are remembered. The new
test fills the set, then sends a known pair and two new ones: the proxy
must log the limit notice exactly once, log none of the refusals and
keep the set at its size.
2026-10-10 08:35:50 +02:00
// buildNamespaceIndex maps the registry hosts containerd may send in the ns
// query parameter to the configured routes. The index is closed-world: a host
// is only ever looked up, never dialed. Docker Hub aliases and the default
// registry's host select the default route; hosts of upstream.oci entries
// select their named upstream. Registry URLs with a path are skipped because
// ns names the registry at the root of that host, not a repository mounted
// below it. On collisions the default route wins, then the alphabetically
// first upstream name.
func ( h * ContainerHandler ) buildNamespaceIndex ( ) {
h . namespaces = make ( map [ string ] string )
for _ , registryURL := range dockerHubNamespaces {
h . indexNamespace ( defaultNamespaceRoute , registryURL )
}
if ! h . indexNamespace ( defaultNamespaceRoute , h . registryURL ) {
h . warn ( "host of the default OCI registry is not indexed for ns lookups: URL has a path; Docker Hub aliases still select it" ,
"url" , redactedURL ( h . registryURL ) )
}
for _ , name := range slices . Sorted ( maps . Keys ( h . namedRegistries ) ) {
if ! h . indexNamespace ( name , h . namedRegistries [ name ] ) {
h . warn ( "OCI upstream is not reachable through the ns query parameter: URL has a path" ,
"upstream" , name , "url" , redactedURL ( h . namedRegistries [ name ] ) )
}
}
}
// SetMirroredRegistries records which registry hosts each named upstream
// mirrors, for example "ghcr" -> ["ghcr.io"] for an Artifactory remote of
// ghcr.io. Those hosts select the upstream in ns lookups and are accepted as
// ns on its upstream/{name}/ prefix. They rank below every host taken from a
// configured URL, so they are indexed after the constructor's index.
func ( h * ContainerHandler ) SetMirroredRegistries ( mirrors map [ string ] [ ] string ) {
h . mirrorKeys = make ( map [ string ] [ ] string , len ( mirrors ) )
for _ , name := range slices . Sorted ( maps . Keys ( mirrors ) ) {
if _ , ok := h . namedRegistries [ name ] ; ! ok {
h . warn ( "OCI mirror entry has no upstream of that name" , "upstream" , name )
continue
}
for _ , host := range mirrors [ name ] {
registryURL := "https://" + host
keys , ok := namespaceKeysForURL ( registryURL )
if ! ok {
h . warn ( "OCI mirror host is not a registry host" , "upstream" , name , "host" , host )
continue
}
h . mirrorKeys [ name ] = append ( h . mirrorKeys [ name ] , keys ... )
h . indexNamespace ( name , registryURL )
}
}
}
// indexNamespace maps the ns lookup keys of registryURL to route. Keys that
// another route already owns stay with that route and are reported once. It
// reports false when the URL is not a bare registry root.
func ( h * ContainerHandler ) indexNamespace ( route , registryURL string ) bool {
keys , ok := namespaceKeysForURL ( registryURL )
if ! ok {
return false
}
var taken [ ] string
for _ , key := range keys {
owner , exists := h . namespaces [ key ]
switch {
case ! exists :
h . namespaces [ key ] = route
case owner != route :
if owner == defaultNamespaceRoute {
owner = "default registry"
}
taken = append ( taken , key + "=" + owner )
}
}
if len ( taken ) > 0 {
h . warn ( "OCI upstream shares a registry host with another route; unprefixed ns requests for it go to the other route" ,
"upstream" , route , "hosts" , strings . Join ( taken , ", " ) )
}
return true
}
// namespaceKeysForURL returns the ns lookup keys of a registry URL. The
// scheme-default port is optional in image references, so such a URL is
// indexed both without and with the port. Any other port is kept as is, which
// keeps https://host:80 and https://host apart. It reports false for URLs
// that are not a bare registry root; namespaceKeysForHost serves those.
func namespaceKeysForURL ( registryURL string ) ( [ ] string , bool ) {
parsed , err := url . Parse ( registryURL )
if err != nil || parsed . Host == "" || ( parsed . Path != "" && parsed . Path != "/" ) {
return nil , false
}
return namespaceKeysForHost ( parsed ) , true
}
// namespaceKeysForHost returns the lookup keys of a URL's host, ignoring its
// path.
func namespaceKeysForHost ( parsed * url . URL ) [ ] string {
host , port := splitNamespaceHost ( parsed . Host )
defaultPort := schemeDefaultPorts [ strings . ToLower ( parsed . Scheme ) ]
switch {
case port != "" && port != defaultPort :
return [ ] string { namespaceKey ( host , port ) }
case defaultPort == "" :
return [ ] string { namespaceKey ( host , "" ) }
default :
return [ ] string { namespaceKey ( host , "" ) , namespaceKey ( host , defaultPort ) }
}
}
// namespaceKeyForRequest normalizes the ns value of a request. containerd
// sends the registry host of the image reference, with or without a port, so
// the value is matched as sent apart from case and IPv6 bracket form.
func namespaceKeyForRequest ( namespace string ) string {
host , port := splitNamespaceHost ( namespace )
return namespaceKey ( host , port )
}
// splitNamespaceHost splits host[:port], accepting bracketed and bare IPv6
// hosts without a port.
func splitNamespaceHost ( hostport string ) ( host , port string ) {
host , port , err := net . SplitHostPort ( hostport )
if err != nil {
return strings . TrimSuffix ( strings . TrimPrefix ( hostport , "[" ) , "]" ) , ""
}
return host , port
}
// namespaceKey builds a lookup key from a host and an optional port: the host
// lowercased, IPv6 literals in brackets.
func namespaceKey ( host , port string ) string {
host = strings . ToLower ( host )
if strings . Contains ( host , ":" ) {
host = "[" + host + "]"
}
if port == "" {
return host
}
return host + ":" + port
}
// redactedURL returns a registry URL for logging with any password masked.
func redactedURL ( raw string ) string {
parsed , err := url . Parse ( raw )
if err != nil {
return "<invalid url>"
}
return parsed . Redacted ( )
}
func ( h * ContainerHandler ) warn ( msg string , args ... any ) {
if h . proxy != nil && h . proxy . Logger != nil {
h . proxy . Logger . Warn ( msg , args ... )
}
2026-08-29 11:19:54 +01:00
}
2026-09-03 16:59:12 +01:00
// RegisterRegistry routes a repository and its descendants to a specific OCI
// registry. The longest matching repository prefix wins.
func ( h * ContainerHandler ) RegisterRegistry ( repositoryPrefix , registryURL string ) {
h . registries = append ( h . registries , containerRegistry {
repositoryPrefix : strings . Trim ( repositoryPrefix , "/" ) ,
registryURL : strings . TrimSuffix ( registryURL , "/" ) ,
} )
}
// BlockRegistry prevents a repository and its descendants from falling back to
// the default OCI registry. A more specific registered repository still wins.
func ( h * ContainerHandler ) BlockRegistry ( repositoryPrefix string ) {
h . RegisterRegistry ( repositoryPrefix , "" )
}
func ( h * ContainerHandler ) registryURLFor ( name string ) string {
registryURL := h . registryURL
matchLength := 0
for _ , registry := range h . registries {
if name != registry . repositoryPrefix && ! strings . HasPrefix ( name , registry . repositoryPrefix + "/" ) {
continue
}
if len ( registry . repositoryPrefix ) > matchLength {
registryURL = registry . registryURL
matchLength = len ( registry . repositoryPrefix )
}
}
return registryURL
}
2026-01-29 19:35:15 +00:00
// Routes returns the HTTP handler for container registry requests.
// Mount this at /v2 on your router.
func ( h * ContainerHandler ) Routes ( ) http . Handler {
return http . HandlerFunc ( func ( w http . ResponseWriter , r * http . Request ) {
path := strings . TrimPrefix ( r . URL . Path , "/" )
// Set standard Docker registry header on all responses
w . Header ( ) . Set ( "Docker-Distribution-Api-Version" , "registry/2.0" )
// Handle different endpoints
switch {
case path == "" || path == "/" :
// Version check: GET /v2/
h . handleVersionCheck ( w , r )
case strings . HasSuffix ( path , "/blobs/" + r . URL . Query ( ) . Get ( "digest" ) ) || strings . Contains ( path , "/blobs/sha256:" ) :
// Blob download: GET /v2/{name}/blobs/{digest}
h . handleBlobDownload ( w , r , path )
Proxy the OCI referrers API in the container handler (#427)
* Proxy the OCI referrers API in the container handler
GET /v2/{name}/referrers/{digest} used to fall through to a plain 404,
so clients only ever saw referrers stored under the sha256-<hex> tag
schema. Registries that keep SBOMs and signatures behind the referrers
API looked empty through the proxy.
The index is now fetched from the upstream that the repository routes
to and cached like the tag list: fresh within the metadata TTL,
revalidated with If-None-Match, and served stale when the upstream is
down. artifactType is not forwarded, so one cached row covers every
filter and clients filter the full list themselves, which they do when
OCI-Filters-Applied is absent. An upstream 404 is passed through
untouched, so clients still fall back to the tag schema for registries
like GHCR. When the upstream cannot answer and nothing is cached, the
proxy keeps answering 404 as before rather than failing the request.
Closes #144
* Cover absolute upstream links in the referrers link test
The second page now answers with an absolute Link pointing back at the
upstream host, and the test checks that it comes back rewritten to the
proxy. That was missing so far, and it also gives the upstream variable
a reason to be declared before the handler closure, which staticcheck
complained about.
* Read cached referrers through a small shared loader
loadContainerReferrers was a line-for-line copy of loadContainerTags with
the types renamed, which dupl flags in CI. The part that opens the cache
row and reads the body now lives in loadContainerMetadata next to
storeContainerMetadata, and the referrers loader only maps the row onto
its struct. The tag and manifest loaders are left as they are.
* Make the manifest routing test notice which handler answered
For foo/manifests/referrers/<digest> the manifest handler and the
referrers handler send the very same upstream path, so the test passed
even with the referrers case moved in front of the manifest case. The
fake upstream now rejects requests that only accept an image index,
which is what the referrers handler sends.
* Check that a cached referrers row links back to whoever reads it
A repository can be reached as upstream/<name>/<repo> and, when the
default registry is the same host, as plain <repo>. Both end up in the
same cache row, so the pagination Link has to be rewritten when the row
is served, not when it is stored. The link test now reads the row
through both paths; with a store-time rewrite the second path would get
the first one's link.
* Make the referrers ETag test prove the revalidation
Without If-None-Match the fake upstream just sends the full index again,
so the old assertions held either way. The test now counts the 304s the
upstream sent and expects exactly one.
* Reword which tools use the referrers API in the README
The cosign mention was too broad. cosign reaches the referrers API for
its newer signature bundles, while the old .sig tags keep going through
the normal manifest path. Also rewraps the paragraph, one line had run
past the others.
* Check that a 304 restarts the referrers cache TTL
The ETag test now backdates the cached row instead of running with a
zero TTL. After the upstream answers 304, a third request has to come
from the cache. Before, the test would also have passed if the 304
branch forgot to bump fetchedAt and every request kept revalidating.
* Test the referrers Content-Type fallback
None of the fake upstreams left out Content-Type, so the default to the
image index type was never exercised. oras-go rejects anything else, so
it is worth pinning, both for the first fetch and for the cached copy.
* Test referrers digests with extra characters around them
The invalid-request table only had digests that were too short or used
an unknown algorithm, so it would not notice if the digest pattern lost
its anchors. Two cases now put junk before and after an otherwise valid
sha256 digest.
* Reuse the manifest cache key for referrers
The referrers handler had its own key function, but it did exactly what
containerManifestCacheKey already does with four strings. Referrers rows
sit in their own oci-referrers ecosystem anyway, so they can't collide
with manifests.
* Drop the separate struct for cached referrers
A cached referrers response carries the same fields as a cached tag
list, and the freshness check was a straight copy too. So the referrers
code just uses cachedContainerTags and containerTagsFresh now. Loading,
storing and writing stay on their own, since the ecosystem and the Link
handling are different.
* Route referrers requests by ns like the other OCI endpoints
Now that containerd ns support is on main, referrers requests have to
go through registryForRequest too, otherwise a _default mirror would
look every subject up on Docker Hub. ns only picks the registry, so it
is dropped from the forwarded query and the cache key, and the next-page
Link keeps it, the same way tag lists do. This also follows the new
rewriteContainerTagsLink signature, which takes the namespace.
* Without a cached index, referrers now pass upstream errors through and answer 502 when the upstream can't be reached or sends garbage, so clients no longer read an outage as a registry without the referrers API. Stale cache is still served when there is one.
* The tag list and manifest routes now only match paths that end in their endpoint, so a repository with tags/list or manifests in its name can still reach the referrers endpoint.
2026-10-12 10:08:01 +02:00
case manifestPathPattern . MatchString ( path ) :
2026-01-29 19:35:15 +00:00
// Manifest: GET /v2/{name}/manifests/{reference}
h . handleManifest ( w , r , path )
Proxy the OCI referrers API in the container handler (#427)
* Proxy the OCI referrers API in the container handler
GET /v2/{name}/referrers/{digest} used to fall through to a plain 404,
so clients only ever saw referrers stored under the sha256-<hex> tag
schema. Registries that keep SBOMs and signatures behind the referrers
API looked empty through the proxy.
The index is now fetched from the upstream that the repository routes
to and cached like the tag list: fresh within the metadata TTL,
revalidated with If-None-Match, and served stale when the upstream is
down. artifactType is not forwarded, so one cached row covers every
filter and clients filter the full list themselves, which they do when
OCI-Filters-Applied is absent. An upstream 404 is passed through
untouched, so clients still fall back to the tag schema for registries
like GHCR. When the upstream cannot answer and nothing is cached, the
proxy keeps answering 404 as before rather than failing the request.
Closes #144
* Cover absolute upstream links in the referrers link test
The second page now answers with an absolute Link pointing back at the
upstream host, and the test checks that it comes back rewritten to the
proxy. That was missing so far, and it also gives the upstream variable
a reason to be declared before the handler closure, which staticcheck
complained about.
* Read cached referrers through a small shared loader
loadContainerReferrers was a line-for-line copy of loadContainerTags with
the types renamed, which dupl flags in CI. The part that opens the cache
row and reads the body now lives in loadContainerMetadata next to
storeContainerMetadata, and the referrers loader only maps the row onto
its struct. The tag and manifest loaders are left as they are.
* Make the manifest routing test notice which handler answered
For foo/manifests/referrers/<digest> the manifest handler and the
referrers handler send the very same upstream path, so the test passed
even with the referrers case moved in front of the manifest case. The
fake upstream now rejects requests that only accept an image index,
which is what the referrers handler sends.
* Check that a cached referrers row links back to whoever reads it
A repository can be reached as upstream/<name>/<repo> and, when the
default registry is the same host, as plain <repo>. Both end up in the
same cache row, so the pagination Link has to be rewritten when the row
is served, not when it is stored. The link test now reads the row
through both paths; with a store-time rewrite the second path would get
the first one's link.
* Make the referrers ETag test prove the revalidation
Without If-None-Match the fake upstream just sends the full index again,
so the old assertions held either way. The test now counts the 304s the
upstream sent and expects exactly one.
* Reword which tools use the referrers API in the README
The cosign mention was too broad. cosign reaches the referrers API for
its newer signature bundles, while the old .sig tags keep going through
the normal manifest path. Also rewraps the paragraph, one line had run
past the others.
* Check that a 304 restarts the referrers cache TTL
The ETag test now backdates the cached row instead of running with a
zero TTL. After the upstream answers 304, a third request has to come
from the cache. Before, the test would also have passed if the 304
branch forgot to bump fetchedAt and every request kept revalidating.
* Test the referrers Content-Type fallback
None of the fake upstreams left out Content-Type, so the default to the
image index type was never exercised. oras-go rejects anything else, so
it is worth pinning, both for the first fetch and for the cached copy.
* Test referrers digests with extra characters around them
The invalid-request table only had digests that were too short or used
an unknown algorithm, so it would not notice if the digest pattern lost
its anchors. Two cases now put junk before and after an otherwise valid
sha256 digest.
* Reuse the manifest cache key for referrers
The referrers handler had its own key function, but it did exactly what
containerManifestCacheKey already does with four strings. Referrers rows
sit in their own oci-referrers ecosystem anyway, so they can't collide
with manifests.
* Drop the separate struct for cached referrers
A cached referrers response carries the same fields as a cached tag
list, and the freshness check was a straight copy too. So the referrers
code just uses cachedContainerTags and containerTagsFresh now. Loading,
storing and writing stay on their own, since the ecosystem and the Link
handling are different.
* Route referrers requests by ns like the other OCI endpoints
Now that containerd ns support is on main, referrers requests have to
go through registryForRequest too, otherwise a _default mirror would
look every subject up on Docker Hub. ns only picks the registry, so it
is dropped from the forwarded query and the cache key, and the next-page
Link keeps it, the same way tag lists do. This also follows the new
rewriteContainerTagsLink signature, which takes the namespace.
* Without a cached index, referrers now pass upstream errors through and answer 502 when the upstream can't be reached or sends garbage, so clients no longer read an outage as a registry without the referrers API. Stale cache is still served when there is one.
* The tag list and manifest routes now only match paths that end in their endpoint, so a repository with tags/list or manifests in its name can still reach the referrers endpoint.
2026-10-12 10:08:01 +02:00
case tagsListPathPattern . MatchString ( path ) :
2026-01-29 19:35:15 +00:00
// Tags list: GET /v2/{name}/tags/list
h . handleTagsList ( w , r , path )
Proxy the OCI referrers API in the container handler (#427)
* Proxy the OCI referrers API in the container handler
GET /v2/{name}/referrers/{digest} used to fall through to a plain 404,
so clients only ever saw referrers stored under the sha256-<hex> tag
schema. Registries that keep SBOMs and signatures behind the referrers
API looked empty through the proxy.
The index is now fetched from the upstream that the repository routes
to and cached like the tag list: fresh within the metadata TTL,
revalidated with If-None-Match, and served stale when the upstream is
down. artifactType is not forwarded, so one cached row covers every
filter and clients filter the full list themselves, which they do when
OCI-Filters-Applied is absent. An upstream 404 is passed through
untouched, so clients still fall back to the tag schema for registries
like GHCR. When the upstream cannot answer and nothing is cached, the
proxy keeps answering 404 as before rather than failing the request.
Closes #144
* Cover absolute upstream links in the referrers link test
The second page now answers with an absolute Link pointing back at the
upstream host, and the test checks that it comes back rewritten to the
proxy. That was missing so far, and it also gives the upstream variable
a reason to be declared before the handler closure, which staticcheck
complained about.
* Read cached referrers through a small shared loader
loadContainerReferrers was a line-for-line copy of loadContainerTags with
the types renamed, which dupl flags in CI. The part that opens the cache
row and reads the body now lives in loadContainerMetadata next to
storeContainerMetadata, and the referrers loader only maps the row onto
its struct. The tag and manifest loaders are left as they are.
* Make the manifest routing test notice which handler answered
For foo/manifests/referrers/<digest> the manifest handler and the
referrers handler send the very same upstream path, so the test passed
even with the referrers case moved in front of the manifest case. The
fake upstream now rejects requests that only accept an image index,
which is what the referrers handler sends.
* Check that a cached referrers row links back to whoever reads it
A repository can be reached as upstream/<name>/<repo> and, when the
default registry is the same host, as plain <repo>. Both end up in the
same cache row, so the pagination Link has to be rewritten when the row
is served, not when it is stored. The link test now reads the row
through both paths; with a store-time rewrite the second path would get
the first one's link.
* Make the referrers ETag test prove the revalidation
Without If-None-Match the fake upstream just sends the full index again,
so the old assertions held either way. The test now counts the 304s the
upstream sent and expects exactly one.
* Reword which tools use the referrers API in the README
The cosign mention was too broad. cosign reaches the referrers API for
its newer signature bundles, while the old .sig tags keep going through
the normal manifest path. Also rewraps the paragraph, one line had run
past the others.
* Check that a 304 restarts the referrers cache TTL
The ETag test now backdates the cached row instead of running with a
zero TTL. After the upstream answers 304, a third request has to come
from the cache. Before, the test would also have passed if the 304
branch forgot to bump fetchedAt and every request kept revalidating.
* Test the referrers Content-Type fallback
None of the fake upstreams left out Content-Type, so the default to the
image index type was never exercised. oras-go rejects anything else, so
it is worth pinning, both for the first fetch and for the cached copy.
* Test referrers digests with extra characters around them
The invalid-request table only had digests that were too short or used
an unknown algorithm, so it would not notice if the digest pattern lost
its anchors. Two cases now put junk before and after an otherwise valid
sha256 digest.
* Reuse the manifest cache key for referrers
The referrers handler had its own key function, but it did exactly what
containerManifestCacheKey already does with four strings. Referrers rows
sit in their own oci-referrers ecosystem anyway, so they can't collide
with manifests.
* Drop the separate struct for cached referrers
A cached referrers response carries the same fields as a cached tag
list, and the freshness check was a straight copy too. So the referrers
code just uses cachedContainerTags and containerTagsFresh now. Loading,
storing and writing stay on their own, since the ecosystem and the Link
handling are different.
* Route referrers requests by ns like the other OCI endpoints
Now that containerd ns support is on main, referrers requests have to
go through registryForRequest too, otherwise a _default mirror would
look every subject up on Docker Hub. ns only picks the registry, so it
is dropped from the forwarded query and the cache key, and the next-page
Link keeps it, the same way tag lists do. This also follows the new
rewriteContainerTagsLink signature, which takes the namespace.
* Without a cached index, referrers now pass upstream errors through and answer 502 when the upstream can't be reached or sends garbage, so clients no longer read an outage as a registry without the referrers API. Stale cache is still served when there is one.
* The tag list and manifest routes now only match paths that end in their endpoint, so a repository with tags/list or manifests in its name can still reach the referrers endpoint.
2026-10-12 10:08:01 +02:00
case referrersPathPattern . MatchString ( path ) :
// Referrers: GET /v2/{name}/referrers/{digest}
h . handleReferrers ( w , r , path )
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default :
http . Error ( w , "not found" , http . StatusNotFound )
}
} )
}
// handleVersionCheck responds to the /v2/ endpoint.
// This is used by clients to verify the registry supports the v2 API.
func ( h * ContainerHandler ) handleVersionCheck ( w http . ResponseWriter , _ * http . Request ) {
w . WriteHeader ( http . StatusOK )
}
// handleBlobDownload fetches and caches container layer blobs.
// Path format: {name}/blobs/{digest}
// Example: library/nginx/blobs/sha256:abc123...
func ( h * ContainerHandler ) handleBlobDownload ( w http . ResponseWriter , r * http . Request , path string ) {
if r . Method != http . MethodGet && r . Method != http . MethodHead {
http . Error ( w , "method not allowed" , http . StatusMethodNotAllowed )
return
}
name , digest := h . parseBlobPath ( path )
if name == "" || digest == "" {
h . containerError ( w , http . StatusBadRequest , "BLOB_UNKNOWN" , "invalid blob path" )
return
}
Route containerd ns mirror requests to configured registries (#405)
* Route containerd ns mirror requests to configured registries
containerd's hosts.toml mirrors append ?ns=<registry-host> to every
request. The container handler ignored it, so a single _default mirror
entry could not serve more than one registry.
ns is a closed-world lookup key and is never dialed. Docker Hub aliases
and the host of upstream.oci_default select the default route, hosts of
upstream.oci entries select their named upstream. Unknown hosts return
NAME_UNKNOWN so containerd falls back to its next host. Registry URLs
with a path are not indexed, because ns names the registry at the root
of a host. Host collisions log a warning and resolve deterministically.
With ns the path is the verbatim upstream repository, the reserved
upstream/ prefix is rejected, and repository prefix routes such as
Homebrew's do not apply. Cache names match the unprefixed and
upstream/{name}/ routes, so all routes share cached blobs, manifests and
tag lists. ns is no longer forwarded on tag-list requests, and the
pagination Link is rewritten per request instead of at store time so
clients on different routes get links for their own route.
Refs #303
* Document containerd ns mirroring
Refs #303
* Version the tag-list cache identity for the raw-link format
Tag-list rows now store the upstream Link verbatim and rewrite it per
request. Rows written by earlier versions hold a Link already rewritten
for one route. Under the unchanged key an older binary running next to
this one (rolling update on shared Postgres, or a rollback) would serve
the raw Link unrewritten, sending clients to the wrong route for the
next page. A format marker in the key keeps the two apart at the cost of
one cache miss per tag list after the upgrade.
Adversarial review finding F1: tag-list cache rows hold raw upstream
Links under unchanged keys, so an older binary serves them unrewritten.
* Qualify the README claim about ns mirror coverage
Registries whose URL has a path and hosts shared by two entries are not
reachable through ns; point to the configuration guide for both rules.
Adversarial review finding F3: README says ns covers every upstream.oci
registry.
* Redact registry URLs in ns index warnings
Configured registry URLs may carry userinfo credentials, which the new
startup warnings wrote to the log verbatim. Log them with the password
masked, and say precisely what a path-prefixed default registry means:
its host is not indexed, while the Docker Hub aliases still select it.
Adversarial review finding F2: startup warnings print registry URLs
unredacted and the default-registry message is misleading.
* Keep non-default ports apart in the ns index
Dropping 80 and 443 regardless of scheme turned https://host:80 and
https://host into the same key, so a request for one of them could land
on the other registry. Only the default port of the URL's scheme is
optional now. A configured host is indexed with and without that port,
because image references spell it either way; any other port has to
match exactly, and the ns value is used as containerd sends it, apart
from case and IPv6 brackets.
Since a URL now yields two keys that can belong to different routes,
the collision warning lists the owner per key.
The handler test runs two registries on one host that differ only in
the port. Tests can't bind 80 or 443, so a dialer maps those addresses
to the fake servers.
* Allow upstream/{name}/ together with ns when they agree
containerd sends ns on every request to a mirror host, override_path or
not. Per-registry mirrors pointing at /v2/upstream/{name} therefore
arrive as upstream/{name}/...?ns=<registry>, and refusing every prefixed
name under ns broke them, including the only way to mirror an upstream
whose URL has a path.
Such requests are now handled like the prefix route without ns, as long
as ns names that upstream's own host under the same port rules as the
index. Any other ns on a prefixed name is still NAME_UNKNOWN, so ns
can't be used to create cache entries under another registry's name.
* README: containerd config_path and how to check it
A _default/hosts.toml does nothing while CRI has no hosts directory
configured, so add the config.toml snippet for containerd 2.x and 1.x.
To check the setup, look at containerd config dump and pull with
crictl, then find the request in the proxy log; ctr --hosts-dir reads
the directory on its own and would succeed even without config_path.
Also mention that existing per-registry override_path entries keep
working and that k3s generates the directory itself.
* Let the prefix route take ns for aliases and mirrored registries
With upstream.oci.hub pointing at registry-1.docker.io and a docker.io
hosts.toml mirror on /v2/upstream/hub, containerd sends ns=docker.io,
and the prefix check only accepted the upstream's own host. The same
happens whenever the upstream is a mirror of the registry the nodes
pull from, say an Artifactory remote for ghcr.io: ns carries ghcr.io,
the upstream host is something else, and the pull got a 404.
The prefix already decides where the content comes from and which
cache entries are used, so ns can't redirect anything there. The check
now only refuses an ns that contradicts the prefix, meaning a host the
proxy knows that belongs to another route. The Docker Hub aliases count
as one host, and a host the proxy doesn't know at all is accepted,
since a client can only arrive at the prefix through its own mirror
entry.
* Take docker.io on every prefix route
A Docker Hub mirror configured as a named upstream (mirror.gcr.io, an
Artifactory remote) with a docker.io hosts.toml pointing at
/v2/upstream/hub got a 404 again: docker.io is always in the index for
the default route, so the check saw a known host of another route. That
setup worked before this branch. Docker Hub repository names have
exactly two path components, so docker.io/upstream/... can never be a
real image, and accepting the aliases on every prefix route shadows
nothing.
While here: the collision warning claimed ns requests go to the other
route, which is only true without the prefix, and the README said pulls
for unknown registries always get a 404, which isn't the case for paths
under upstream/{name}/.
* Only take a foreign ns on a prefix route when it is configured
A containerd _default mirror sends the same request for a pull of
unconfigured.example/upstream/mirror/owner/app as a ghcr.io hosts.toml
with override_path does for a mirror upstream. Accepting any host the
proxy didn't know therefore let such a pull be answered with owner/app
from the mirror upstream, a different image, instead of a 404 that lets
containerd go to the registry the image actually names.
The prefix route now accepts ns only for the upstream's own host, for
Docker Hub, and for hosts listed in the new upstream.oci_mirrors setting.
That setting is how an Artifactory remote of ghcr.io keeps working:
upstream:
oci_mirrors:
ghcr: ["ghcr.io"]
The listed hosts also select the upstream for unprefixed ns requests,
which makes a mirror with a path in its URL reachable through the
_default entry as well. Hosts from configured URLs still win over
mirror entries; the proxy warns about such overlaps at startup.
* Fix the docs sentence on which ns a prefix route takes
configuration.md still said a prefix request with ns is only refused
when ns names another route's host. Since the last commit it is the
other way round: only the upstream's own host, its oci_mirrors entries
and Docker Hub get through.
* Note what a host accepted on a prefix route gives up
Listing ghcr.io for an upstream (or the upstream's own host) still has
the ambiguity from the wildcard case: ghcr.io/upstream/ghcr/owner/app
lands on that upstream. That is the price of an explicit entry and
fine in practice, but it should be written down.
* Test that oci_mirrors entries stay with their own upstream
Two gaps in the coverage of the last change: nothing failed if a host
listed for one upstream was also accepted on another upstream's prefix,
and nothing checked that the server actually hands upstream.oci_mirrors
to the container handler. The handler test now has a second upstream
that must refuse ghcr.io, and a small server test pulls through a
mirror entry on both the prefix and the unprefixed route.
* Log when a prefix route refuses an ns
Setups with a ghcr.io hosts.toml pointing at a mirror upstream worked
before this branch and now need an oci_mirrors entry. Without one,
containerd gets a 404, quietly pulls from ghcr.io directly, and nobody
notices the proxy is being skipped. The refusal is now logged as a
warning that names the upstream and the ns and points at
upstream.oci_mirrors.
* Drop a check in validateOCIMirrors that could never fire
user@ghcr.io parses with ghcr.io as its host, so the parsed.Host != host
comparison already rejects it and the extra parsed.User test was dead.
A test case for a host with credentials keeps that path covered.
* Reject an oci_mirrors host that is listed for two upstreams
With ghcr.io under both art and nexus, both prefix routes took ns=ghcr.io
while unprefixed requests went to whichever name sorted first, with
nothing but a startup warning. Config validation now refuses the second
entry, comparing hosts without case and without the default :443.
* Log each refused ns once per upstream and refuse overlong values
The refusal warning fired on every request, and a node with a missing
oci_mirrors entry asks for the manifest and each layer, so the same line
piled up. Each upstream/ns pair is now logged once, for up to 1024
pairs; after that every refusal is logged again.
ns comes straight from the client and can be as long as the request
line allows, so remembering it as is would let anyone pin a lot of
memory with a handful of requests. No registry host is longer than 259
characters (a 253-character name plus a port), so anything longer is
refused right away, before it is logged or remembered.
* Compare oci_mirrors hosts the way the handler does
The duplicate check lowercased the host and trimmed :443, while the
handler splits host and port, brackets IPv6 literals and drops an empty
port. So ghcr.io and ghcr.io:, or [::1] and [::1]:, passed as different
hosts in two upstreams and then collided in the handler. The check now
builds the same key the handler uses.
* Rewrap the oci_mirrors paragraphs in the configuration docs
Two sentences had been dropped into the middle of wrapped lines, and the
prefix-route paragraph named Docker Hub twice in a row. Same content,
shorter lines, one mention.
* Stop logging ns refusals once the set is full
Past 1024 different upstream/ns pairs every refusal was logged again,
so anyone could fill the set with made-up hosts and then flood the log
at warning level. When the set is full the proxy now says so once and
keeps quiet after that. A real misconfiguration shows up long before
that, with the first pull.
* Test the limit on remembered ns refusals
Nothing covered what happens once 1024 pairs are remembered. The new
test fills the set, then sends a known pair and two new ones: the proxy
must log the limit notice exactly once, log none of the refusals and
keep the set at its size.
2026-10-10 08:35:50 +02:00
registryURL , upstreamName , cacheName , ok := h . registryForRequest ( r , name )
2026-08-16 22:42:55 +05:30
if ! ok {
h . containerError ( w , http . StatusNotFound , "NAME_UNKNOWN" , "unknown upstream registry" )
return
}
h . proxy . Logger . Info ( "container blob request" , "name" , upstreamName , "digest" , digest )
2026-01-29 19:35:15 +00:00
2026-08-13 07:35:07 +01:00
filename := digest
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cached , err := h . proxy . GetCachedArtifact ( r . Context ( ) , "oci" , cacheName , digest , filename )
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if err != nil {
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h . proxy . Logger . Error ( "failed to check blob cache" , "error" , err )
h . containerError ( w , http . StatusInternalServerError , "INTERNAL_ERROR" , "failed to check blob cache" )
return
}
if cached != nil {
w . Header ( ) . Set ( "Docker-Content-Digest" , digest )
2026-09-04 10:58:22 +01:00
if cached . Artifact . MediaType == "" {
cached . Artifact . MediaType = "application/octet-stream"
2026-08-16 22:42:55 +05:30
}
Support HTTP byte-range requests for local file cached artifact downloads (#404)
* feat(storage): expose efficient seek for local files
Open file-backed artifacts with os.Open so local readers support
efficient seeking. Leave cloud storage readers unchanged.
Keep the legacy sidecar mapping test focused on fileblob's reader:
Blob.Open now reads local files directly and no longer consults the
sidecar. Continue checking sidecar cleanup and post-store reads.
* feat(handler): preserve efficient seek through integrity checks
Keep the cache result's single Reader field and preserve io.Seeker
when the underlying storage reader supports efficient seeking.
Sequential reads continue through whole-object integrity verification.
A successful seek switches subsequent reads to the source for range
responses, where full-object verification is not possible.
Test both modes and verify the source is closed once.
* feat(handler): add request-aware byte range responses
Add a request-aware artifact serving helper for bounded, open-ended,
and suffix byte ranges, including If-Range handling, 206 responses,
and 416 responses for valid unsatisfiable ranges.
Ignore malformed and multi-range requests by serving the full artifact.
Advertise byte-range support only for seekable readers, preserving HEAD,
redirect, and non-seekable behavior. Clarify that net/http recovers
ErrAbortHandler per request and keeps the server running.
* feat(handler): enable byte ranges across artifact downloads
Forward each artifact request to the shared range-aware response helper,
including cached generic release assets and OCI blobs. This lets the
handler honor ranges only when its reader supports efficient seeking,
without changing direct-storage redirect behavior.
Add warm-cache endpoint tests that assert partial response headers and
bytes without an upstream refetch. Document supported range behavior,
unsupported reader fallback, and the integrity limitation of partial reads.
2026-10-04 09:48:41 -07:00
ServeArtifactRequest ( w , r , cached )
2026-01-29 19:35:15 +00:00
return
}
// For HEAD requests, just proxy to upstream
if r . Method == http . MethodHead {
2026-08-16 22:42:55 +05:30
h . proxyBlobHead ( w , r , registryURL , upstreamName , digest )
2026-01-29 19:35:15 +00:00
return
}
2026-08-13 07:35:07 +01:00
// Try to get from cache, or fetch from the authentication-aware upstream client.
2026-09-03 16:59:12 +01:00
result , err := h . proxy . GetOrFetchArtifactFromURLWithDigest (
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r . Context ( ) ,
"oci" ,
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cacheName ,
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digest , // use digest as version
filename ,
2026-08-16 22:42:55 +05:30
fmt . Sprintf ( "%s/v2/%s/blobs/%s" , registryURL , upstreamName , digest ) ,
2026-09-03 16:59:12 +01:00
digest ,
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)
if err != nil {
2026-07-26 20:07:46 +02:00
if errors . Is ( err , ErrUpstreamNotFound ) {
h . containerError ( w , http . StatusNotFound , "BLOB_UNKNOWN" , "blob unknown to registry" )
return
}
2026-09-20 14:42:30 +05:30
if errors . Is ( err , ErrArtifactBlocked ) || errors . Is ( err , ErrVersionDenied ) {
2026-09-03 05:06:44 -04:00
h . containerError ( w , http . StatusForbidden , "DENIED" , err . Error ( ) )
return
}
2026-09-03 16:59:12 +01:00
if errors . Is ( err , ErrArtifactDigestMismatch ) {
h . proxy . Logger . Error ( "upstream blob failed digest verification" , "error" , err )
h . containerError ( w , http . StatusBadGateway , "DIGEST_INVALID" , "blob digest verification failed" )
return
}
2026-10-15 13:35:12 +01:00
if writeUpstreamHeld ( w , err ) {
return
}
2026-04-01 15:22:39 +01:00
h . proxy . Logger . Error ( "failed to fetch blob" , "error" , err )
2026-07-26 20:07:46 +02:00
h . containerError ( w , http . StatusBadGateway , "INTERNAL_ERROR" , "failed to fetch blob" )
2026-01-29 19:35:15 +00:00
return
}
w . Header ( ) . Set ( "Docker-Content-Digest" , digest )
2026-09-04 10:58:22 +01:00
if result . Artifact . MediaType == "" {
result . Artifact . MediaType = "application/octet-stream"
2026-08-16 22:42:55 +05:30
}
Support HTTP byte-range requests for local file cached artifact downloads (#404)
* feat(storage): expose efficient seek for local files
Open file-backed artifacts with os.Open so local readers support
efficient seeking. Leave cloud storage readers unchanged.
Keep the legacy sidecar mapping test focused on fileblob's reader:
Blob.Open now reads local files directly and no longer consults the
sidecar. Continue checking sidecar cleanup and post-store reads.
* feat(handler): preserve efficient seek through integrity checks
Keep the cache result's single Reader field and preserve io.Seeker
when the underlying storage reader supports efficient seeking.
Sequential reads continue through whole-object integrity verification.
A successful seek switches subsequent reads to the source for range
responses, where full-object verification is not possible.
Test both modes and verify the source is closed once.
* feat(handler): add request-aware byte range responses
Add a request-aware artifact serving helper for bounded, open-ended,
and suffix byte ranges, including If-Range handling, 206 responses,
and 416 responses for valid unsatisfiable ranges.
Ignore malformed and multi-range requests by serving the full artifact.
Advertise byte-range support only for seekable readers, preserving HEAD,
redirect, and non-seekable behavior. Clarify that net/http recovers
ErrAbortHandler per request and keeps the server running.
* feat(handler): enable byte ranges across artifact downloads
Forward each artifact request to the shared range-aware response helper,
including cached generic release assets and OCI blobs. This lets the
handler honor ranges only when its reader supports efficient seeking,
without changing direct-storage redirect behavior.
Add warm-cache endpoint tests that assert partial response headers and
bytes without an upstream refetch. Document supported range behavior,
unsupported reader fallback, and the integrity limitation of partial reads.
2026-10-04 09:48:41 -07:00
ServeArtifactRequest ( w , r , result )
2026-01-29 19:35:15 +00:00
}
2026-08-13 07:35:07 +01:00
// handleManifest serves immutable manifests from cache and revalidates mutable tags.
2026-01-29 19:35:15 +00:00
// Path format: {name}/manifests/{reference}
func ( h * ContainerHandler ) handleManifest ( w http . ResponseWriter , r * http . Request , path string ) {
if r . Method != http . MethodGet && r . Method != http . MethodHead {
http . Error ( w , "method not allowed" , http . StatusMethodNotAllowed )
return
}
name , reference := h . parseManifestPath ( path )
if name == "" || reference == "" {
h . containerError ( w , http . StatusBadRequest , "MANIFEST_UNKNOWN" , "invalid manifest path" )
return
}
Route containerd ns mirror requests to configured registries (#405)
* Route containerd ns mirror requests to configured registries
containerd's hosts.toml mirrors append ?ns=<registry-host> to every
request. The container handler ignored it, so a single _default mirror
entry could not serve more than one registry.
ns is a closed-world lookup key and is never dialed. Docker Hub aliases
and the host of upstream.oci_default select the default route, hosts of
upstream.oci entries select their named upstream. Unknown hosts return
NAME_UNKNOWN so containerd falls back to its next host. Registry URLs
with a path are not indexed, because ns names the registry at the root
of a host. Host collisions log a warning and resolve deterministically.
With ns the path is the verbatim upstream repository, the reserved
upstream/ prefix is rejected, and repository prefix routes such as
Homebrew's do not apply. Cache names match the unprefixed and
upstream/{name}/ routes, so all routes share cached blobs, manifests and
tag lists. ns is no longer forwarded on tag-list requests, and the
pagination Link is rewritten per request instead of at store time so
clients on different routes get links for their own route.
Refs #303
* Document containerd ns mirroring
Refs #303
* Version the tag-list cache identity for the raw-link format
Tag-list rows now store the upstream Link verbatim and rewrite it per
request. Rows written by earlier versions hold a Link already rewritten
for one route. Under the unchanged key an older binary running next to
this one (rolling update on shared Postgres, or a rollback) would serve
the raw Link unrewritten, sending clients to the wrong route for the
next page. A format marker in the key keeps the two apart at the cost of
one cache miss per tag list after the upgrade.
Adversarial review finding F1: tag-list cache rows hold raw upstream
Links under unchanged keys, so an older binary serves them unrewritten.
* Qualify the README claim about ns mirror coverage
Registries whose URL has a path and hosts shared by two entries are not
reachable through ns; point to the configuration guide for both rules.
Adversarial review finding F3: README says ns covers every upstream.oci
registry.
* Redact registry URLs in ns index warnings
Configured registry URLs may carry userinfo credentials, which the new
startup warnings wrote to the log verbatim. Log them with the password
masked, and say precisely what a path-prefixed default registry means:
its host is not indexed, while the Docker Hub aliases still select it.
Adversarial review finding F2: startup warnings print registry URLs
unredacted and the default-registry message is misleading.
* Keep non-default ports apart in the ns index
Dropping 80 and 443 regardless of scheme turned https://host:80 and
https://host into the same key, so a request for one of them could land
on the other registry. Only the default port of the URL's scheme is
optional now. A configured host is indexed with and without that port,
because image references spell it either way; any other port has to
match exactly, and the ns value is used as containerd sends it, apart
from case and IPv6 brackets.
Since a URL now yields two keys that can belong to different routes,
the collision warning lists the owner per key.
The handler test runs two registries on one host that differ only in
the port. Tests can't bind 80 or 443, so a dialer maps those addresses
to the fake servers.
* Allow upstream/{name}/ together with ns when they agree
containerd sends ns on every request to a mirror host, override_path or
not. Per-registry mirrors pointing at /v2/upstream/{name} therefore
arrive as upstream/{name}/...?ns=<registry>, and refusing every prefixed
name under ns broke them, including the only way to mirror an upstream
whose URL has a path.
Such requests are now handled like the prefix route without ns, as long
as ns names that upstream's own host under the same port rules as the
index. Any other ns on a prefixed name is still NAME_UNKNOWN, so ns
can't be used to create cache entries under another registry's name.
* README: containerd config_path and how to check it
A _default/hosts.toml does nothing while CRI has no hosts directory
configured, so add the config.toml snippet for containerd 2.x and 1.x.
To check the setup, look at containerd config dump and pull with
crictl, then find the request in the proxy log; ctr --hosts-dir reads
the directory on its own and would succeed even without config_path.
Also mention that existing per-registry override_path entries keep
working and that k3s generates the directory itself.
* Let the prefix route take ns for aliases and mirrored registries
With upstream.oci.hub pointing at registry-1.docker.io and a docker.io
hosts.toml mirror on /v2/upstream/hub, containerd sends ns=docker.io,
and the prefix check only accepted the upstream's own host. The same
happens whenever the upstream is a mirror of the registry the nodes
pull from, say an Artifactory remote for ghcr.io: ns carries ghcr.io,
the upstream host is something else, and the pull got a 404.
The prefix already decides where the content comes from and which
cache entries are used, so ns can't redirect anything there. The check
now only refuses an ns that contradicts the prefix, meaning a host the
proxy knows that belongs to another route. The Docker Hub aliases count
as one host, and a host the proxy doesn't know at all is accepted,
since a client can only arrive at the prefix through its own mirror
entry.
* Take docker.io on every prefix route
A Docker Hub mirror configured as a named upstream (mirror.gcr.io, an
Artifactory remote) with a docker.io hosts.toml pointing at
/v2/upstream/hub got a 404 again: docker.io is always in the index for
the default route, so the check saw a known host of another route. That
setup worked before this branch. Docker Hub repository names have
exactly two path components, so docker.io/upstream/... can never be a
real image, and accepting the aliases on every prefix route shadows
nothing.
While here: the collision warning claimed ns requests go to the other
route, which is only true without the prefix, and the README said pulls
for unknown registries always get a 404, which isn't the case for paths
under upstream/{name}/.
* Only take a foreign ns on a prefix route when it is configured
A containerd _default mirror sends the same request for a pull of
unconfigured.example/upstream/mirror/owner/app as a ghcr.io hosts.toml
with override_path does for a mirror upstream. Accepting any host the
proxy didn't know therefore let such a pull be answered with owner/app
from the mirror upstream, a different image, instead of a 404 that lets
containerd go to the registry the image actually names.
The prefix route now accepts ns only for the upstream's own host, for
Docker Hub, and for hosts listed in the new upstream.oci_mirrors setting.
That setting is how an Artifactory remote of ghcr.io keeps working:
upstream:
oci_mirrors:
ghcr: ["ghcr.io"]
The listed hosts also select the upstream for unprefixed ns requests,
which makes a mirror with a path in its URL reachable through the
_default entry as well. Hosts from configured URLs still win over
mirror entries; the proxy warns about such overlaps at startup.
* Fix the docs sentence on which ns a prefix route takes
configuration.md still said a prefix request with ns is only refused
when ns names another route's host. Since the last commit it is the
other way round: only the upstream's own host, its oci_mirrors entries
and Docker Hub get through.
* Note what a host accepted on a prefix route gives up
Listing ghcr.io for an upstream (or the upstream's own host) still has
the ambiguity from the wildcard case: ghcr.io/upstream/ghcr/owner/app
lands on that upstream. That is the price of an explicit entry and
fine in practice, but it should be written down.
* Test that oci_mirrors entries stay with their own upstream
Two gaps in the coverage of the last change: nothing failed if a host
listed for one upstream was also accepted on another upstream's prefix,
and nothing checked that the server actually hands upstream.oci_mirrors
to the container handler. The handler test now has a second upstream
that must refuse ghcr.io, and a small server test pulls through a
mirror entry on both the prefix and the unprefixed route.
* Log when a prefix route refuses an ns
Setups with a ghcr.io hosts.toml pointing at a mirror upstream worked
before this branch and now need an oci_mirrors entry. Without one,
containerd gets a 404, quietly pulls from ghcr.io directly, and nobody
notices the proxy is being skipped. The refusal is now logged as a
warning that names the upstream and the ns and points at
upstream.oci_mirrors.
* Drop a check in validateOCIMirrors that could never fire
user@ghcr.io parses with ghcr.io as its host, so the parsed.Host != host
comparison already rejects it and the extra parsed.User test was dead.
A test case for a host with credentials keeps that path covered.
* Reject an oci_mirrors host that is listed for two upstreams
With ghcr.io under both art and nexus, both prefix routes took ns=ghcr.io
while unprefixed requests went to whichever name sorted first, with
nothing but a startup warning. Config validation now refuses the second
entry, comparing hosts without case and without the default :443.
* Log each refused ns once per upstream and refuse overlong values
The refusal warning fired on every request, and a node with a missing
oci_mirrors entry asks for the manifest and each layer, so the same line
piled up. Each upstream/ns pair is now logged once, for up to 1024
pairs; after that every refusal is logged again.
ns comes straight from the client and can be as long as the request
line allows, so remembering it as is would let anyone pin a lot of
memory with a handful of requests. No registry host is longer than 259
characters (a 253-character name plus a port), so anything longer is
refused right away, before it is logged or remembered.
* Compare oci_mirrors hosts the way the handler does
The duplicate check lowercased the host and trimmed :443, while the
handler splits host and port, brackets IPv6 literals and drops an empty
port. So ghcr.io and ghcr.io:, or [::1] and [::1]:, passed as different
hosts in two upstreams and then collided in the handler. The check now
builds the same key the handler uses.
* Rewrap the oci_mirrors paragraphs in the configuration docs
Two sentences had been dropped into the middle of wrapped lines, and the
prefix-route paragraph named Docker Hub twice in a row. Same content,
shorter lines, one mention.
* Stop logging ns refusals once the set is full
Past 1024 different upstream/ns pairs every refusal was logged again,
so anyone could fill the set with made-up hosts and then flood the log
at warning level. When the set is full the proxy now says so once and
keeps quiet after that. A real misconfiguration shows up long before
that, with the first pull.
* Test the limit on remembered ns refusals
Nothing covered what happens once 1024 pairs are remembered. The new
test fills the set, then sends a known pair and two new ones: the proxy
must log the limit notice exactly once, log none of the refusals and
keep the set at its size.
2026-10-10 08:35:50 +02:00
registryURL , upstreamName , _ , ok := h . registryForRequest ( r , name )
2026-08-16 22:42:55 +05:30
if ! ok {
h . containerError ( w , http . StatusNotFound , "NAME_UNKNOWN" , "unknown upstream registry" )
return
}
h . proxy . Logger . Info ( "container manifest request" , "name" , upstreamName , "reference" , reference )
h . serveManifest ( w , r , registryURL , upstreamName , reference )
2026-01-29 19:35:15 +00:00
}
2026-09-02 17:10:35 +05:30
// handleTagsList caches tag list responses for offline OCI pulls.
2026-01-29 19:35:15 +00:00
func ( h * ContainerHandler ) handleTagsList ( w http . ResponseWriter , r * http . Request , path string ) {
if r . Method != http . MethodGet {
http . Error ( w , "method not allowed" , http . StatusMethodNotAllowed )
return
}
name := h . parseTagsListPath ( path )
if name == "" {
h . containerError ( w , http . StatusBadRequest , "NAME_UNKNOWN" , "invalid repository name" )
return
}
Route containerd ns mirror requests to configured registries (#405)
* Route containerd ns mirror requests to configured registries
containerd's hosts.toml mirrors append ?ns=<registry-host> to every
request. The container handler ignored it, so a single _default mirror
entry could not serve more than one registry.
ns is a closed-world lookup key and is never dialed. Docker Hub aliases
and the host of upstream.oci_default select the default route, hosts of
upstream.oci entries select their named upstream. Unknown hosts return
NAME_UNKNOWN so containerd falls back to its next host. Registry URLs
with a path are not indexed, because ns names the registry at the root
of a host. Host collisions log a warning and resolve deterministically.
With ns the path is the verbatim upstream repository, the reserved
upstream/ prefix is rejected, and repository prefix routes such as
Homebrew's do not apply. Cache names match the unprefixed and
upstream/{name}/ routes, so all routes share cached blobs, manifests and
tag lists. ns is no longer forwarded on tag-list requests, and the
pagination Link is rewritten per request instead of at store time so
clients on different routes get links for their own route.
Refs #303
* Document containerd ns mirroring
Refs #303
* Version the tag-list cache identity for the raw-link format
Tag-list rows now store the upstream Link verbatim and rewrite it per
request. Rows written by earlier versions hold a Link already rewritten
for one route. Under the unchanged key an older binary running next to
this one (rolling update on shared Postgres, or a rollback) would serve
the raw Link unrewritten, sending clients to the wrong route for the
next page. A format marker in the key keeps the two apart at the cost of
one cache miss per tag list after the upgrade.
Adversarial review finding F1: tag-list cache rows hold raw upstream
Links under unchanged keys, so an older binary serves them unrewritten.
* Qualify the README claim about ns mirror coverage
Registries whose URL has a path and hosts shared by two entries are not
reachable through ns; point to the configuration guide for both rules.
Adversarial review finding F3: README says ns covers every upstream.oci
registry.
* Redact registry URLs in ns index warnings
Configured registry URLs may carry userinfo credentials, which the new
startup warnings wrote to the log verbatim. Log them with the password
masked, and say precisely what a path-prefixed default registry means:
its host is not indexed, while the Docker Hub aliases still select it.
Adversarial review finding F2: startup warnings print registry URLs
unredacted and the default-registry message is misleading.
* Keep non-default ports apart in the ns index
Dropping 80 and 443 regardless of scheme turned https://host:80 and
https://host into the same key, so a request for one of them could land
on the other registry. Only the default port of the URL's scheme is
optional now. A configured host is indexed with and without that port,
because image references spell it either way; any other port has to
match exactly, and the ns value is used as containerd sends it, apart
from case and IPv6 brackets.
Since a URL now yields two keys that can belong to different routes,
the collision warning lists the owner per key.
The handler test runs two registries on one host that differ only in
the port. Tests can't bind 80 or 443, so a dialer maps those addresses
to the fake servers.
* Allow upstream/{name}/ together with ns when they agree
containerd sends ns on every request to a mirror host, override_path or
not. Per-registry mirrors pointing at /v2/upstream/{name} therefore
arrive as upstream/{name}/...?ns=<registry>, and refusing every prefixed
name under ns broke them, including the only way to mirror an upstream
whose URL has a path.
Such requests are now handled like the prefix route without ns, as long
as ns names that upstream's own host under the same port rules as the
index. Any other ns on a prefixed name is still NAME_UNKNOWN, so ns
can't be used to create cache entries under another registry's name.
* README: containerd config_path and how to check it
A _default/hosts.toml does nothing while CRI has no hosts directory
configured, so add the config.toml snippet for containerd 2.x and 1.x.
To check the setup, look at containerd config dump and pull with
crictl, then find the request in the proxy log; ctr --hosts-dir reads
the directory on its own and would succeed even without config_path.
Also mention that existing per-registry override_path entries keep
working and that k3s generates the directory itself.
* Let the prefix route take ns for aliases and mirrored registries
With upstream.oci.hub pointing at registry-1.docker.io and a docker.io
hosts.toml mirror on /v2/upstream/hub, containerd sends ns=docker.io,
and the prefix check only accepted the upstream's own host. The same
happens whenever the upstream is a mirror of the registry the nodes
pull from, say an Artifactory remote for ghcr.io: ns carries ghcr.io,
the upstream host is something else, and the pull got a 404.
The prefix already decides where the content comes from and which
cache entries are used, so ns can't redirect anything there. The check
now only refuses an ns that contradicts the prefix, meaning a host the
proxy knows that belongs to another route. The Docker Hub aliases count
as one host, and a host the proxy doesn't know at all is accepted,
since a client can only arrive at the prefix through its own mirror
entry.
* Take docker.io on every prefix route
A Docker Hub mirror configured as a named upstream (mirror.gcr.io, an
Artifactory remote) with a docker.io hosts.toml pointing at
/v2/upstream/hub got a 404 again: docker.io is always in the index for
the default route, so the check saw a known host of another route. That
setup worked before this branch. Docker Hub repository names have
exactly two path components, so docker.io/upstream/... can never be a
real image, and accepting the aliases on every prefix route shadows
nothing.
While here: the collision warning claimed ns requests go to the other
route, which is only true without the prefix, and the README said pulls
for unknown registries always get a 404, which isn't the case for paths
under upstream/{name}/.
* Only take a foreign ns on a prefix route when it is configured
A containerd _default mirror sends the same request for a pull of
unconfigured.example/upstream/mirror/owner/app as a ghcr.io hosts.toml
with override_path does for a mirror upstream. Accepting any host the
proxy didn't know therefore let such a pull be answered with owner/app
from the mirror upstream, a different image, instead of a 404 that lets
containerd go to the registry the image actually names.
The prefix route now accepts ns only for the upstream's own host, for
Docker Hub, and for hosts listed in the new upstream.oci_mirrors setting.
That setting is how an Artifactory remote of ghcr.io keeps working:
upstream:
oci_mirrors:
ghcr: ["ghcr.io"]
The listed hosts also select the upstream for unprefixed ns requests,
which makes a mirror with a path in its URL reachable through the
_default entry as well. Hosts from configured URLs still win over
mirror entries; the proxy warns about such overlaps at startup.
* Fix the docs sentence on which ns a prefix route takes
configuration.md still said a prefix request with ns is only refused
when ns names another route's host. Since the last commit it is the
other way round: only the upstream's own host, its oci_mirrors entries
and Docker Hub get through.
* Note what a host accepted on a prefix route gives up
Listing ghcr.io for an upstream (or the upstream's own host) still has
the ambiguity from the wildcard case: ghcr.io/upstream/ghcr/owner/app
lands on that upstream. That is the price of an explicit entry and
fine in practice, but it should be written down.
* Test that oci_mirrors entries stay with their own upstream
Two gaps in the coverage of the last change: nothing failed if a host
listed for one upstream was also accepted on another upstream's prefix,
and nothing checked that the server actually hands upstream.oci_mirrors
to the container handler. The handler test now has a second upstream
that must refuse ghcr.io, and a small server test pulls through a
mirror entry on both the prefix and the unprefixed route.
* Log when a prefix route refuses an ns
Setups with a ghcr.io hosts.toml pointing at a mirror upstream worked
before this branch and now need an oci_mirrors entry. Without one,
containerd gets a 404, quietly pulls from ghcr.io directly, and nobody
notices the proxy is being skipped. The refusal is now logged as a
warning that names the upstream and the ns and points at
upstream.oci_mirrors.
* Drop a check in validateOCIMirrors that could never fire
user@ghcr.io parses with ghcr.io as its host, so the parsed.Host != host
comparison already rejects it and the extra parsed.User test was dead.
A test case for a host with credentials keeps that path covered.
* Reject an oci_mirrors host that is listed for two upstreams
With ghcr.io under both art and nexus, both prefix routes took ns=ghcr.io
while unprefixed requests went to whichever name sorted first, with
nothing but a startup warning. Config validation now refuses the second
entry, comparing hosts without case and without the default :443.
* Log each refused ns once per upstream and refuse overlong values
The refusal warning fired on every request, and a node with a missing
oci_mirrors entry asks for the manifest and each layer, so the same line
piled up. Each upstream/ns pair is now logged once, for up to 1024
pairs; after that every refusal is logged again.
ns comes straight from the client and can be as long as the request
line allows, so remembering it as is would let anyone pin a lot of
memory with a handful of requests. No registry host is longer than 259
characters (a 253-character name plus a port), so anything longer is
refused right away, before it is logged or remembered.
* Compare oci_mirrors hosts the way the handler does
The duplicate check lowercased the host and trimmed :443, while the
handler splits host and port, brackets IPv6 literals and drops an empty
port. So ghcr.io and ghcr.io:, or [::1] and [::1]:, passed as different
hosts in two upstreams and then collided in the handler. The check now
builds the same key the handler uses.
* Rewrap the oci_mirrors paragraphs in the configuration docs
Two sentences had been dropped into the middle of wrapped lines, and the
prefix-route paragraph named Docker Hub twice in a row. Same content,
shorter lines, one mention.
* Stop logging ns refusals once the set is full
Past 1024 different upstream/ns pairs every refusal was logged again,
so anyone could fill the set with made-up hosts and then flood the log
at warning level. When the set is full the proxy now says so once and
keeps quiet after that. A real misconfiguration shows up long before
that, with the first pull.
* Test the limit on remembered ns refusals
Nothing covered what happens once 1024 pairs are remembered. The new
test fills the set, then sends a known pair and two new ones: the proxy
must log the limit notice exactly once, log none of the refusals and
keep the set at its size.
2026-10-10 08:35:50 +02:00
registryURL , upstreamName , _ , ok := h . registryForRequest ( r , name )
2026-08-16 22:42:55 +05:30
if ! ok {
h . containerError ( w , http . StatusNotFound , "NAME_UNKNOWN" , "unknown upstream registry" )
return
}
2026-09-02 17:10:35 +05:30
h . serveTagsList ( w , r , registryURL , upstreamName )
2026-01-29 19:35:15 +00:00
}
// proxyBlobHead handles HEAD requests for blobs.
2026-08-16 22:42:55 +05:30
func ( h * ContainerHandler ) proxyBlobHead ( w http . ResponseWriter , r * http . Request , registryURL , name , digest string ) {
upstreamURL := fmt . Sprintf ( "%s/v2/%s/blobs/%s" , registryURL , name , digest )
2026-01-29 19:35:15 +00:00
req , err := http . NewRequestWithContext ( r . Context ( ) , http . MethodHead , upstreamURL , nil )
if err != nil {
h . containerError ( w , http . StatusInternalServerError , "INTERNAL_ERROR" , "failed to create request" )
return
}
2026-03-13 07:44:11 +00:00
resp , err := h . proxy . HTTPClient . Do ( req )
2026-01-29 19:35:15 +00:00
if err != nil {
2026-10-15 13:35:12 +01:00
if writeUpstreamHeld ( w , err ) {
return
}
2026-01-29 19:35:15 +00:00
h . containerError ( w , http . StatusBadGateway , "INTERNAL_ERROR" , "failed to fetch from upstream" )
return
}
defer func ( ) { _ = resp . Body . Close ( ) } ( )
2026-09-26 15:44:28 +05:30
h . proxy . relayResponse ( w , r , resp , func ( dst , src http . Header ) {
for _ , header := range [ ] string { headerContentType , headerContentLength , "Docker-Content-Digest" , headerETag , headerLastModified } {
if v := src . Get ( header ) ; v != "" {
dst . Set ( header , v )
}
2026-01-29 19:35:15 +00:00
}
2026-09-26 15:44:28 +05:30
if resp . StatusCode >= http . StatusOK && resp . StatusCode < http . StatusMultipleChoices && dst . Get ( "Docker-Content-Digest" ) == "" {
dst . Set ( "Docker-Content-Digest" , digest )
}
} )
2026-01-29 19:35:15 +00:00
}
Route containerd ns mirror requests to configured registries (#405)
* Route containerd ns mirror requests to configured registries
containerd's hosts.toml mirrors append ?ns=<registry-host> to every
request. The container handler ignored it, so a single _default mirror
entry could not serve more than one registry.
ns is a closed-world lookup key and is never dialed. Docker Hub aliases
and the host of upstream.oci_default select the default route, hosts of
upstream.oci entries select their named upstream. Unknown hosts return
NAME_UNKNOWN so containerd falls back to its next host. Registry URLs
with a path are not indexed, because ns names the registry at the root
of a host. Host collisions log a warning and resolve deterministically.
With ns the path is the verbatim upstream repository, the reserved
upstream/ prefix is rejected, and repository prefix routes such as
Homebrew's do not apply. Cache names match the unprefixed and
upstream/{name}/ routes, so all routes share cached blobs, manifests and
tag lists. ns is no longer forwarded on tag-list requests, and the
pagination Link is rewritten per request instead of at store time so
clients on different routes get links for their own route.
Refs #303
* Document containerd ns mirroring
Refs #303
* Version the tag-list cache identity for the raw-link format
Tag-list rows now store the upstream Link verbatim and rewrite it per
request. Rows written by earlier versions hold a Link already rewritten
for one route. Under the unchanged key an older binary running next to
this one (rolling update on shared Postgres, or a rollback) would serve
the raw Link unrewritten, sending clients to the wrong route for the
next page. A format marker in the key keeps the two apart at the cost of
one cache miss per tag list after the upgrade.
Adversarial review finding F1: tag-list cache rows hold raw upstream
Links under unchanged keys, so an older binary serves them unrewritten.
* Qualify the README claim about ns mirror coverage
Registries whose URL has a path and hosts shared by two entries are not
reachable through ns; point to the configuration guide for both rules.
Adversarial review finding F3: README says ns covers every upstream.oci
registry.
* Redact registry URLs in ns index warnings
Configured registry URLs may carry userinfo credentials, which the new
startup warnings wrote to the log verbatim. Log them with the password
masked, and say precisely what a path-prefixed default registry means:
its host is not indexed, while the Docker Hub aliases still select it.
Adversarial review finding F2: startup warnings print registry URLs
unredacted and the default-registry message is misleading.
* Keep non-default ports apart in the ns index
Dropping 80 and 443 regardless of scheme turned https://host:80 and
https://host into the same key, so a request for one of them could land
on the other registry. Only the default port of the URL's scheme is
optional now. A configured host is indexed with and without that port,
because image references spell it either way; any other port has to
match exactly, and the ns value is used as containerd sends it, apart
from case and IPv6 brackets.
Since a URL now yields two keys that can belong to different routes,
the collision warning lists the owner per key.
The handler test runs two registries on one host that differ only in
the port. Tests can't bind 80 or 443, so a dialer maps those addresses
to the fake servers.
* Allow upstream/{name}/ together with ns when they agree
containerd sends ns on every request to a mirror host, override_path or
not. Per-registry mirrors pointing at /v2/upstream/{name} therefore
arrive as upstream/{name}/...?ns=<registry>, and refusing every prefixed
name under ns broke them, including the only way to mirror an upstream
whose URL has a path.
Such requests are now handled like the prefix route without ns, as long
as ns names that upstream's own host under the same port rules as the
index. Any other ns on a prefixed name is still NAME_UNKNOWN, so ns
can't be used to create cache entries under another registry's name.
* README: containerd config_path and how to check it
A _default/hosts.toml does nothing while CRI has no hosts directory
configured, so add the config.toml snippet for containerd 2.x and 1.x.
To check the setup, look at containerd config dump and pull with
crictl, then find the request in the proxy log; ctr --hosts-dir reads
the directory on its own and would succeed even without config_path.
Also mention that existing per-registry override_path entries keep
working and that k3s generates the directory itself.
* Let the prefix route take ns for aliases and mirrored registries
With upstream.oci.hub pointing at registry-1.docker.io and a docker.io
hosts.toml mirror on /v2/upstream/hub, containerd sends ns=docker.io,
and the prefix check only accepted the upstream's own host. The same
happens whenever the upstream is a mirror of the registry the nodes
pull from, say an Artifactory remote for ghcr.io: ns carries ghcr.io,
the upstream host is something else, and the pull got a 404.
The prefix already decides where the content comes from and which
cache entries are used, so ns can't redirect anything there. The check
now only refuses an ns that contradicts the prefix, meaning a host the
proxy knows that belongs to another route. The Docker Hub aliases count
as one host, and a host the proxy doesn't know at all is accepted,
since a client can only arrive at the prefix through its own mirror
entry.
* Take docker.io on every prefix route
A Docker Hub mirror configured as a named upstream (mirror.gcr.io, an
Artifactory remote) with a docker.io hosts.toml pointing at
/v2/upstream/hub got a 404 again: docker.io is always in the index for
the default route, so the check saw a known host of another route. That
setup worked before this branch. Docker Hub repository names have
exactly two path components, so docker.io/upstream/... can never be a
real image, and accepting the aliases on every prefix route shadows
nothing.
While here: the collision warning claimed ns requests go to the other
route, which is only true without the prefix, and the README said pulls
for unknown registries always get a 404, which isn't the case for paths
under upstream/{name}/.
* Only take a foreign ns on a prefix route when it is configured
A containerd _default mirror sends the same request for a pull of
unconfigured.example/upstream/mirror/owner/app as a ghcr.io hosts.toml
with override_path does for a mirror upstream. Accepting any host the
proxy didn't know therefore let such a pull be answered with owner/app
from the mirror upstream, a different image, instead of a 404 that lets
containerd go to the registry the image actually names.
The prefix route now accepts ns only for the upstream's own host, for
Docker Hub, and for hosts listed in the new upstream.oci_mirrors setting.
That setting is how an Artifactory remote of ghcr.io keeps working:
upstream:
oci_mirrors:
ghcr: ["ghcr.io"]
The listed hosts also select the upstream for unprefixed ns requests,
which makes a mirror with a path in its URL reachable through the
_default entry as well. Hosts from configured URLs still win over
mirror entries; the proxy warns about such overlaps at startup.
* Fix the docs sentence on which ns a prefix route takes
configuration.md still said a prefix request with ns is only refused
when ns names another route's host. Since the last commit it is the
other way round: only the upstream's own host, its oci_mirrors entries
and Docker Hub get through.
* Note what a host accepted on a prefix route gives up
Listing ghcr.io for an upstream (or the upstream's own host) still has
the ambiguity from the wildcard case: ghcr.io/upstream/ghcr/owner/app
lands on that upstream. That is the price of an explicit entry and
fine in practice, but it should be written down.
* Test that oci_mirrors entries stay with their own upstream
Two gaps in the coverage of the last change: nothing failed if a host
listed for one upstream was also accepted on another upstream's prefix,
and nothing checked that the server actually hands upstream.oci_mirrors
to the container handler. The handler test now has a second upstream
that must refuse ghcr.io, and a small server test pulls through a
mirror entry on both the prefix and the unprefixed route.
* Log when a prefix route refuses an ns
Setups with a ghcr.io hosts.toml pointing at a mirror upstream worked
before this branch and now need an oci_mirrors entry. Without one,
containerd gets a 404, quietly pulls from ghcr.io directly, and nobody
notices the proxy is being skipped. The refusal is now logged as a
warning that names the upstream and the ns and points at
upstream.oci_mirrors.
* Drop a check in validateOCIMirrors that could never fire
user@ghcr.io parses with ghcr.io as its host, so the parsed.Host != host
comparison already rejects it and the extra parsed.User test was dead.
A test case for a host with credentials keeps that path covered.
* Reject an oci_mirrors host that is listed for two upstreams
With ghcr.io under both art and nexus, both prefix routes took ns=ghcr.io
while unprefixed requests went to whichever name sorted first, with
nothing but a startup warning. Config validation now refuses the second
entry, comparing hosts without case and without the default :443.
* Log each refused ns once per upstream and refuse overlong values
The refusal warning fired on every request, and a node with a missing
oci_mirrors entry asks for the manifest and each layer, so the same line
piled up. Each upstream/ns pair is now logged once, for up to 1024
pairs; after that every refusal is logged again.
ns comes straight from the client and can be as long as the request
line allows, so remembering it as is would let anyone pin a lot of
memory with a handful of requests. No registry host is longer than 259
characters (a 253-character name plus a port), so anything longer is
refused right away, before it is logged or remembered.
* Compare oci_mirrors hosts the way the handler does
The duplicate check lowercased the host and trimmed :443, while the
handler splits host and port, brackets IPv6 literals and drops an empty
port. So ghcr.io and ghcr.io:, or [::1] and [::1]:, passed as different
hosts in two upstreams and then collided in the handler. The check now
builds the same key the handler uses.
* Rewrap the oci_mirrors paragraphs in the configuration docs
Two sentences had been dropped into the middle of wrapped lines, and the
prefix-route paragraph named Docker Hub twice in a row. Same content,
shorter lines, one mention.
* Stop logging ns refusals once the set is full
Past 1024 different upstream/ns pairs every refusal was logged again,
so anyone could fill the set with made-up hosts and then flood the log
at warning level. When the set is full the proxy now says so once and
keeps quiet after that. A real misconfiguration shows up long before
that, with the first pull.
* Test the limit on remembered ns refusals
Nothing covered what happens once 1024 pairs are remembered. The new
test fills the set, then sends a known pair and two new ones: the proxy
must log the limit notice exactly once, log none of the refusals and
keep the set at its size.
2026-10-10 08:35:50 +02:00
// registryForRequest resolves the repository name of a request. containerd
// mirror requests name the target registry in the ns query parameter; without
// it the name is routed by registryForName.
func ( h * ContainerHandler ) registryForRequest ( r * http . Request , name string ) ( registryURL , upstreamName , cacheName string , ok bool ) {
namespaces := r . URL . Query ( ) [ namespaceQueryParam ]
switch {
case len ( namespaces ) == 0 || ( len ( namespaces ) == 1 && namespaces [ 0 ] == "" ) :
return h . registryForName ( name )
case len ( namespaces ) > 1 :
return "" , "" , "" , false
}
return h . registryForNamespace ( namespaces [ 0 ] , name )
}
// registryForNamespace resolves a repository name verbatim against the registry
// named by ns. Cache names match the unprefixed and upstream/{name}/ routes,
// so all routes to one registry share blobs.
//
// Per-registry containerd mirrors with override_path address the reserved
// upstream/{name}/ prefix and still send ns. Such requests are served like
// the prefix route without ns unless ns contradicts the prefix, see
// namespaceNamesPrefixUpstream.
func ( h * ContainerHandler ) registryForNamespace ( namespace , name string ) ( registryURL , upstreamName , cacheName string , ok bool ) {
if len ( namespace ) > maxNamespaceLength {
return "" , "" , "" , false
}
if strings . HasPrefix ( name , "upstream/" ) {
if ! h . namespaceNamesPrefixUpstream ( namespace , name ) {
return "" , "" , "" , false
}
return h . registryForName ( name )
}
route , ok := h . namespaces [ namespaceKeyForRequest ( namespace ) ]
if ! ok {
return "" , "" , "" , false
}
if route == defaultNamespaceRoute {
// ns explicitly names the default registry, so repository prefix
// routes such as Homebrew's do not apply.
if h . registryURL == "" {
return "" , "" , "" , false
}
return h . registryURL , name , name , true
}
registryURL = h . namedRegistries [ route ]
if registryURL == "" {
return "" , "" , "" , false
}
return registryURL , name , "upstream/" + route + "/" + name , true
}
// namespaceNamesPrefixUpstream decides whether an upstream/{name}/ request
// may carry the given ns. A per-registry mirror with override_path and a
// _default wildcard pull of <ns>/upstream/{name}/... send the same request,
// so ns has to name a registry the upstream is known to serve: its own host
// (the URL's path is irrelevant), a host listed for it in upstream.oci_mirrors,
// or Docker Hub. Docker Hub repository names have two path components, so
// docker.io/upstream/... is never a real image and a Docker Hub mirror behind
// any prefix stays reachable. Any other ns gets a 404 and containerd falls
// back to the registry the image actually names.
func ( h * ContainerHandler ) namespaceNamesPrefixUpstream ( namespace , name string ) bool {
rest , _ := strings . CutPrefix ( name , "upstream/" )
upstream , _ , _ := strings . Cut ( rest , "/" )
parsed , err := url . Parse ( h . namedRegistries [ upstream ] )
if err != nil || parsed . Host == "" {
return false
}
key := namespaceKeyForRequest ( namespace )
if isDockerHubKey ( key ) ||
slices . Contains ( namespaceKeysForHost ( parsed ) , key ) ||
slices . Contains ( h . mirrorKeys [ upstream ] , key ) {
return true
}
h . reportNamespaceRefusal ( upstream , key , namespace )
return false
}
// reportNamespaceRefusal logs a refused ns on a prefix route. containerd
// falls back to the registry itself on that 404 without reporting anything,
// so this line is all an operator gets to see. Each upstream/ns pair is
// logged once, since a misconfigured node repeats the same request for every
// layer. ns comes from the client, so the set is bounded: once it is full,
// that is logged one time and later refusals stay quiet. Overlong values
// never get here (see maxNamespaceLength).
func ( h * ContainerHandler ) reportNamespaceRefusal ( upstream , key , namespace string ) {
pair := upstream + "\x00" + key
h . refusalsMu . Lock ( )
if _ , seen := h . refusals [ pair ] ; seen {
h . refusalsMu . Unlock ( )
return
}
if len ( h . refusals ) >= maxReportedNamespaceRefusals {
announce := ! h . refusalsFull
h . refusalsFull = true
h . refusalsMu . Unlock ( )
if announce {
h . warn ( "too many different ns values refused on OCI upstream prefixes; further refusals are not logged" ,
"limit" , maxReportedNamespaceRefusals )
}
return
}
if h . refusals == nil {
h . refusals = make ( map [ string ] struct { } )
}
h . refusals [ pair ] = struct { } { }
h . refusalsMu . Unlock ( )
h . warn ( "refusing ns on OCI upstream prefix; if the upstream mirrors this registry, list it in upstream.oci_mirrors" ,
"upstream" , upstream , "ns" , namespace )
}
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// registryForName resolves a client-visible OCI repository name to an upstream
// registry and its repository name. Named upstreams use upstream/{name}/ as a
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// reserved prefix. Other names are matched against registered repository
// prefixes, falling back to Docker Hub when no prefix matches.
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func ( h * ContainerHandler ) registryForName ( name string ) ( registryURL , upstreamName , cacheName string , ok bool ) {
parts := strings . SplitN ( name , "/" , registrySelectorParts )
if len ( parts ) >= 2 && parts [ 0 ] == "upstream" {
if len ( parts ) != registrySelectorParts || parts [ 2 ] == "" {
return "" , "" , "" , false
}
registryURL , ok = h . namedRegistries [ parts [ 1 ] ]
if ! ok || registryURL == "" {
return "" , "" , "" , false
}
return registryURL , parts [ 2 ] , name , true
}
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registryURL = h . registryURLFor ( name )
if registryURL == "" {
return "" , "" , "" , false
}
return registryURL , name , name , true
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}
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// containerError writes an OCI-compliant error response.
func ( h * ContainerHandler ) containerError ( w http . ResponseWriter , status int , code , message string ) {
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w . Header ( ) . Set ( headerContentType , "application/json" )
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w . WriteHeader ( status )
_ = json . NewEncoder ( w ) . Encode ( map [ string ] any {
"errors" : [ ] map [ string ] string {
{ "code" : code , "message" : message } ,
} ,
} )
}
// blobPathPattern matches blob paths: {name}/blobs/{digest}
var blobPathPattern = regexp . MustCompile ( ` ^(.+)/blobs/(sha256:[a-f0-9]+)$ ` )
// parseBlobPath extracts repository name and digest from a blob path.
func ( h * ContainerHandler ) parseBlobPath ( path string ) ( name , digest string ) {
matches := blobPathPattern . FindStringSubmatch ( path )
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if len ( matches ) != blobMatchCount {
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return "" , ""
}
return matches [ 1 ] , matches [ 2 ]
}
// manifestPathPattern matches manifest paths: {name}/manifests/{reference}
Proxy the OCI referrers API in the container handler (#427)
* Proxy the OCI referrers API in the container handler
GET /v2/{name}/referrers/{digest} used to fall through to a plain 404,
so clients only ever saw referrers stored under the sha256-<hex> tag
schema. Registries that keep SBOMs and signatures behind the referrers
API looked empty through the proxy.
The index is now fetched from the upstream that the repository routes
to and cached like the tag list: fresh within the metadata TTL,
revalidated with If-None-Match, and served stale when the upstream is
down. artifactType is not forwarded, so one cached row covers every
filter and clients filter the full list themselves, which they do when
OCI-Filters-Applied is absent. An upstream 404 is passed through
untouched, so clients still fall back to the tag schema for registries
like GHCR. When the upstream cannot answer and nothing is cached, the
proxy keeps answering 404 as before rather than failing the request.
Closes #144
* Cover absolute upstream links in the referrers link test
The second page now answers with an absolute Link pointing back at the
upstream host, and the test checks that it comes back rewritten to the
proxy. That was missing so far, and it also gives the upstream variable
a reason to be declared before the handler closure, which staticcheck
complained about.
* Read cached referrers through a small shared loader
loadContainerReferrers was a line-for-line copy of loadContainerTags with
the types renamed, which dupl flags in CI. The part that opens the cache
row and reads the body now lives in loadContainerMetadata next to
storeContainerMetadata, and the referrers loader only maps the row onto
its struct. The tag and manifest loaders are left as they are.
* Make the manifest routing test notice which handler answered
For foo/manifests/referrers/<digest> the manifest handler and the
referrers handler send the very same upstream path, so the test passed
even with the referrers case moved in front of the manifest case. The
fake upstream now rejects requests that only accept an image index,
which is what the referrers handler sends.
* Check that a cached referrers row links back to whoever reads it
A repository can be reached as upstream/<name>/<repo> and, when the
default registry is the same host, as plain <repo>. Both end up in the
same cache row, so the pagination Link has to be rewritten when the row
is served, not when it is stored. The link test now reads the row
through both paths; with a store-time rewrite the second path would get
the first one's link.
* Make the referrers ETag test prove the revalidation
Without If-None-Match the fake upstream just sends the full index again,
so the old assertions held either way. The test now counts the 304s the
upstream sent and expects exactly one.
* Reword which tools use the referrers API in the README
The cosign mention was too broad. cosign reaches the referrers API for
its newer signature bundles, while the old .sig tags keep going through
the normal manifest path. Also rewraps the paragraph, one line had run
past the others.
* Check that a 304 restarts the referrers cache TTL
The ETag test now backdates the cached row instead of running with a
zero TTL. After the upstream answers 304, a third request has to come
from the cache. Before, the test would also have passed if the 304
branch forgot to bump fetchedAt and every request kept revalidating.
* Test the referrers Content-Type fallback
None of the fake upstreams left out Content-Type, so the default to the
image index type was never exercised. oras-go rejects anything else, so
it is worth pinning, both for the first fetch and for the cached copy.
* Test referrers digests with extra characters around them
The invalid-request table only had digests that were too short or used
an unknown algorithm, so it would not notice if the digest pattern lost
its anchors. Two cases now put junk before and after an otherwise valid
sha256 digest.
* Reuse the manifest cache key for referrers
The referrers handler had its own key function, but it did exactly what
containerManifestCacheKey already does with four strings. Referrers rows
sit in their own oci-referrers ecosystem anyway, so they can't collide
with manifests.
* Drop the separate struct for cached referrers
A cached referrers response carries the same fields as a cached tag
list, and the freshness check was a straight copy too. So the referrers
code just uses cachedContainerTags and containerTagsFresh now. Loading,
storing and writing stay on their own, since the ecosystem and the Link
handling are different.
* Route referrers requests by ns like the other OCI endpoints
Now that containerd ns support is on main, referrers requests have to
go through registryForRequest too, otherwise a _default mirror would
look every subject up on Docker Hub. ns only picks the registry, so it
is dropped from the forwarded query and the cache key, and the next-page
Link keeps it, the same way tag lists do. This also follows the new
rewriteContainerTagsLink signature, which takes the namespace.
* Without a cached index, referrers now pass upstream errors through and answer 502 when the upstream can't be reached or sends garbage, so clients no longer read an outage as a registry without the referrers API. Stale cache is still served when there is one.
* The tag list and manifest routes now only match paths that end in their endpoint, so a repository with tags/list or manifests in its name can still reach the referrers endpoint.
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var manifestPathPattern = regexp . MustCompile ( ` ^(.+)/manifests/([^/]+)$ ` )
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// parseManifestPath extracts repository name and reference from a manifest path.
func ( h * ContainerHandler ) parseManifestPath ( path string ) ( name , reference string ) {
matches := manifestPathPattern . FindStringSubmatch ( path )
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if len ( matches ) != manifestMatchCount {
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return "" , ""
}
return matches [ 1 ] , matches [ 2 ]
}
// tagsListPathPattern matches tags list paths: {name}/tags/list
var tagsListPathPattern = regexp . MustCompile ( ` ^(.+)/tags/list$ ` )
// parseTagsListPath extracts repository name from a tags list path.
func ( h * ContainerHandler ) parseTagsListPath ( path string ) string {
matches := tagsListPathPattern . FindStringSubmatch ( path )
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if len ( matches ) != tagsListMatchCount {
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return ""
}
return matches [ 1 ]
}